Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands
p. 106.
The area of ocean in which the U.S. carrier task forces operated was known as "
Torpedo Junction"
[Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 335.] by U.S. forces due to the high concentration of Japanese
submarines in the area.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 6â€"7.] On
August 31,
Saratoga was torpedoed by Japanese submarine
I-26 and was out of action for three months for repairs.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 10â€"12.] On
September 14, while supporting a major reinforcement and resupply convoy to Guadalcanal, and almost engaging Japanese carriers
Shokaku and
Zuikaku (who withdrew just before the two adversaries came into range of each other's aircraft),
Wasp was hit by three torpedoes fired by Japanese submarine
I-19. With power knocked out due to damage from the torpedo explosions,
Wasp's
damage-control teams were unable to contain the ensuing large fires, and she was abandoned and
scuttled.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 24â€"41. U.S. battleship North Carolina and destroyer O'Brien were also hit by torpedoes during the same attack. O'Brien later sank as a result of the torpedo damage and North Carolina was under repair at Pearl Harbor until November 16, 1942.]Although the U.S. now had only one operational carrier (
Hornet) in the South Pacific, the Allies still maintained
air superiority over the southern Solomon Islands due to their aircraft based at
Henderson Field on Guadalcanal. However, at night, when aircraft weren't able to operate effectively, the Japanese were able to operate their ships around Guadalcanal almost at will. Thus, a
stalemate in the battle for Guadalcanal developed, with the Allies delivering supplies and reinforcements to Guadalcanal during the day, and the Japanese delivering supplies and reinforcements by warship (called the "
Tokyo Express" by the Allies) at night with neither side able to deliver enough troops to the island to secure a decisive advantage. By mid-October, both sides had roughly an equal number of troops on the island.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 19â€"21, 84â€"85.] The stalemate was briefly interrupted by two large-ship naval actions. On the night of October 11â€"12, a U.S. warship force intercepted and defeated a Japanese warship force that was enroute to bombard Henderson Field in the
Battle of Cape Esperance. But, just two nights later a Japanese force that included battleships
Haruna and
Kongo successfully bombarded Henderson Field, destroying most of the U.S. aircraft and inflicting severe damage on the field's facilities.
[Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 316â€"319.] Although still marginally operational, it would take several weeks for the airfield to recover from the damage and replace the destroyed aircraft.
|
Enterprise conducts air operations in the South Pacific on October 24, 1942. The aircraft pictured is an F4F Wildcat. |
At this time, the U.S. made two moves to try to break the stalemate in the battle for Guadalcanal. First, repairs to
Enterprise were expedited so that she could return to the South Pacific as soon as possible. On October 10,
Enterprise received her new air groups, on October 16, she departed Pearl Harbor, and, on October 23,
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 154â€"155.] she arrived back in the South Pacific and rendezvoused with
Hornet and the rest of the Allied South Pacific naval forces on
October 24, 273 miles (505 km) northeast of
Espiritu Santo.
[McGee, The Solomons Campaigns, p. 145.]Second, on October 18,
Admiral Chester Nimitz, Allied Commander in Chief of Pacific Forces, replaced
Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, as Commander, South Pacific Area (this position commanded Allied forces involved in the Solomon Islands campaign) with Vice Admiral
William Halsey, Jr.[McGee, The Solomons Campaigns, p. 134.] Nimitz felt that Ghormley had become too myopic and pessimistic to effectively lead Allied forces involved in the struggle for Guadalcanal. Halsey was reportedly respected throughout the U.S. naval fleet as a "fighter."
[Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 334.] Upon assuming command, Halsey immediately began making plans to draw the Japanese naval forces into a battle, writing to Nimitz, "I had to begin throwing punches almost immediately."
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 150.]The Japanese Combined Fleet was also seeking to draw Allied naval forces into what was hoped to be a decisive battle. Two fleet carriers,
Hiyo and
Junyo, plus one light carrier,
Zuiho, arrived at the main Japanese naval base at
Truk from Japan in early October and joined
Shokaku and
Zuikaku. With five carriers fully staffed with air groups, plus their numerous battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, the Japanese Combined Fleet, directed by Admiral
Isoroku Yamamoto, was confident that they could make-up for their defeat at the Battle of Midway.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 146â€"149.] Apart from a couple of air raids on Henderson Field in October, the Japanese carriers and their supporting warships stayed out of the battle for Guadalcanal in the northen Solomon Island's area, waiting for a chance to approach and engage the U.S. carrier fleet. With the Japanese
Army's next planned major ground attack on Allied forces on Guadalcanal set for October 20â€"25, Yamamoto's warships began to position themselves towards the southern Solomons to not only support their army's offensive, but to be ready to engage any Allied (primarily U.S.) ships, especially carriers, that approached to support the Allied ground forces' defenses on Guadalcanal. The Japanese believed that U.S. Navy forces were likely to be in the Solomons Island area for they had read a report from the
United Press dated
October 20 that stated that the United States Navy was preparing for a major sea and air battle in the South Pacific.
[Hara, Japanese Destroyer Captain, p. 124â€"125.]Prelude
From October 20â€"25, Japanese land forces on Guadalcanal attempted to capture Henderson Field with a large-scale attack against U.S. troops defending the airfield. However, the attack was decisively defeated with heavy casualties for the Japanese.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 95â€"97.]Incorrectly believing that the Japanese army troops had succeeded in capturing Henderson Field, a force of Japanese warships approached Guadalcanal on the morning of
October 25 to provide further support for the army offensive. Aircraft from Henderson Field attacked the convoy throughout the day, sinking the
light cruiser Yura and damaging the destroyer
Akizuki.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 103â€"106. The force consisted of Japanese cruiser Yura, and destroyers Akizuki, Harusame, Murasame, and Yudachi (Parshall, Imperial Japanese Navy Page-Combinedfleet.com). Although Hammel says that it was a supply convoy, Parshall says that it was a bombardment force. Akizuki went to Japan for repairs, which were completed on December 16, 1942. This incident is usually considered a separate action from the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands.] |
Map of the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, October 26, 1942. Red lines are Japanese warship forces and black lines are U.S. carrier forces. Numbered yellow dots represent significant actions in the battle. (Click on map for larger image and full description.) |
Despite the failure of the Japanese ground offensive and the loss of
Yura. The rest of the Combined Fleet continued to maneuver near the southern Solomon Islands on October 25 with the hope of encountering Allied naval forces in battle. The Japanese naval forces now included four carriers, for
Hiyo had suffered an accidental, damaging fire on October 22 that forced her to return to Truk for repairs.
[Hara, Japanese Destroyer Captain, p. 124.] The Japanese naval forces were divided into three groups: The "Advanced" force contained
Junyo, plus two battleships, four
heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and 10 destroyers, and was commanded by Vice Admiral
Nobutake Kondo in heavy cruiser
Atago; the "Main Body" consisted of
Shokaku,
Zuikaku, and
Zuiho plus one heavy cruiser and eight destroyers, and was commanded by Vice Admiral
Chuichi Nagumo in
Shokaku; the "Vanguard" force contained two battleships, three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and seven destroyers, and was commanded by Rear Admiral
Hiroaki Abe in battleship
Hiei. In addition to commanding the Advanced force, Kondo acted as the overall commander of the three forces.
[Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 374â€"375.]On the U.S. side, the
Hornet and
Enterprise task groups, under the overall command of Rear Admiral
Thomas Kinkaid swept around to the north of the Santa Cruz Islands on October 25 searching for the Japanese naval forces. The U.S. warships were deployed as two separate carrier groups, each centered on either
Hornet or
Enterprise, and separated from each other by about 10 miles (20 km). A U.S.
PBY Catalina based in the Santa Cruz Islands located the Japanese Main body carriers at
11:03. However, the Japanese carriers were about 355 miles (655 km) from the U.S. force, just beyond carrier aircraft range. Kinkaid, hoping to close the range to be able to execute an attack that day, steamed towards the Japanese carriers at top speed, and, at 14:25, launched a strike force of 23 aircraft. But, the Japanese, knowing that they had been spotted by U.S. aircraft and not knowing where the U.S. carriers were, turned to the north to stay out of range of the U.S. carriers' aircraft.
[Hara, Japanese Destroyer Captain, p. 127.] Thus, the U.S. strike force returned to their carriers without finding or attacking the Japanese warships.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 163â€"174.]Carrier action on October 26 - 1st strikes
At 02:50 on October 26, the Japanese naval forces reversed direction and the naval forces of the two adversaries closed the distance until they were only 200 miles (370 km) away from each other by 05:00.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 186.] At this time, both sides launched search aircraft and prepared their remaining aircraft to attack as soon as the other side's ships were located. Although a
radar-equipped U.S. Catalina sighted the Japanese carriers at 03:10, the report didn't reach Kinkaid until 05:12. Therefore, believing that the Japanese ships had probably changed position during the last two hours, he decided to withhold launching a strike force until he received more current information on the location of the Japanese ships.
[Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 381.] |
Japanese fighter and dive bomber aircraft on Shokaku prepare to launch for an attack on U.S. carrier forces the morning of October 26, 1942. |
At 06:45, a U.S. scout aircraft sighted the carriers of Nagumo's Main body.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 187.] At 06:58, a Japanese scout aircraft reported the location of
Hornets task force.[Frank, ]Guadalcanal
, p. 382. Both sides now raced to be the first to attack the other. The Japanese were first to get their strike force launched, with 64 aircraft, including 21 "Val" dive bombers, 20 "Kate" torpedo bombers, 21 Zero fighters, and two "Kate" command and control aircraft on the way towards Hornet
by 07:40.[Hammel, ]Carrier Strike
, p. 191â€"192. At this same time (07:40), two U.S. SBD Dauntless scout aircraft, responding to the earlier sighting of the Japanese carriers, arrived and dove on Zuiho
. With the Japanese combat air patrol (CAP) busy chasing other U.S. scout aircraft away, the two U.S. aircraft were able to approach and drop both of their bombs on Zuiho
, causing heavy damage and preventing the carrier's flight deck from being able to land aircraft.[Frank, ]Guadalcanal
, p. 382.
Meanwhile, Kondo ordered Abe's Vanguard force to race ahead to try to intercept and engage the U.S. warships. Kondo also brought his own Advanced force forward at maximum speed so that Junyos aircraft could join in the attacks on the U.S. ships. At 08:10,
Shokaku launched a second wave of strike aircraft, consisting of 19 Vals and eight Zeros and, at 08:40,
Zuikaku launched 16 Kates. Thus, by 09:10 the Japanese had 110 aircraft on the way to attack the U.S. carriers.
[Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 383.] |
As a TBF Avenger prepares to take off from Enterprise on October 26, the signs held aloft by deck crewmen give the last known location of the Japanese carriers as well as instructions to proceed without waiting for Hornet's aircraft. |
The U.S. strike aircraft were running about 20 minutes behind the Japanese. Believing that a speedy attack was more important than a massed attack, the U.S. aircraft proceeded in small groups towards the Japanese ships instead of forming into one large strike force. The first group, consisting of 15 SBD dive bombers, six
TBF Avenger torpedo bombers, and eight
F4F Wildcat fighters from
Hornet, was on its way by about 08:00. A second group, consisting of three SBDs, seven TBFs, and eight Wildcats from
Enterprise was off by 08:10. A third group, which included nine SBDs, eight TBFs, and seven Wildcats from
Hornet, was on its way by 08:20.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 198â€"199.]At 08:30, the opposing aircraft strike formations began passing within sight of each other. Nine Zeros from
Zuiho broke off from their formation and attacked the
Enterprise group of aircraft. In the resulting engagement, four Zeros, three Wildcats, and two TBFs were shot down, with another two TBFs forced to return to
Enterprise with heavy damage.
[Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 384â€"385.]At 08:50, the lead U.S. attack formation from
Hornet spotted four ships from Abe's Vanguard force. Pressing on, the U.S. aircraft sighted the Japanese carriers and prepared to attack. Three Zeros from
Zuiho attacked the formation's Wildcats, drawing them away from the bombers they were assigned to protect. Thus, the dive bombers in the first group initiated their attacks without fighter escort. Twenty Zeros from the Japanese carrier CAP attacked the SBD formation and shot-down four of them. The remaining 11 SBDs commenced their attack dives on
Shokaku at 09:27, hitting her with three to six bombs, ruining her flight deck, and causing serious damage to the interior of the ship. The final SBD of the 11 lost track of the
Shokaku and instead dropped its bomb near the Japanese destroyer
Teruzuki, causing minor damage.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 213â€"223.] The six TBFs in the first strike force, having become separated from their strike group, missed finding the Japanese carriers and eventually turned-back towards
Hornet. On the way back, they attacked the Japanese heavy cruiser
Tone, missing with all of their torpedoes.
[Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 387â€"388.] |
Japanese cruiser Chikuma under attack on October 26. The white spot in the center of the ship is where one of the 1,000 bombs hit directly on the bridge, causing heavy damage and high casualties. |
The TBFs of the second U.S. attack formation from
Enterprise were unable to locate the Japanese carriers, and instead attacked the Japanese heavy cruiser
Suzuya from Abe's Vanguard force, but caused no damage. At about the same time, the third U.S. attack formation, from
Hornet, found Abe's ships and attacked the Japanese heavy cruiser
Chikuma, hitting her with two 1,000 pound bombs and causing heavy damage. The three
Enterprise SBDs then arrived and also attacked
Chikuma, causing more damage with one bomb hit and two near-misses. Finally, the eight TBFs from the third strike group arrived and attacked the smoking
Chikuma, scoring one more hit.
Chikuma, escorted by two destroyers, withdrew from the battle and headed towards Truk for repairs.
[Hara, Japanese Destroyer Captain, p. 132, and Parshall, The Imperial Japanese Navy Page. Chikuma was under repair at Truk, and later Kure, Japan, until January, 1943.]The U.S. carrier forces received word from their outbound strike aircraft at 08:30 that Japanese attack aircraft were headed their way.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 235.] At 08:52, the Japanese strike force commander sighted the
Hornet task force (the
Enterprise task force was hidden by a rain
squall) and deployed his aircraft for attack. At 08:55, the U.S. carriers detected the approaching Japanese aircraft on radar, about 35 miles (65 km) away, and began to vector the 37 Wildcat fighters of their CAP to engage the incoming Japanese aircraft. However, communication problems, mistakes by the U.S. fighter control directors, and primitive control procedures prevented all but a few of the U.S. fighters from engaging the Japanese aircraft before they began their attacks on
Hornet.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 235â€"239.] Although the U.S. CAP was able to shoot down several Vals, most of the Japanese aircraft commenced their attacks relatively unmolested by U.S. fighters.
[Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 385.] |
A damaged Japanese Val dive bomber (upper left) purposely dives towards Hornet at 09:13... |
|
...and seconds later crashes into the carrier. |
At 09:09, the
anti-aircraft guns of
Hornet and her escorting warships opened fire as the 20 untouched Japanese Kates and remaining 16 Vals commenced their attacks on the carrier.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 249â€"251. The Hornets screening ships included heavy cruisers Northampton and Pensacola, light cruisers San Diego and Juneau, and six destroyers.] At 09:12, a Val placed its 250-kilogram, semi-armor-piercing bomb dead center on Hornets flight deck, across from the island, which penetrated three decks before exploding, killing 60 men. Moments later, a 242-kilogram "land" bomb struck the flight deck, detonating on impact and creating an 11-foot hole as well as killing 30 men. A minute or so later, a third bomb hit
Hornet near where the first bomb hit, penetrating three decks before exploding, causing severe damage but no direct loss of life.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 253â€"356.] At 09:14, a diving Val was hit and damaged by anti-aircraft fire directly over
Hornet. The Val's pilot, in an apparently spontaneous,
kamikaze-style attack, then purposely crashed his aircraft into
Hornet's
stack, spreading burning aviation fuel over the signal deck.
[Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 386, and Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 262â€"267.]At the same time that the Vals were attacking, the Japanese Kate torpedo bombers were also attacking
Hornet from two different directions. In spite of suffering heavy losses from anti-aircraft fire, the Kates planted two torpedoes in
Hornet between 09:13 and 09:17, knocking-out her engines. As
Hornet glided to a stop, a damaged Val approached and purposely crashed into the carrier's side, starting a fire near the ship's main supply of aviation fuel. At 09:20, the surviving Japanese aircraft departed, leaving
Hornet dead in the water and burning.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 269â€"271.] Thirty-eight Japanese
[Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 386.] and six U.S. aircraft were destroyed in this first attack on
Hornet.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 284.]With the assistance of firehoses from three escorting destroyers, the fires on
Hornet were under control by 10:00. Wounded personnel were evacuated from the carrier and an attempt was made by the U.S. cruiser
Northampton to tow
Hornet away from the battle area. However, the effort to rig the towline took some time and more attack waves of Japanese aircraft were inbound.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 271â€"280.]Carrier action on October 26 - post-first strike actions
Starting at 09:30,
Enterprise landed many of the damaged and fuel-depleted CAP fighters and returning scout aircraft from both carriers. However, with her flight deck full, and the second wave of Japanese aircraft inbound, which was detected on radar at 09:30,
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 299.] Enterprise ceased landing operations at 10:00. Fuel-depleted aircraft then began
ditching in the ocean as the carrier's escorting destroyers rescued the aircrews. One of the ditching aircraft, a damaged TBF from
Enterprise's strike force that had been attacked earlier by
Zuiho Zeros, crashed into the water near the U.S. destroyer
Porter. As the destroyer rescued the TBF's crew, the torpedo from the TBF began running in a wild circle and struck
Porter and exploded, causing heavy damage and killing 15 crewmen. After the task force commander ordered the destroyer scuttled, the crew was rescued by the U.S. destroyer
Shaw which then sank
Porter with gunfire.
[Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 388â€"389.] |
A Japanese Val dive bomber (center) is shot down during the attack on the Enterprise (lower right). Enterprise is smoking from earlier bomb hits as another bomb near-misses the carrier. |
As the first wave of Japanese strike aircraft began returning to their carriers from their attack on
Hornet, one of them spotted the
Enterprise task force and reported the carrier's position.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 283.] Thus, the second Japanese aircraft strike wave, believing
Hornet to be sinking, directed their attacks on the
Enterprise task force, beginning at 10:08. Again, the U.S. CAP had trouble intercepting the Japanese aircraft before they attacked
Enterprise, shooting down only two of the 19 Vals as they began their dives on the carrier. Attacking through the intense anti-aircraft fire put-up by
Enterprise and her escorting warships, the Vals hit the carrier with two 250-kilogram bombs and near-missed with another, causing heavy damage to the carrier and jamming her forward
elevator in the "up" position.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 300â€"313.] Twelve of the 19 Vals were lost in this attack.
[Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 390.]Twenty-minutes later, the 16
Zuikaku Kates arrived and split-up to attack
Enterprise. One group of Kates was attacked by two CAP Wildcats which shot down three of them and damaged a fourth. On fire, the fourth damaged Kate purposely crashed into the U.S. destroyer
Smith, setting the ship on fire and killing 57 of her crew. The destroyer steered into the spraying
wake of the U.S. battleship
South Dakota to help put-out the fires and then resumed her station, firing her remaining anti-aircraft guns at the still attacking Kates.
[Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 390â€"391. Smith eventually went to Pearl Harbor for repairs, which were completed in February, 1943.] |
A Hornet Wildcat that just landed minutes earlier skids across Enterprises flight deck as the carrier maneuvers violently during Junyos dive bomber attack. Two crewmen are taking defensive postures on the deck as smoke from earlier bomb hits swirls around them. |
The remaining Kates attacked
Enterprise,
South Dakota, and U.S. cruiser
Portland, but all of their torpedoes missed or were
duds, causing no damage. The engagement was over at 10:53 with ten of the 16 attacking Kates shot down.
[Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 391.] After suppressing most of the onboard fires, at 11:15
Enterprise reopened her flight deck to begin landing returning aircraft from the morning U.S. strikes on the Japanese warship forces. However, only a few aircraft landed before the next wave of Japanese strike aircraft arrived and began their attacks on
Enterprise, forcing a suspension of landing operations.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 335â€"337.]Between 09:05 and 09:14,
Junyo had arrived within 280 miles (520 km) of the U.S. carriers and launched a strike of 17 Vals and 12 Zeros.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 330â€"331, and Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 391.] As the Japanese Main body and Advanced force maneuvered to try to join formations,
Junyo readied follow-on strikes.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 331.] At 11:21, the
Junyo Vals arrived and dove on the
Enterprise task force. The Vals scored one near miss on
Enterprise, causing more damage, and one hit each on
South Dakota and U.S. cruiser
San Juan, causing moderate damage to both ships. Eleven of the 17 Vals were destroyed in this attack.
[Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 391â€"393.]At 11:35, Kinkaid decided to withdraw
Enterprise and her screening ships from the battle, due to
Hornet being out of action, the heavy damage that
Enterprise had received, and believing (correctly), that the Japanese had one to two undamaged carriers in the area.
[Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 395.] He directed
Hornet's task force to follow as soon as they were able. Between 11:39 and 13:22,
Enterprise recovered 57 aircraft as she headed away from the battle. The remaining airborne U.S. aircraft ditched in the ocean and their aircrews were rescued by escorting warships.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 345â€"352.]Between 11:40 and 14:00,
Zuikaku and
Junyo recovered the few aircraft that returned from the morning strikes on
Hornet and
Enterprise and prepared follow-on strikes. At 13:00, Kondo's Advanced force and Abe's Vanguard force warships together headed directly towards the last reported position of the U.S. carrier task forces and increased speed to try intercept them for a warship gunfire battle.
Zuiho and
Shokaku, with Nagumo still on board, retreated from the battle area,
[Hara, Japanese Destroyer Captain, p. 129â€"131.] leaving Rear Admiral
Kakuji Kakuta in charge of the
Zuikaku and
Junyo battle forces. At 13:06,
Junyo launched her second strike of seven Kates and eight Zeros, and
Zuikaku launched her third strike of seven Kates, two Vals, and five Zeros. At 15:35,
Junyo launched the last Japanese strike force of the day, consisting of four Kates and six Zeros.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 357â€"358.] |
Hornet, sinking and abandoned late on October 26, 1942. |
After several technical problems, U.S. cruiser
Northampton finally began slowly towing
Hornet out of the battle area at 14:45. Also,
Hornets crew was on the verge of restoring partial power to the ship.[Frank, ]Guadalcanal
, p. 395â€"396. However, at 15:20, Junyos second strike arrived and attacked the almost stationary carrier. At 15:23, one torpedo struck
Hornet, destroying the repairs to the power system, causing heavy flooding, and a 14-degree list. With no power to pump-out the water,
Hornet was given-up for lost and the crew abandoned ship. The third strike from
Zuikaku attacked
Hornet during this time, hitting the sinking ship with one more bomb. All of the
Hornets crewmen were off by 16:27. The last Japanese strike of the day dropped one more bomb on the sinking hulk at 17:20.[Hammel, ]Carrier Strike
, p. 359â€"376.
U.S destroyers Mustin
and Anderson
were ordered to scuttle Hornet
with gunfire and torpedoes while the rest of the U.S. warships retired towards the southeast to get out of range of Kondo's and Abe's oncoming warships. With advancing Japanese destroyers only 20 minutes away, the two U.S. destroyers abandoned Hornets burning hulk at 20:40. The rest of the warships of Kondo's and Abe's forces arrived at
Hornet's location by 22:20 and decided that she was too damaged to try to capture. Thus, they finished the job of scuttling her with torpedoes by 01:35 on October 27. Several night attacks by radar-equipped Catalinas on
Junyo and
Teruzuki, knowledge of the head-start the U.S. warships had in their retreat from the area, plus a critical fuel situation apparently caused the Japanese to reconsider further pursuit of the U.S. warships. After refueling near the northern Solomon Islands, the ships returned to their main base at Truk on October 30. During the U.S. retreat from the battle area towards Espiritu Santo and New Caledonia,
South Dakota collided with U.S. destroyer
Mahan, heavily damaging the destroyer.
[Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 399. Mahan returned to action on January 9, 1943.] |
The crew of Enterprise conducts a burial-at-sea on October 27, 1942, for 44 of their fellow crewmen killed during the battle the day before. |
The loss of
Hornet was a severe blow for Allied forces in the South Pacific, leaving just one operational, albeit damaged, Allied carrier in the entire Pacific theater.
Enterprise, however, received temporary repairs at New Caledonia and, although still somewhat damaged, returned to the southern Solomons area just two weeks later to support Allied forces during the
Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, playing an important role in what turned out to be the decisive naval engagement in the overall battle for Guadalcanal.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 384.]Although a tactical victory for the Japanese in terms of ships sunk, it came at a high cost for Japanese naval forces. Both damaged carriers were forced to return to Japan for extensive repairs and refitting. After repair,
Zuiho returned to Truk in late January, 1943.
Shokaku was under repair until March, 1943 and didn't return to the front until July, 1943, when she was reunited with
Zuikaku at Truk.
[Parshall & Tully, Imperial Japanese Navy Page (Combinedfleet.com), Shokaku & Zuiho.]The most significant losses for the Japanese Navy, however, were in aircrew. The U.S. lost 24 aircrew members in the battle. The Japanese, on the other hand, lost 148 aircrew members including two dive bomber group leaders, three torpedo squadron leaders,
[Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 400â€"401.] and 18 other section or flight leaders.
[Hammel, Carrier Strike, p. 381.] The Japanese lost so many aircrew members that undamaged
Zuikaku and
Hiyo were also forced to return to Japan due to a scarcity of trained aircrew to man their air groups. Admiral Nagumo, upon being relieved of command shortly after the battle and reassigned to shore duty in Japan, stated,
With its carrier aircrew ranks decimated, and with no quick way to replace them, Japan lost its strategic opportunity to defeat Allied naval forces in a single, decisive battle before the industrial might of the U.S. placed that goal out of reach. Although they returned to Truk by summer, 1943, the Japanese carriers played no further offensive role in the decisive Solomon Islands campaign.
Historian Eric Hammel sums up the significance of the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands this way:
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