Battle of Tours
The
Battle of Tours (
October 10,
732), often called
Battle of Poitiers and also called in
Arabic بلاط الشهداء (Balaat Alshuhada'a)
The Court of Martyrs was fought near the city of
Tours,
France, by
Frankish forces under
Austrasian
Mayor of the Palace Charles Martel and a massive invading Muslim army led by
Emir `Abdul Raħmān al Ghāfiqī, Governor-general of
Al-Andalus. The Franks defeated the
Islamic army and Emir Abd er Rahman was killed. Charles earned the nickname Martel ("The Hammer") for the merciless way he hammered his opponents during this victory, and went on to repulse later Muslim invasions, driving Muslim forces back to the port of
Narbonne.
Edward Gibbon said of the Muslim invasions and Charles Martel "in the public danger, he was summoned by the voice of his country."
The battle followed twenty years of
Muslim conquests in Europe, beginning with the invasion of the
Visigoth Christian Kingdoms of the
Iberian peninsula in
711 and progressing into the
Frankish territories of
Gaul, former provinces of the
Roman Empire. Muslim military campaigns had reached northward into
Aquitaine and
Burgundy, including a major battle at
Bordeaux and a raid on
Autun. Martel's victory is believed by many historians to have stopped the northward advance of
Islam from the
Iberian peninsula, and is therefore also considered of
macrohistorical importance in that it halted the
Muslim conquests and preserved
Christianity as the controlling faith in Europe during a period when Islam was overrunning the remains of the old
Roman and
Persian Empires.
["There were no further Muslim invasions of Frankish territory, and Charles's victory has often been regarded as decisive for world history, since it preserved western Europe from Muslim conquest and Islamization." [1]]Despite the great importance of this battle, its exact location remains unknown. Surviving contemporary sources, both Western and Muslim, agree on certain details while disputing others. Most historians assume that the two armies met where the rivers
Clain and
Vienne join between
Tours and
Poitiers. Varied estimates of the Frankish army defending
Gaul suggest Martel commanded between 15,000 and 75,000
infantry[
2] in the first western
standing army since the
fall of Rome. They had been trained to fight in
phalanxes in order to face the dreaded Muslim heavy
cavalry. Between 60,000 and 400,000 men [
3] [
4], mostly
Berber lighthorse
cavalry supplemented by Muslim heavy cavalry were under Abd er Rahman, often fractured into raiding parties to plunder various Frankish centers. According to Arab accounts, in the six days before the battle, Abd er Rahman recalled his forces so they were all present for the battle. By both western and Arab historical accounts, the Muslim forces probably outnumbered the Franks significantly at the onset of the Battle, but how far is unknown. Losses during the battle are unknown; according to
St. Denis Martel's force lost about 1,500,
[ probably an underestimate]; Abd er Rahman's force reportedly suffered massive casualties, including the loss of their commander Abd er Rahman.
Muslim conquests from Iberia
|
The "Age of the Caliphs," showing Muslim dominance stretching from the Middle East to the Iberian peninsula, including the port of Narbonne, c. 720 |
|
Modern-day French borders. Autun is just to the right of the map's midpoint, Septimania runs along the rightward coast from the Spanish border, and Aquitaine is along the coast running north from Spain. |
The
Moors, under
Al-Samh ibn Malik, the governor-general of
al-Andalus, overran
Septimania by
719, continuing their sweep up the
Iberian peninsula. Al-Samh set up his capital from
720 at
Narbonne, which the Moors called Arbūna. With the port of Narbonne secure, the Moors swiftly subdued the largely unresisting cities of
Alet,
Béziers,
Agde,
Lodève,
Maguelonne, and
Nîmes, still controlled by their
Visigoth counts.
[ Saudi Arabia's Aramco historical site, ]The Muslim campaign into
Aquitaine suffered a temporary setback at the
Battle of Toulouse (721), when Duke
Odo of Aquitaine (also known as Eudes the Great) broke the siege of
Toulouse, taking
Al-Samh ibn Malik's forces by surprise and mortally wounding the governor-general Al-Samh ibn Malik himself. This defeat did not stop incursions into old Roman Gaul, as
Arab forces, soundly based in Narbonne and easily resupplied by sea, struck eastwards in the 720s, penetrating as far as
Autun in
Burgundy (725).
Threatened by both the Arabs in the south and by the Franks in the north, in 730 Eudes allied himself with the Berber
emir Uthman ibn Naissa, called "Munuza" by the Franks, in what would later become
Catalonia. As a
gage, Uthman was given Eudes's daughter Lampade in marriage to seal the alliance, and Arab raids across the Pyrenees, Eudes' southern border, ceased.
[ [5] ]However, the next year, Uthman rebelled against the governor of
al-Andalus, Abd er Rahman, who quickly crushed the revolt and directed his attention against Eudes. According to one unidentified
Arab, "That army went through all places like a desolating storm." Duke Eudes (called King by some), collected his army at
Bordeaux, but was defeated, and Bordeaux was plundered. The slaughter of Christians at the River
Garonne was evidently horrific;
Isidorus Pacensis commented,
"solus Deus numerum morientium vel pereuntium recognoscat", ("God alone knows the number of the slain").
[Chronicon of Isidous Pacensis.] The Muslim horsemen then utterly devastated that portion of Gaul, their own histories saying the "faithful pierced through the mountains, trampled over rough and level ground, plundered far into the country of the Franks, and smote all with the sword, insomuch that when Eudo came to battle with them at the River Garonne, he fled."
Sir Edward Creasy said:
"It was under one of their ablest and most renowned commanders, with a veteran army, and with every apparent advantage of time, place, and circumstance, that the Arabs made their great effort at the conquest of Europe north of the Pyrenees. The victorious Moslem soldiery in Spain,
"A countless multitude;:Syrian, Moor, Saracen, Greek renegade,:Persian, and Copt, and Tartar, in one bond:Of erring faith conjoined--strong in the youth:And heat of zeal--a dreadful brotherhood,"
were eager for the plunder of more Christian cities and shrines, and full of fanatic confidence in the invincibility of their arms.
"Nor were the chiefs:Of victory less assured, by long success:Elate, and proud of that o'erwhelming strength:Which surely, they believed, as it had rolled:Thus far uncheck'd, would roll victorious on,:Till, like the Orient, the subjected West:Should bow in reverence at Mahommed's name;:And pilrims from remotest Arctic shores:Tread with religious feet the burning sands:Of Araby and Mecca's stony soil." :SOUTHEY'S RODERICK.
And so, after smashing Eudes and laying waste in the south, the Muslim Cavalry advanced north, pursuing the fleeing Eudes, and looting, and destroying all before them.
Eudes' appeal to the Franks
Eudes appealed to the Franks for assistance, which Charles Martel only granted after Eudes agreed to submit to Frankish authority. As noted above, Charles had been preparing for this battle for a decade, and prepared at once to confront the Muslims, believing that if he allowed them to occupy Aquitaine, the whole West would be lost eventually.
It appears as if the Muslims were not aware of the true strength of the Franks. The Muslim forces were not particularly concerned about any of the
Germanic tribes, including the Franks, and the
Arab Chronicles, the history of that age, show that awareness of the Franks as a growing military power only came after the Battle of Tours when the
Caliph expressed shock at his army's disastrous defeat.
Further, the Muslims appear not to have scouted northward for potential foes, for if they had, they surely would have noted Charles Martel as a force to be reckoned with in his own account, due to his thorough domination of Europe from 717: this might have alerted the
Moors that a real power led by a gifted general was rising in the ashes of the
Western Roman Empire.
Advance toward the Loire
In
732, the Arab advance force was proceeding north toward the
River Loire having outpaced their supply train and a large part of their army. Essentially, having easily destroyed all resistance in that part of Gaul, the invading army had split off into several raiding parties, simply looting and destroying, while the main body advanced more slowly.
The Muslim attack was likely so late in the year because many men and horses needed to live off the land as they advanced; thus they had to wait until the area's wheat
harvest was ready and then until a reasonable amount of the harvest was
threshed (slowly by hand with
flails) and stored. The further north, the later the harvest is, and while the men could kill farm livestock for food, horses cannot eat meat and needed
grain as food. Letting them graze each day would take too long, and interrogating natives to find where food stores were kept would not work where the two sides had no common language.
A military explanation for why Eudes was defeated so easily at
Bordeaux and at the River
Garonne after having won 11 years earlier at the
Battle of Toulouse is simple. At Toulouse, Eudes managed a basic surprise attack against an overconfident and unprepared foe, all of whose defensive works were aimed inward, while he attacked from the outside. The Arab cavalry never got a chance to mobilize and meet him in open battle.
At
Bordeaux, and again at the River
Garonne, the Arab cavalry did have such a chance, and this led to the devastation of Eudes's army, almost all of whom were killed with minimal losses to the Muslims. Eudes's forces, like other European troops of that era, lacked
stirrups, and therefore had no armoured cavalry. Virtually all of their troops were infantry. The Muslim heavy cavalry broke the Christian infantry in their first charge, and then slaughtered them at will as they broke and ran.
The invading force went on to devastate southern Gaul, preparing it for complete conquest. One of the major raiding parties advanced on Tours. A possible motive, according to the second continuator of
Fredegar, was the riches of the
Abbey of Saint Martin of
Tours, the most prestigious and holiest
shrine in western Europe at the time. Upon hearing this,
Austrasia's
Mayor of the Palace,
Charles Martel, collected his army (estimated at 15,000 to 75,000 veterans) and marched south, avoiding the old Roman roads and hoping to take the Muslims by surprise. Because he intended to use a
phalanx, it was essential for him to choose the battlefield. His plan — to find a high wooded plain, form his men and force the Muslims to come to him — depended on the element of surprise.
Preparations and maneuver
From all accounts, the invading forces were caught entirely off guard to find a large force, well disposed and prepared for battle, with high ground, directly opposing their attack on Tours. Charles had achieved the total surprise he hoped for. He then chose to begin the battle in a defensive,
phalanx-like formation. According to the Arabian sources the Franks drew up in a large square, with the trees and upward slope to break any cavalry charge.
For six days, the two armies watched each other with minor skirmishes. The Muslims waited for their full strength to arrive, which it did, but they were still uneasy. No good general, and Abd er Rahman was one, liked to let his opponent pick the ground and conditions for battle — and Martel had done both. Martel gambled everything that Abd er Rahman would in the end feel compelled to battle, and to go on and loot Tours. Neither of them wanted to attack.
The Franks in their wolf and bear pelts were well dressed for the cold, and had the terrain advantage. The Arabs were not as prepared for the intense cold of an oncoming northern European winter, despite having tents, which the Franks did not, but did not want to attack a Frankish army they believed may have been numerically superior -- according to most historians it was not. Essentially, the Arabs wanted the Franks to come out in the open, while the Franks, formed in a tightly packed defensive formation, wanted them to come uphill, into the trees, diminishing at once the advantages of their cavalry. It was a waiting game which Martel won: The fight began on the seventh day, as Abd er Rahman did not want to postpone the battle indefinitely with winter approaching.
Engagement
Abd er Rahman trusted the tactical superiority of his cavalry, and had them charge repeatedly. This time the faith the Muslims had in their cavalry, armed with their long
lances and
swords which had brought them victory in previous battles, was not justified. The Franks, without
stirrups in wide use, had to depend on unarmoured foot soldiers.
In one of the rare instances where
medieval infantry stood up against cavalry charges, the disciplined Frankish soldiers withstood the assaults, though according to Arab sources, the Arab cavalry several times broke into the interior of the Frankish square.
"The Moslem horsemen dashed fierce and frequent forward against the battalions of the Franks, who resisted manfully, and many fell dead on either side."
[(from the Anon Arab Chronicler: The Battle of Poitiers, 732).]Despite this, the Franks did not break. It appears that the years of year-round training that Charles had bought with Church funds, paid off. His hard-trained soldiery accomplished what was not thought possible at that time: unarmoured infantry withstood the fierce Muslim heavy cavalry. A translation of an Arab account of the battle from the Medieval Source Book says::"And in the shock of the battle the men of the North seemed like a sea that cannot be moved. Firmly they stood, one close to another, forming as it were a bulwark of ice; and with great blows of their swords they hewed down the Arabs. Drawn up in a band around their chief, the people of the
Austrasians carried all before them. Their tireless hands drove their swords down to the breasts of the foe."
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/732tours.htmlAccording to
Creasy, the Muslims' best strategic choice would have been to simply decline battle, depart with their loot, garrisoning the captured towns in southern Gaul, and return when they could force Martel to a battleground more to their liking, one that maximized the huge advantage they had in their mailed and amoured horsemen—the first true "knights". It might have been different, however, had the Muslim forces remained under control. Both western and Muslim histories agree the battle was hard fought, and that the Muslim heavy cavalry had broken into the square, but agreed that the Franks were in formation still strongly resisting.
The battle turns
Those Muslims who had broken into the square had tried to kill Martel, but his
liege men surrounded him and would not be broken. The battle was still in flux when Frankish histories claim that a rumor went through the Arab army that Frankish scouts threatened the booty that they had taken from
Bordeaux. Some of the Muslim troops at once broke off the battle and returned to camp to secure their loot. According to Muslim accounts of the battle, in the midst of the fighting on the second day (Frankish accounts have the battle lasting one day only), scouts from the Franks sent by Charles began to raid the camp and supply train (liberating prisoners and recovering other plunder).
Charles supposedly had sent scouts to cause chaos in the Muslim base camp, and free as many of the slaves as possible, hoping to draw off part of his foe. This succeeded beyond his wildest dreams as many of the Muslim Cavalry returned to their camp. To the rest of the Muslim army, this appeared to be a full-scale retreat, and soon it was one. Both Western and Muslim histories agree that while trying to stop the retreat,
Abd er Rahman became surrounded, which led to his death, and the Muslims then withdrew altogether to their camp. "All the host fled before the enemy," candidly wrote one Arab source, "and many died in the flight." The Franks resumed their phalanx, and rested in place through the night, believing the battle would resume at dawn the following morning.
Following day
The next day, when the Muslims did not renew the battle, the Franks feared an ambush. Charles at first believed that the Muslims were trying to lure him down the hill and into the open. This tactic he knew he had to resist at all costs; he had in fact disciplined his troops for years to under no circumstances break formation and come out in the open (see the
Battle of Hastings for the results of infantry being lured into the open by armoured cavalry). Only after extensive reconnaissance of the Muslim camp by Frankish soldiers — which by both historical accounts had been so hastily abandoned that even the tents remained, as the Muslim forces headed back to
Iberia with what loot remained that they could carry — was it discovered that the Muslims had retreated during the night.
Later, the Arab Chronicles would reveal that generals from the different parts of the Caliphate, including Berbers, Arabs, Persians, and others, could not agree on a single battlefield commander, much less on a leader to take
Abd er Rahman's place as
Emir. Only Abd er Rahman had a
Fatwa from the Caliph, and thus absolute authority over the faithful under arms. With his death emerged politics, racial and ethnic bias, and personal conflict, exacerbated by the varied nationalities and ethnicities present in an army drawn from all over the Caliphate.
This inability to select a leader, rather than the loss at Tours alone, may have led to the wholesale withdrawal of an army that probably still could have defeated the Franks, and was precipitated by Martel's opportunity to have killed Abd er Rahman using a clever ruse he had carefully planned to cause confusion at the battle's apex, combined with years of rigorously training his men to withstand trained heavy calvary. Martel's Franks, virtually all infantry without armour, managed to withstand both mailed heavy cavalry with 20 foot lances, and bow-wielding light cavalry, without aid of
bows or
firearms. [
6] This was a feat of war almost unheard of in medieval history, a feat which even the heavily armored
Roman legions proved themselves incapable of against the
Parthians, [
7] gave him a place in the pantheon of great generals during an age generally bereft of same, one of the greatest upset victories in military history, and left him with a unique place in history hailed through the centuries as Christendom's savior. [
8]
Certainly, given the disparity between the armies, in that the Franks were mostly infantry, all without armour, against mounted and Arab armored or mailed horsemen (the Berbers were less heavily protected), Charles Martel fought a brilliant defensive battle. In a place and time of his choosing, he met a far superior force, and defeated it.
Strategic analysis
Emir Abdul Rahman Al Ghafiqi was a good general and should have done two things he failed to do:
*He assumed that the Franks would not come to the aid of their
Aquitanian cousins, and he thus failed to assess their strength before invasion.
*He failed to scout the movements of the
Frankish army, and Charles Martel.Having done either, he would have curtailed his lighthorse ravaging throughout lower Gaul, and marched at once with his full power against the Franks. This strategy would have nullified every advantage Charles had at Tours:
*The invaders would have not been burdened with booty that played such a huge role in the battle.
*They would have not lost one warrior in the battles they fought before Tours. (Though they lost relatively few men in overrunning
Aquitaine, they suffered some casualties — losses that may have been pivotal at Tours).
*They would have bypassed weaker opponents such as Eudes, whom they could have picked off at will later, while moving at once to force battle with the real power in Europe, and at least partially picked the battlefield.While some military historians point out that leaving enemies in your rear is not generally wise, the Mongols proved that indirect attack, and bypassing weaker foes to eliminate the strongest first, is a devastatingly effective mode of invasion. In this case, those enemies were virtually no danger, given the ease with which the Muslims destroyed them. The real danger was Charles, and the failure to scout Europe adequately was disastrous. Had Emir Abdul Rahman Al Ghafiqi realized how thoroughly Martel had dominated Europe for fifteen years, and how gifted a commander he was, he would not have allowed Charles Martel to pick the time and place the two powers would collide, which historians agree was pivotal to Frankish victory.
The battle turns
Those Muslims who had broken into the square had tried to kill Martel, but his
liege men surrounded him and would not be broken. An account of the arrival of the tide turning Christian forces is given, albeit somewhat aggrandized, in the historical "Lay of Roland," an epic chanson de geste. Roland, believed to be known as Markgraf Hruotland, became a lasting literary and folk figure for his part in the battle of Tours. The battle was still in flux when Muslim histories claim that a rumor went through the Arab army that Frankish scouts threatened the booty that they had taken from
Bordeaux. Some of the Muslim troops at once broke off the battle and returned to camp to secure their loot. According to Muslim accounts of the battle, in the midst of the fighting on the second day, scouts from the Franks sent by Charles began to raid the camp and supply train (liberating prisoners and recovering other plunder). Frankish accounts begin the battle when a small guard of forces on the border, left as rearguard of Charlemagne's army encounters the massive Muslim forces in the pass of Roncevalles. Despite numbers of more than ten to one, the men were able to hold back the invading army, and Roland was famously able to blow a horn call sounding warning and eventually bringing the Frankish army proper into the fight who might otherwise have missed the engagement or been taken unawares from an unguarded rear flank. The army of the Holy Roman Empire was at that point three days march north heading to put down a Saxon uprising, and had just ended a campaign in Spain. The small number of men were left at a strategic mountain pass, and this careful planning undoubtedly led to their improbable victory of the first day.
The first day of fighting was one of confusion as the fierce and effective resistance led Muslim forces to overestimate the size of the rear guard and bought the bulk of the Frankish army precious time. The forces of Roland were all but destroyed however, and they formed desperate stands after the slaying of their horses within the trees, preventing a deadly full cavalry charge and further confusing the Muslims as to the size of their army. The innovation of the ‘seargant' an important feudal military innovation also came into play. The seargants, ranking below and less heavily armoured than knights, were in charge of the foot soldier forces, and the efficiency of this command allowed an effective defense that saved the life of Charles Martell.
The second day of battle saw the arrival of the wrathful Frankish forces and the siege army of the Muslims was quickly turned to a rout. According to Muslim sources Charles Martell supposedly sent scouts to cause chaos in the Muslim base camp, and free as many of the slaves as possible, hoping to draw off part of his foe. This caused many of the Muslim Cavalry returned to their camp. To the rest of the Muslim army, this appeared to be a full-scale retreat, and soon it was one. Both Western and Muslim histories agree that while trying to stop the retreat,
Abd er Rahman became surrounded, which led to his death, and the Muslims then withdrew altogether to their camp. "All the host fled before the enemy," candidly wrote one Arab source, "and many died in the flight." The Franks resumed their phalanx, and rested in place through the night, believing the battle would resume at dawn the following morning.
According to
Creasy, the Muslims' best strategic choice would have been to simply decline battle, depart with their loot, garrisoning the captured towns in southern Gaul, and return when they could force Martel to a battleground more to their liking, one that maximized the advantage of their vast numbers. However, the Muslim invaders had begun to reach the strongholds of Europe not decimated with infighting and the destruction of previous Empires. In the north of Europe the Franks had not known foreign conquest, and though little loved by Gaul, the kinship of the peoples was beginning to be strengthened by foreign invasion. The knights of Europe (from the Anglo-Saxon "Cnicht"), were able to overcome most adversaries on a field of battle. The Franks in particular were skilled and fearsome horsemen, whose stature and long leg length made them fearsome horsed fighters as well as competent on the ground. Previous Frankish conquests of Europe, including Gaul, had made horseback travel a necessity, so that by the late 9th century a chronicler recorded that the Franks did not know how to fight on foot. Even hundreds of years later the support of pagan knights was sought and obtained by Muslim forces during the crusades. Muslim forces were also employing slash and burn techniques on the countryside, including routine mass beheadings, mass rapes, and the capture of large civilian populations as slaves. All of these techniques lead to a weakened native population that was easily subdued but also lessened the value of any lands permanently held. These factors lead to a false sense of Muslim security, yet weakened their tactical position on the land. Muslim forces were also routinely strengthened by different factions as the hundreds of years of occupation drew on, and these forces, beign from different areas of Islamic control, did not always readily fall into one organized fighting unit.
Charlemagne also introduced many tactical and military innovations the Muslims had no previously seen, as well as a heavy cavalry to match their own. In short the Muslim invaders as they marched northward encountered the strength of Europe. They were off put by the previously encountered might of Charlemagne's army when he first entered Spain, but withdrew as a feint which nearly succeeded, because the Holy Roman Emperor believed them for the time subdued, and the Muslims wisely held back their men and waited for Charles to erroneously withdraw before attacking northward. Charles knew that with the approaching winter the Muslim forces, already infamous for their cruelty, had to withdraw to areas more firmly under their control. Therefore their forays north had to either be raiding parties or absolutely crush native resistance. He did not calculate on an attempt at the later so late in the year.
The battle of Tours quickly became exactly what the Moors had sought to avoid, because Charlemagne had initially sent his army south to engage their army, whereas the Muslims were seeking to conquer relatively unprotected country, and this was the battle they had hoped to avoid. Despite either false reports or lack of scouting, the predominately Moorish army nearly succeeded in breaking through the pass. Muslim histories agree the battle was hard fought, and that the Muslim heavy cavalry had broken into a square of knights set about the beleaguered Charles, but the Franks in formation still strongly resisted. The European account plays up the value of the valor of the rearguard of Charlemagne's forces on the first day, which held the massive Muslim force with only a few hundred men until they could be succored with greater forces on the second. The Muslim forces were also relying on treachery on the European side. They had received reports and assurances that the Christian army was in fact several days farther off in their march. Part of the tide of battle was no doubt influenced by the fact that the Muslims had expected little to no resistance at all.
Both Hallam and Wallace rightly point out that had Martel failed, there was no remaining force to protect Christian Europe. Perhaps the greates advantage of teh Frankish forces was that they fought for their homes, land, and kindred. Hallam perhaps said it best:
"It may justly be reckoned among those few battles of which a contrary event would have essentially varied the drama of the world in all its subsequent scenes: with Marathon, Arbela, the Metaurus, Chalons, and Leipsic."
Muslim retreat and second invasion
The Arab army retreated south over the
Pyrenees. Martel continued to drive the Muslims from France in subsequent years. After the death (c. 735-6) of Eudes, who had reluctantly acknowledged Charles'
suzerainty in 719, Charles wished to unite Eudes's Duchy to himself, and went there to elicit the proper
homage of the
Aquitainians. But the nobility proclaimed Hunold, Eudes' son, as the Duke, and Charles recognized his legitimacy when the
Arabs invaded
Provence the next year. Hunold, who originally resisted acknowledging Charles as overlord, soon had little choice. Martel believed, and most historians agree his vision was correct, that it was vital to confine the Muslims to
Iberia, and not allow them a foothold in Gaul. Therefore he marched at once against the invaders, defeating one army outside
Arles, which he took by storm and razed the city, and defeated the primary invasion force at the River
Berre, outside
Narbonne.
Advance to Narbonne
Despite this, the Arabs remained in control of Narbonne and
Septimania for another 27 years, though they could not expand further. The treaties reached earlier with the local population stood firm and were further consolidated in 734 when the governor of Narbonne,
Yusuf ibn 'Abd al-Rahman al-Fihri, concluded agreements with several towns on common defense arrangements against the encroachments of Charles Martel, who had systematically brought the south to heel as he extended his domains. He destroyed Muslim armies and Fortresses at the
Battle of Avignon and the
Battle of Nimes. The army attempting to relieve Narbonne met him in open battle at the
Battle of the River Berre and was destroyed, but Charles failed in his attempt to take Narbonne by siege in 737, when the city was jointly defended by its Muslim Arab and Christian
Visigoth citizens.
Carolingian dynasty
Reluctant to tie down his army for a siege that could last years, and believing he could not afford the losses of an all out frontal assault such as he had used at
Arles, Martel was content to isolate the few remaining invaders in
Narbonne and
Septimania. It was left to his son,
Pippin the Short, to force Narbonne's surrender in 759, and to drive the Arabs completely back to Iberia, thus bringing Narbonne into the Frankish Domains. His grandson,
Charlemagne, became the first Christian ruler to begin what would be called the
Reconquista from Europe. In the northeast of Spain the Frankish emperors established the
Marca Hispanica across the
Pyrenees in part of what today is
Catalonia, reconquering
Girona in 785 and
Barcelona in 801. This formed a buffer zone against Islam across the Pyrenees.
The importance of Tours and the later campaigns of 736-7 in putting an end to Muslim bases in Gaul, thus eliminating any immediate ability to expand Muslim influence in Europe, cannot be overstated. Gibbon and his generation of historians agree that they were unquestionably decisive in world history, an assessment shared by the majority of modern experts.
In Western history
Christian contemporaries, from
Bede to
Theophanes, carefully recorded the battle and were keen to spell out what they saw as its implications. Later scholars, such as
Edward Gibbon, would contend that had Martel fallen, the Moors would have easily conquered a divided Europe. Gibbon famously observed::"A victorious line of march had been prolonged above a thousand miles from the rock of
Gibraltar to the banks of the
Loire; the repetition of an equal space would have carried the
Saracens to the confines of
Poland and the
Highlands of
Scotland; the
Rhine is not more impassable than the
Nile or
Euphrates, and the Arabian
fleet might have sailed without a naval combat into the mouth of the
Thames. Perhaps the interpretation of the
Qur'an would now be taught in the schools of
Oxford, and her pulpits might demonstrate to a
circumcised people the sanctity and truth of the revelation of
Muhammed. [
9]
Certainly, the Muslim invasions were an enormous danger to Europe during the window from 721 at
Toulouse to 737, the year of the Arab defeat at Narbonne. But the window was closing, and the unified
Caliphate would collapse into
civil war in 750 at the
Battle of the Zab. This left the
Umayyad dynasty wiped out, except for the Princes who escaped — first to Africa and then to Iberia — where they established the Umayyad Emirate in opposition to the Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad. The threat posed by the Arab heavy cavalry also receded as the Christians copied the Arab model in developing similar forces of their own, giving rise to the familiar figure of the western European medieval armored
knight.
German historians were especially ardent in their praise of Martel and their belief that he saved Europe and Christianity from then all-conquering
Islam, while they also praise him as driving back the ferocious
Saxon barbarians on his borders.
Schlegel speaks of this "mighty victory" in terms of fervent gratitude, and tells how "the arm of Charles Martel saved and delivered the Christian nations of the West from the deadly grasp of all-destroying Islam." Ranke opined that this period was :"one of the most important epochs in the history of the world, the commencement of the eighth century, when on the one side Mohammedanism threatened to overspread Italy and Gaul, and on the other the ancient idolatry of
Saxony and
Friesland once more forced its way across the Rhine. In this peril of Christian institutions, a youthful prince of Germanic race, Karl Martell, arose as their champion, maintained them with all the energy which the necessity for self-defence calls forth, and finally extended them into new regions."
Gibbon perhaps summarized Martel's campaigns against the Muslim invasions most eloquently when he said::"yet the victory of the Franks was complete and final...the Arabs never resumed the conquest of Gaul, and they were soon driven beyond the Pryenees by Charles Martel and his valiant race."
Another great mid era historian,
Thomas Arnold, ranks the victory of Charles Martel even higher than the victory of Arminius in its signal effect on all of modern history:
"Charles Martel's victory at Tours was among those signal deliverances which have affected for centuries the happiness of mankind." [History of the later Roman Commonwealth, vol ii. p. 317.]
In the modern era, Matthew Bennett and his co-authors, in
Fighting Techniques of the Medieval World (2005) say that "few battles are remembered 1,000 years after they are fought [...] but the Battle of Poitiers is an exception [...] Charles Martel turned back a Muslim raid that had it been allowed to continue, might have conquered Gaul." Michael Grant, author of
History of Rome, finds the Battle of Tours of such importance that he lists it in the machrohistorical dates of the Roman era.
In
Barbarians, Marauders, and Infidels,
Antonio Santosuosso, Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Western Ontario, makes a compelling case that the defeats of invading Muslim Armies were at least as important as Tours in their defense of western Christianity, and the preservation of those Christian monasteries and centers of learning which ultimately led Europe out of the dark ages. Both invading forces defeated in those campaigns had come to set up permanent outposts for expansion, and there can be no doubt that these three defeats combined broke the back of Islamic expansion in Europe while the Caliphate was still united.
While some modern assessments of the battle's impact have backed away from Gibbon's position of its supreme importance in deciding the fate of the world as we know it, Gibbon's conjecture is supported by other historians such as
Edward Shepherd Creasy and
William E. Watson. Most modern historians such as Watson, Grant, Bennett, and Santosuosso generally support the concept of Tours as a macrohistorical event favoring western civilization and Christianity. Military writers such as Robert W. Martin,
The Battle of Tours is still felt today, also argue that Tours was such a turning point in favor of western civilization and
Christianity that its aftereffects remain to this day.
In Muslim history
Contemporary Arab and Muslim historians and chroniclers are much more interested in the second Umayyad siege
Arab defeat at Constantinople in
718, which ended in a disastrous defeat. Some Muslim historians have argued that had the Caliph recalled his armies from Europe to aid in the siege, the city might have been taken by land, despite the legendary walls - such a recall would have doubled the army laying siege, allowed a full attack while still beating off
Bulgar forces trying to end the siege by harassing the army from outside while the defenders held the walls.
Some contemporary historians argue that had the Arabs wished to conquer Europe they could easily have done so. Essentially these historians argue that the Arabs were not interested enough to mount a major invasion, because Northern Europe at that time was considered to be a socially, culturally and economically backward area with little to interest any invaders. Some western scholars, such as
Bernard Lewis, agree with this stance.
This is also disputed by Arab histories of the period circa 722-850 which mentioned the Franks more than any other Christian people save the
Byzantines, (The Arabian chronicles were compiled and translated into Spanish by
José Antonio Conde, in his
"Historia de la Dominación de los Árabes en España", published at Madrid in 1820, and in dealing specifically with this period, the Arab chronicles discuss the Franks as one of two non-Muslim Powers then concerning the Caliphate). The Arab Chronicles discuss the impact of the death of Abdul Rahman Al Ghafiqi, as an absolute disaster for the faithful.
Further, a microhistorical view of this Battle is disputed by the records of the Muslim raids into
India and other non-Muslim states for loot and converts. Given the great wealth in Christian shrines such as at Tours, Muslim expansion into that area would have been likely had it not been sharply defeated in 732, 736, and 737 by Martel, and internal strife in the Muslim world prevented later efforts. Other relevant evidence of the importance of this battle lies in Muslim expansion into all other regions of the old Roman Empire -- except for Europe, and what was retained by Byzantium, the Caliphate took all of the old Roman and Persian Empires. It is not likely
Gaul would have been spared save by the campaigns by, and the loyalty of, Charles Martel's veteran Frankish Army.
Finally, it ignores that 4
Emirs of
al-Andalus over a 25 year period used a
Fatwa from the Caliph to levy troops from all provinces of Africa, Syria, and even
Turkomens who were beginning conversion, to raise 4 huge invading armies, well supplied and equipped, with the intention of permanent expansion across the Pyrenees into Europe. No such later attempts however were made, as conflict between the Umayyad Emirate of Iberia and the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad prevented a unified assault on Europe.
Given the importance Arab histories of the time placed on the death of Abdul Rahman Al Ghafiqi Abd al Rahman and the defeat in Gaul, and the subsequent defeat and destruction of Muslim bases in what is now France, it seems reasonably certain that this battle did have macrohistorical importance in stopping westward Muslim expansion. Muslim historians for centuries referred to Tours, notes Creasy, as "the deadly battle" and "the disgraceful overthrow." Indeed, Arab histories written during that period and for the next seven centuries make clear that Abdul Rahman Al Ghafiqi Abd al Rahman's defeat and death was regarded, and most scholars believe, as a catastrophe of major proportions. Their own words record it best: (translated from Arabic)
"This deadly defeat of the Moslems, and the loss of the great leader and good cavalier, Abderrahman, took place in the hundred and fifteenth year." (of the
Islamic calendar)
This quote, from a portion of the history of the Umayyad Caliphate, and the Arab period of expansion, also translated into Spanish by Don Jose Antonio Conde, in his
"Historia de la Dominacion de los Arabos en España," appears to put the importance of the Battle of Tours in macrohistorical perspective.
Contemporary analysis
Martel's victory at Tours and in the following campaigns may have literally saved Europe and Christianity as we know it. William Watson believes it preserved what would become western civilization after the
Renaissance. All parties essentially agree that had the Franks fallen, no other power existed capable of stopping a Muslim conquest of Italy and the effective end of the
Roman Catholic Church. [
10]
Had Martel failed, in the majority view, there would have been no
Charlemagne, no
Holy Roman Empire or
Papal States; all these depended upon Martel's containment of Islam from expanding into Europe while the Caliphate was unified and able to mount such a conquest. Gibbon has said Martel was "content with the titles of Mayor or Duke of the Franks, but he deserved to become the father of a line of kings," for his fearless defense of Europe. And the line of Kings he established continued his fight. His son retook Narbonne, and his grandson Charlemagne established the
Spanish Marches across the Pyrenees in part of what today is Catalonia, reconquering
Girona in 785 and
Barcelona in 801. This formed a permanent buffer zone of Frankish strongholds in Iberia against
Islam which, with the
Kingdom of Asturias, became the basis of the
Reconquista.
No later significant Muslim attempts against
Asturias or the
Franks were made as conflict between what remained of the
Umayyad Dynasty and the
Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad prevented a unified assault on Europe. It would be another 700 years before the
Ottomans managed to invade Europe via the Balkans.
In 1922 and 1923, Belgian historian
Henri Pirenne published a series of papers, known collectively as the "Pirenne Thesis", which remain influential to this day. Pirenne held that the Roman Empire continued, in the Frankish realms, up until the time of the
Arab conquests in the
7th century. These conquests disrupted Mediterranean trade routes leading to a decline in the European economy. Such continued disruption would have meant complete disaster except for Charles Martel's halting of Islamic expansion into Europe from 732 on. What he managed to preserve led to the
Carolingian Renaissance, named after him.
Creasy argues that the Martel victory "preserved the relics of ancient and the germs of modern civilizations." Gibbon called those eight days in 732, the week leading up to Tours, and the battle itself, "the events that rescued our ancestors of Britain, and our neighbors of Gaul [France], from the civil and religious yoke of the Koran." Paul Akers, in his editorial on Charles Martel, says for those who value Christianity "you might spare a minute sometime today, and every October, to say a silent "thank you" to a gang of half-savage Germans and especially to their leader, Charles "The Hammer" Martel."
http://fredericksburg.com/News/FLS/2005/102005/10302005/141401/index_html.
In using his enemies' tools against them, no pride stopped Martel from seizing any advantage he could in defending his faith, his father's home and homeland, and his people, from what he saw was a danger that would destroy them if not checked. His foresight in moving to strike first, to engage enemies short of his "front door", reminds one of
Winston Churchill's famous statement, that "it is better to fight in your neighbor's back yard, than have to defend your own front door."
In 5 short years, from the Battle of Tours, to the
Battle of the River Berre, he fathered western heavy cavalry, and used it in conjunction with his phalanx with devastating effect. Martel's incorporation of the stirrup and mailed cavalry into the Frankish army gave birth to the armoured Knights which would form the backbone of western armies for the next five centuries.
For his defense of Europe against both Muslim invasion and barbarian incursions, but most specifically for his victory in this battle, Charles Martel is considered a hero in the Netherlands, a vital part of the Carolingian Empire, and the
Low Countries. In both France and Germany he is revered as a hero of epic proportions. Gibbon called him
"the hero of the age" and said
"Christiandom...delivered... by the genius and good fortune of one man, Charles Martel." A strong argument can be made that Gibbon was absolutely correct.
*
Ian Meadows, "The Arabs in Occitania": A sketch giving the context of the conflict from the Arab point of view.
*
Poke's edition of Creasy's 15 Most Important Battles Ever Fought ACCORDING TO EDWARD SHEPHERD CREASY Chapter VII. THE BATTLE OF TOURS, A.D. 732.
*
Cassius Dio: Roman History*
Medieval Sourcebook: Arabs, Franks, and the Battle of Tours, 732: Three Accounts*
Medieval Sourcebook: Anon Arab Chronicler: The Battle of Poitiers, 732 *
History of Europe: The Battle of Tours*Watson, William E.,
"The Battle of Tours-Poitiers Revisited",
Providence: Studies in Western Civilization, 2 (1993)
*Poke,
The Battle of Tours, from the book
Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World From Marathon to Waterloo by Sir Edward Creasy, MA *Edward Gibbon,
The Battle of Tours,
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*Michael Grant
"History of Rome"
*Richard Hooker,
"Civil War and the Umayyads" *
Arabs, Franks, and the Battle of Tours, 732: Three Accounts from the
Internet Medieval Sourcebook *
The Battle of Tours 732, from the "
Jewish Virtual Library" website: A division of the American-Israeli Cooperative.
*
Tours,Poiters, from "Leaders and Battles Database" online.
*Robert W. Martin,
"The Battle of Tours is still felt today", from
about.com *Santosuosso, Anthony,
Barbarians, Marauders, and Infidels ISBN 0-8133-9153-9
*Medieval Sourcebook: Arabs, Franks, and the Battle of Tours, 732 at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/732tours.html
*Bennett, Bradsbury, Devries, Dickie and Jestice,
Fighting Tehniques of the Medieval World *Reagan, Geoffry,
The Guinness Book of Decisive Battles , Canopy Books, NY (1992) ISBN 1558594310
*
Hanson, Victor Davis.
Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power. Anchor Books, 2001. Published in the UK as
Why the West has Won. Faber and Faber, 2001. ISBN 0571216404
