Chuichi Nagumo
Chuichi Nagumo (南雲 忠一,
Nagumo Chūichi,
March 25,
1887–
July 6,
1944) was a
Japanese
Vice Admiral of the
Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) of
Imperial Japan under
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto during
World War II. He was the commander of the
attack on Pearl Harbor, but was later defeated at the
Battle of Midway. He was also the member of the
Fleet Faction group at
IJN.
After graduating from the
Japanese Naval Academy in
1908, he held various commands, including the Naval War College. His specialty was in
torpedo tactics. Through seniority and politics he rose in the IJN, until he gained control of a Japanese
carrier striking force (the 1st Carrier Fleet) in April 1941. Many contemporaries and historians have doubted his suitability for this command, given his lack of familiarity with naval aviation. While commanding this force, Nagumo commanded the effective attack on Pearl Harbor, and fought well in the early
1942 Pacific War campaigns. His
Indian Ocean raid, on the
British Eastern Fleet, was a success, with the sinking of a British aircraft carrier, two
cruisers and two
destroyers, causing Admiral Sir
James Somerville to retreat to
East Africa. However, he lost four carriers in the turning point of
World War II in the Pacific, the
Battle of Midway. This led to much criticism, mainly because many Japanese citizens felt that Nagumo had not put forth a whole-hearted effort during the battle. Afterwards, he commanded carriers in the
Battle of the Eastern Solomons and
Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, then he was moved to naval base command in Japan in November 1942. He was put again in command of naval forces in March
1944 in the
Marianas, and in the final stages of the U.S. capture of
Saipan, committed
suicide rather than surrender.
Chuichi Nagumo was born in Yamagato, Honshu, Japan in 1887. He joined the Japanese Navy in 1908, and by 1917 he was at the helm of his first commission, a destroyer. His specialty was torpedo and destroyer tactics. In the 1920s, Nagumo was part of a mission to tour and study naval warfare in Europe and the United States. Upon his return to Japan in 1929, Nagumo was promoted to the rank of Captain and served at the Naval Academy. When Japan's eyes looked upon
Manchuria, the energetic Nagumo was commissioned the light cruiser Naka to command the 11th Destroyers Division. He later commanded the battleship Yamashiro and the heavy cruiser Takao. As a Rear Admiral, Nagumo commanded the 8th Cruiser Division to support
Japanese Army movements in China from the Yellow Sea. As an officer of the militaristic
Fleet Faction, he also received a boost in his career from
political forces.
As the war started to rage in Europe, Nagumo, at the time the head of the Naval War College in Tokyo, was promoted to the rank of vice admiral in preparation for Japan's entry into the global conflict. By this time, he had visibly aged, physically and mentally. Physically, he suffered from arthritis, perhaps from his younger days as an athletic kendo fencer. Mentally, he had become an officer who spent every ounce of his effort going over tactical plans of every operation he was involved in. Very soon after his promotion he was named the commander of the Japanese First Air Fleet. Admiral Nishizo Tsukahara had some doubts with this appointment; he commented, "Nagumo was an officer of the old school, a specialist of torpedo and surface maneuvers.... He did not have any idea of the capability and potential of naval aviation." At home, Nagumo did not receive a loving description, either. One of his two sons described him as a brooding father who was obsessed (and later disappointed) with pressuring his sons to follow his foot steps into the navy. Contrastingly, Nagumo's junior officers in the navy viewed him as precisely the father figure that his sons failed to do.
Although Nagumo had plenty of critics in the navy, his seniority landed him the job of the commander of the mobile fleet that had been tagged for the task of attacking Pearl Harbor. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander of the Combined Fleet, probably wished to assign the job to another admiral, perhaps one who had more experience with naval aviation, but strict rules of seniority left Yamamoto little choice. All Yamamoto could do was ensure the non-innovative Nagumo was surrounded by able lieutenants such as Minoru Genda and Mitsuo Fuchida.
When Nagumo's fleet struck, it became one of the most devastating attacks in the history of the American navy, disabling the entire Pacific Fleet's battle line with one swift strike. Despite the successful raid, Nagumo was largely criticized for his failure to launch the third wave of attack against Pearl Harbor, which might had rendered the greatest American naval base in the Pacific useless. Without Pearl Harbor, the United States would have no major advance base in the Pacific.
After Pearl Harbor, Nagumo was responsible for raids all across the Pacific and Indian Oceans. At the end of his trip into the Indian Ocean, Nagumo's personal score card saw five battleships, one carrier, two cruisers, seven destroyers, dozens of merchantmen, transports, and various other vessels. He was also responsible for downing hundreds of Allied aircraft from six nations. Destruction brought upon Allied ports also disabled or slowed Allied operations. All the while, he had lost no more than a few dozen pilots (although having 20-20 hindsight today, we understand these elite pilots lost would have significant consequences later in the war). After the raid in the Indian Ocean, Nagumo returned to Japan a national hero with an impressive resume:
*He had sailed from Kurile Islands to Pearl Harbor, then returned to the western portions of the South Pacific then Indian Ocean.
*He had destroyed five battleships, one carrier, two cruisers, seven destroyers, dozens of merchantmen, transports, and various other vessels.
*He was responsible for downing hundreds of Allied aircraft from six nations.
*He brought upon destruction on Allied ports, disabling or slowing Allied operations.
*The damages brought upon Allied forces were at a cost of no more than a few dozen pilots.
Although by now Nagumo's name was associated with the wild successes of the Japanese navy, Yamamoto still believed that the fleet carriers of the navy should be commanded by someone who was more daring and believed more in the strength of air power. Nagumo, however, had secured himself in his command based on his seniority over any other officer who had been available for Yamamoto to choose as a replacement. At the Battle of Midway, Nagumo's near-perfect record finally saw an end. With a combination of reasons such as Admiral
Osami Nagano's insistence of a simultaneous Aleutian operation and Yamamoto's overly-complex fleet operations, Nagumo saw a devastating loss of four fleet carriers at the conclusion of the battle. Nagumo later sought revenge against the American advances in Guadalcanal, but actions there was largely indecisive, and in hindsight the actions there would slowly fritter away Japan's maritime strength.
After Guadacanal, Nagumo was demoted to various unimportant posts before being given command of a small naval flotilla in the Marianas. On
June 15,
1944, days after the failed
Philippine Sea offensive by Vice Admiral
Jisaburo Ozawa cost Japan 500 Japanese aircraft, Nagumo and his Army peer General
Yoshitsugu Saito attempted to defend the island of Saipan against the American juggernaut. On
July 6, during the last stages of the Allied conquest of that island, Nagumo committed suicide for his failure to hold Saipan. His remains was later found by American Marines in the cave where he spent his last days as the commander of the Saipan defenders.
