Essence
In
philosophy,
essence is the attribute (or set of attributes) that make an object or substance what it fundamentally is, and that it has
necessary, in contrast with
accident, properties that the object or substance has
contingently and without which the substance could have existed. The notion of essence has acquired many slightly but importantly different shades of meaning throughout the history of philosophy; most of them derive from its use by
Aristotle and its evolution within the
scholastic tradition.
Based on such considerations, essence was a key notion of
alchemy (cf.
quintessence).
In the modern period, some philosophers—such as
George Santayana—have kept the vocabulary of essences but have abolished the distinction between essence and accidents. For Santayana, the
essence of a being is simply everything about it, independent of the question of existence. Essence is what-ness as distinct from that-ness.
Existentialism is founded on
Jean-Paul Sartre's statement that "existence precedes essence." In as much as "essence" is a cornerstone of all
metaphysical philosophy and the grounding of
Rationalism, Sartre's statement was a refutation of the philosophical system that had come before him (and, in particular, that of
Husserl,
Hegel, and
Heidegger). Instead of "is-ness" generating "actuality," he argued that existence and actuality come first, and the essence is derived afterward.
"Essence," in metaphysics, is often synonymous with the
soul, and some existentialists argue that individuals gain their souls and spirits after they exist, that they develop their souls and spirits during their lifetimes. For Kierkegaard, however, the emphasis was upon essence as "nature." For him, there is no such thing as "human nature" that determines how a human will behave or what a human will be. First, he or she exists, and then comes attribute.
Jean-Paul Sartre's more materialist and skeptical existentialism furthered this existentialist tenet by flatly refuting any metaphysical essence, any soul, and arguing instead that there is merely existence, with attributes as essence.
Thus, in existentialist discourse, essence can refer to physical aspect or attribute, to the ongoing being of a person (the character or internally determined goals), or to the infinite inbound within the human (which can be lost, can atrophy, or can be developed into an equal part with the finite), depending upon the type of existentialist discourse.
Karl Marx was, along with Kierkegaard, a follower of
Hegel's, and he, too, developed a philosophy in reaction to his master. In his early work, Marx used
Aristotalian style
teleology and derived a concept of humanity's essential nature. Marx's
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 describe
a theory of alienation based on human existence being completely different from human essence. Marx said human nature was social, and that humanity had the distinct essence of free activity and consciouss thought. Since capitalism denies the fulfillment of these aspects of human nature, Marx argued that people were alienated.
Some scholars, such as Philip Kain, have argued that Marx abandoned the idea of a human essence, but many other scholars point to Marx's continued discussion of these ideas despite the decline of terms such as essence and alienation in his later work.
Within the
Madhyamika school of
Mahayana Buddhism,
Candrakirti identifies the
self as being:
an essence of things that does not depend on others; it is an intrinsic nature. The non-existence of that is selflessness. ::--
Bodhisattvayogacaryācatuḥśatakaṭikā 256.1.7Indeed the concept of Buddhist
Emptiness, is the strong assertion that all phenomena are
empty of any essence - demonstrating that anti-essentialism lies at the very root of Buddhist praxis. Therefore, within this school it is the innate belief in
essence that is considered to be a cognitive obscuration which serves to cause all suffering. However, the school also rejects the tenets of
Idealism and
Materialism; instead, the ideas of
truth or
existence, along with any assertions that depend upon them are limited to their function within the contexts and conventions that assert them, akin to
Relativism or
Pragmatism. For them, replacement paradoxes such as
Ship of Theseus are answered by stating that the Ship of Thesesus remains so (within the conventions that assert it) until it ceases to function as the Ship of Theseus.
*
Accident (philosophy)*
Haecceity*
Modal logic*
Quiddity*
Substance
