Contra (guerrillas)
The
Contras (from the
Spanish term
La Contra, short for 'movement of the
contrarrevolucionarios') were the armed opponents of
Nicaragua's
Sandinista Junta of National Reconstruction following the July 1979 overthrow of
Anastasio Somoza Debayle (which ended the Somoza dynasty), and continuing throughout the
following decade. The label was commonly used by the
United States press to cover a range of groups opposed to the Sandinistas, who had little or no ideological unity and many of whom supported the revolution against Somoza. Some references use the uncapitalized form,
contra, which means 'against' or 'counter' in
Spanish.
The Contras initially received financial and military support from the
Argentine government and the US through the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Contras would later receive aid through clandestine initiatives by figures in the administration of
President Ronald Reagan. They received some support from Nicaraguans opposed to the Sandinistas'
nationalization of their land, formation of large farming cooperatives, and mistreatment of dissenters. They were opposed by some Nicaraguans as well as foreign
human rights organizations who viewed their tactics, which included the targeting of civilians, as brutal and indiscriminate.
Early opposition to the Sandinistas comprised many disparate strands. Though the escaped remnants of Somoza's National Guard disintegrated as a unified force, some members joined groups such as the Anti-Sandinista Guerrilla Special Forces, the 15th of September Legion, and the National Army of Liberation. However, few Guardsmen were actively raiding into Nicaragua.
Meanwhile, some of the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie, whose discontent with Somoza had led them to back the Sandinistas, had soon become disillusioned by Sandinista rule. Businessman José Francisco Cardenal went into exile and founded the Nicaraguan Democratic Union (UDN), with the Nicaraguan Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARN) as its armed wing.
The earliest contras inside Nicaragua were MILPAS,
peasant militias led by former Sandinista supporters. These militias were the majority of the first Contra groups formed in 1980-1981 in
Honduras, Nicaragua's northern neighbour, allying in August 1981 as the
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (
Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense, FDN) under the command of former
National Guard (army) colonel Enrique Bermúdez and Jaime Irving Steidel, a
Honduran-born Field Commander, later replaced by Oscar Sobalvarro. A joint political directorate was created in February 1983 under businessman and anti-Sandinista politician
Adolfo Calero.
The creation of the
Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) and its armed wing, the Sandino Revolutionary Front (FRS), in April 1982 saw a second front open in the war. The group was founded in neighboring
Costa Rica by
Edén Pastora (
Comandante Cero), a former Sandinista and participant in the August 1978 seizure of Somoza's palace. ARDE consisted largely of Sandinista
dissidents and veterans of the anti-Somoza campaign who opposed the increased influence of
Cuban officials in the
Managua junta. Proclaiming his ideological distance from the FDN, Pastora nevertheless styled his force the "southern front" in a common campaign.
A third force, Misurasata, appeared among the
Miskito,
Sumo and Rama
Amerindian peoples of Nicaragua's
Atlantic coast, who in December 1981 found themselves in conflict with the authorities following what the government later called an "ill-judged modernisation drive," and what the Miskitos themselves believed to be a
genocidal attempt to force the tribes to participate in the revolution. They had a number of grievances against the Sandinistas, including:
*Unilateral natural resource exploitation policies which denied Indians access to much of their traditional land base and severely restricted their subsistence activities.
*The arrest, imprisonment and subsequent execution of the majority of the Misurasata leadership.
*The military occupation, bombing, or deliberate destruction of over half of all Miskito and Sumu villages in the region, and the forced conscription of Indian youth into the Nicaraguan military.
*Forced removal of at least 10,000 Indians from their traditional lands to relocation and re-education centers in the interior of the country, and subsequent burning of their villages.
*Economic embargoes and blockades against native villages not sympathetic to the government.
In 1983 the Misurasata movement, led by Brooklyn Rivera, split, with the breakaway Misura group of Stedman Fagoth allying itself more closely with the FDN. A subsequent autonomy statute in September 1987 largely defused Miskito resistance.
US officials were active in attempting to unite the Contra groups. In June 1985, they reorganized as the
United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO), under the leadership of Calero, Arturo Cruz and Alfonso Robelo, all former members of the original Sandinista cadre; after its dissolution early in 1987, the Nicaraguan Resistance (RN) was organized along similar lines in May. Splits within the rebel movement emerged with Pastora's defection in May 1984 and Misurasata's April 1985 accommodation with the Sandinista government.
Mediation by other
Central American governments under Costa Rican leadership led to the Sapoa ceasefire agreement of
March 23, 1988, which, along with additional agreements in February and August of 1989, provided for the Contras' disarmament and reintegration into Nicaraguan society and
politics. The agreements also called for internationally-monitored elections which were subsequently held on
February 25, 1990.
Violeta Chamorro, former Sandinista and widow of anti-Somoza journalist
Pedro Chamorro, defeated Sandinista leader
Daniel Ortega and became
President with the backing of the
center-right UNO. Some Contra elements and disaffected Sandinistas would return briefly to armed opposition in the 1990s, sometimes styled as
recontras or
revueltos, but these groups were subsequently persuaded to disarm.
See also the Iran-Contra affairA key role in the development of the Contra alliance was played by the
United States following
Ronald Reagan's assumption of the presidency in January 1981. Reagan accused the Sandinistas of importing Cuban-style
socialism and aiding
leftist guerrillas in
El Salvador. On
November 23 of that year, Reagan signed the
top secret National Security Decision Directive 17 (NSDD-17), giving the CIA the authority to recruit and support the Contras with $19 million in military aid. The effort to support the Contras was one component of the
Reagan Doctrine, which called for providing military support to movements opposing
Soviet-supported,
communist governments.
In 1984, Nicaragua filed a suit in the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the United States (
Nicaragua vs. United States), which resulted in a 1986 judgment against the US, calling on it to "cease and to refrain" from the "unlawful use of force" against Nicaragua, through such actions as the placement of underwater mines by CIA operatives and training, funding and support for the guerrilla forces. [
1] The court, whose jurisdiction the Reagan administration did not accept, ruled that the US was "in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to use force against another state" and was ordered to pay reparations.
The US, which did not participate in the merits phase of the proceedings, maintained that the ICJ's power did not supersede the
Constitution of the United States and argued that the court did not seriously consider the Nicaraguan role in El Salvador, whose intervention the court would not accept. The latter argument was affirmed by the primary dissenting justices, including Judge Schwebel of the US who determined that "Nicaragua does not come before the Court with clean hands." [
2]
Direct military aid was interrupted by the
Boland Amendment, passed by the
United States Congress in December 1982, and subsequently extended in October 1984 to forbid action by not only the Defense Department and the
Central Intelligence Agency but all US government agencies. Administration officials sought to arrange funding and military supplies by means of third-parties, culminating in the
Iran-Contra Affair of 1986-1987. On
February 3, 1988 the
United States House of Representatives rejected President Reagan's request for $36.25 million to aid the Contras.
The issue of drug money and its importance in funding the Nicaraguan conflict was the subject of various reports and publications. The 1989 book,
Kings of Cocaine, details charges of Sandinista involvement in cocaine smuggling.
Barry Seal, a Medellin cartel pilot took photos of a high ranking Sandinista official unloading cocaine shipments at a Sandinista military airport.
Senator John Kerry's 1988
Committee on Foreign Relations report on Contra drug links concluded that "senior U.S. policy makers were not immune to the idea that drug money was a perfect solution to the Contras' funding problems." [
3] According to the
National Security Archive,
Oliver North, an important official in the affair, had been in contact with
Manuel Noriega, the military leader of
Panama later convicted on drug charges, whom he personally met. Critics of the report pointed out that there was no tangible evidence whatsoever, that many of the witnesses (such as Karol Prado) were ever Sandinistas, and as a result, no charges were filed in any country.
The Reagan administration's support for the Contras continued to stir controversy well into the 1990s. In August 1996,
San Jose Mercury News reporter
Gary Webb published a series titled
Dark Alliance, alleging that the origins of
crack cocaine in California was the responsibility of the Contras. [
4] [
5] Webb's controversial and highly damaging revelations were disputed at the time, but later revelations confirmed some of his findings.
Freedom of Information Act inquiries by the National Security Archive and other investigators unearthed a number of documents showing that
White House officials, including Oliver North, knew about and supported using money raised via
drug trafficking to fund the Contras. The
Justice Department denied the allegations.
*Belli, Humberto. (1985).
Breaking Faith: The Sandinista Revolution and Its Impact on Freedom and Christian Faith in Nicaragua. Crossway Books/The Puebla Institute.
*Brody, Reed. (1985).
Contra Terror in Nicaragua: Report of a Fact-Finding Mission: September 1984-January 1985. Boston: South End Press. ISBN 0896083136.
*Brown, Timothy. (2001).
The Real Contra War: Highlander Peasant Resistance in Nicaragua. University of Oklahoma Press. ISBN 0806132523.
*
Chamorro, Edgar. (1987).
Packaging the Contras: A Case of CIA Disinformation. New York: Institute for Media Analysis. ISBN 0941781089; ISBN 0941781070.
*Christian, Shirley. (1986)
Nicaragua, Revolution In the Family. New York: Vintage Books.
*Cox, Jack. (1987)
Requiem in the Tropics: Inside Central America. UCA Books.
*Cruz S., Arturo J. (1989).
Memoirs of a Counterrevolutionary. (1989). New York: Doubleday.
*Dickey, Christopher. (1985, 1987).
With the Contras: A Reporter in the Wilds of Nicaragua. New York: Simon & Schuster.
*Garvin, Glenn. (1992).
Everybody Had His Own Gringo: The CIA and the Contras. Washington: Brassey's.
*Gugliota Guy. (1989).
Kings of Cocaine Inside the Medellin Cartel. Simon and Shuster.
*Horton, Lynn.
Peasants in Arms: War and Peace in the Mountains of Nicaragua, 1979-1994. (1998). Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies.
*
Kirkpatrick, Jeane J.. (1982)
Dictatorships and Double Standards. Touchstone. ISBN 0671438360
*Miranda, Roger, and William Ratliff. (1993, 1994) "The Civil War in Nicaragua: Inside the Sandinistas." New Brunswick, NY: Transaction Publishers.
*Moore, John Norton (1987).
The Secret War in Central America: Sandinista Assault on World Order. University Publications of America.
*Pardo-Maurer, Rogelio. (1990)
The Contras, 1980-1989: A Special Kind of Politics. New York: Praeger.
*Persons, David E. (1987)
A Study of the History and Origins of the Nicaraguan Contras. Nacogdoches, Texas: Total Vision Press. Stephen Austin University Special Collections.
*Webb, Gary (1998).
Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion, Seven Stories Press. ISBN 1888363681 (hardcover, 1998), ISBN 1888363932 (paperback, 1999).
*
Iran-Contra Affair*
Sandinista National Liberation Front*
Women and the Armed Struggle in Nicaragua*
Ken Loach's
Carla's Song film
*
"Nicaragua 1981-1990: Destabilization in slow motion, by
William Blum.
*
"Dark Alliance", by
Gary Webb,
San Jose Mercury News, August 1996.
*
"The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations" - National Security Archive.
