Bernard Gert
Bernard Gert (born
October 16,
1934 in
Cincinnati, Ohio) is a philosopher of
ethics known primarily for his work on
medical ethics, especially pertaining to psychology, and for his emphasis on the importance of avoiding
evil as opposed to promoting
good. Gert studied
philosophy at
Cornell University and is presently the Stone Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy at
Dartmouth College. Gert's children Heather and Joshua are also philosophy professors.
Gert believes evil is that which all rational creatures seek to avoid, namely, death and suffering. He maintains that the worst evils are far more important in terms of their effects than the greatest goods, and that it is therefore appropriate for
morality to emphasize the avoidance of evil.
To understand Gert's philosophy, it is important to understand the role
rationality plays. According to Gert, rationality does not require morality, however, it does require that we avoid harming ourselves without a reason. Therefore, a rational person would not cause his own pain unless it were for a reason, for example, to cure a disease. Even a
masochist causes pain for a reason, presumably for pleasure. Thus, no rational being seeks to harm himself for its own sake.
Certain things represent objects of irrational desire, for example, death, pain, and disability. We arrive at moral rules by extending these objects of irrational desire to others. Rationality, alone, does not require this. However, if we adopt the princple of impartiality, whereby we apply the rules without regard to who gains or loses, we extend these prohibitions to others. This results in rules such as do not kill, do not cause pain, do not disable, and so forth.
Gert does not maintain that the moral rules we derive from combining our rational prohibitions and the principle of impartiality are inviolate. In fact, there are sometimes good reasons for violating them. For example, it might well be necessary to cause another pain in order to prevent him from killing someone else. The key to being able to violate a moral rule is that we must be willing to publicly allow and advocate the exception to the rule.
By Bernard Gert
*
The Moral Rules: A New Rational Foundation for Morality, Harper and Row, 1970.
*
Morality: A New Justification of the Moral Rules, Oxford University Press, 1988.
*
Morality: Its Nature and Justification, Oxford University Press, 1998.
*
Common Morality: Deciding What to Do, Oxford University Press, 2004.
*
Morality: Its Nature and Justification, Revised Edition, Oxford University Press, 2005.
* "Bioethics: A Systematic Approach", Oxford University Press, 2006
*
Gert's homepage at Dartmouth*Gert, B. (1989).
Morality versus Slogans Paper Presented to the Center for the Study of Ethics in Society, 3(2) Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan
* Gert, B. (2005).
The Definition of Morality, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
