First Macedonian War
The
First Macedonian War (
215 BC -
205 BC) was fought by
Rome, allied (after
211 BC) with the
Aetolian League and
Attalus I of
Pergamon, against
Philip V of Macedon, contemporaneously with the
Second Punic War against
Carthage. There were no decisive engagements, and the war ended in a stalemate.
During the war
Macedon attempted to gain control over parts of
Illyria and
Greece, but without success. It is commonly thought that these skirmishes with Philip in the east prevented Macedon from aiding the Carthaginian general
Hannibal in the war with Rome.
The "
Peace of Phoenice", a treaty drawn up at Phoenice, in
205 BC, formally ended the war.
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Coin of Philip V of Macedon. |
Rome's preoccupation with its war with Carthage provided an opportunity for Philip V of Macedon, to attempt to extend his power westward. According to the ancient Greek historian
Polybius, an important factor in Philip's decision to take advantage of this opportunity was the influence of
Demetrius of Pharos.
Demetrius had been, after the
First Illyrian War in
229 BC, ruler of most of coastal
Illyria. However, in
219 BC, during the
Second Illyrian War he was defeated by the Romans and fled to the court of Philip.
Involved in a war with the
Aetolians, Philip learned by messenger of the victory of Hannibal, over the Romans, at
Lake Trasimene in June of
217 BC. Philip at first showed the letter only to Demetrius. Perhaps seeing a chance to recover his kingdom, Demetrius immediately advised the young king to make peace with the Aetolians, and turn his attentions toward Illyria and Italy. Polybius quotes Demetrius as saying:
For Greece is already entirely obedient to you, and will remain so: the Achaeans from genuine affection; the Aetolians from the terror which their disasters in the present war have inspired them. Italy, and your crossing into it, is the first step in the acquirement of universal empire, to which no one has a better claim than yourself. And now is the moment to act when the Romans have suffered a reverse.Philip was easily persuaded.
Philip, at once began negotiations with the
Aetolians. At a conference on the coast near
Naupactus, Philip met the Aetolian leaders, and a peace treaty was concluded. Polybius quotes the Aetolian Agelaus of Naupactus as having given the following speech in favor of peace:
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The ancient Region of Aetolia, Greece |
The best thing of all is that the Greeks should not go to war with each other at all, but give the gods hearty thanks if by all speaking with one voice, and joining hands like people crossing a stream, they may be able to repel the attacks of barbarians and save themselves and their cities. But if this is altogether impossible, in the present juncture at least we ought to be unanimous and on our guard, when we see the bloated armaments and the vast proportions assumed by the war in the west. For even now it is evident to any one who pays even a moderate attention to public affairs, that whether the Carthaginians conquer the Romans, or the Romans the Carthaginians, it is in every way improbable that the victors will remain contented with the empire of Sicily and Italy. They will move forward: and will extend their forces and their designs farther than we could wish. Wherefore, I beseech you all to be on your guard against the danger of the crisis, and above all you, O King. You will do this, if you abandon the policy of weakening the Greeks, and thus rendering them an easy prey to the invader; and consult on the contrary for their good as you would for your own person, and have a care for all parts of Greece alike, as part and parcel of your own domains. If you act in this spirit, the Greeks will be your warm friends and faithful coadjutors in all your undertakings; while foreigners will be less ready to form designs against you, seeing with dismay the firm loyalty of the Greeks. If you are eager for action, turn your eyes to the west, and let your thoughts dwell upon the wars in Italy. Wait with coolness the turn of events there, and seize the opportunity to strike for universal dominion. Nor is the present crisis unfavourable for such a hope. But I intreat of you to postpone your controversies and wars with the Greeks to a time of greater tranquillity; and make it your supreme aim to retain the power of making peace or war with them at your own will. For if once you allow the clouds now gathering in the west to settle upon Greece, I fear exceedingly that the power of making peace or war, and in a word all these games which we are now playing against each other, will be so completely knocked out of the hands of us all, that we shall be praying heaven to grant us only this power of making war or peace with each other at our own will and pleasure, and of settling our own disputes.Philip spent the winter of
217–
216 BC building a fleet of 100 warships, according to Polybius, a thing "hardly any Macedonian king had ever done before", and training men to row them.
Macedon probably lacked the resources to build and maintain the kind of fleet necessary to match the Romans. Polybius says that Philip had no "hope of fighting the Romans at sea", perhaps referring to a lack of experience and training.
At any rate, Philip chose to build
lembi. These were the small fast galleys used by the Illyrians. They had a single bank of oars and were able to carry 50 soldiers in addition to the rowers. With these, Philip could hope to avoid or evade the Roman fleet, preoccupied as he hoped it would be with Hannibal, and based, as it was, at
Lilybaeum in western
Sicily.
Philip had in the meantime expanded his territories west along the
Apsus and
Genusus river valleys, right up to the borders with Illyria. Philips' plan was it seems, to first take the Illyrian coasts, conquer the area between the coasts and Macedon, and use the new land link to provide a route for reinforcements for a rapid crossing of the straits to Italy.
At the beginning of summer, Philip and his fleet left Macedon, sailed through the
Euripus Strait, between the island of
Euboea and
Boeotia on the Greek mainland, and then rounded
Cape Malea, before dropping anchor off the Islands of
Cephalenia and
Leucas, to await word of the location of the Roman fleet. Informed that it was still at Lilybaeum, he sailed north to
Apollonia in Illyria.
However as the Macedonia fleet neared the island of
Sazon, Philip heard a report that some Roman
quinqueremes had been seen headed for Apollonia. Convinced that the entire Roman fleet was sailing to apprehend him, Philip ordered an immediate return to Cephalenia. Polybius speaks of "panic" and "disorder" to describe the fleet's hasty retreat, and says that in fact the Roman's had sent only a squadron of ten ships, and that because of "inconsiderate alarm", Philip had missed his best chance to achieve his aims in Illyria, returning to Macedon, "without loss indeed, but with considerable dishonour".
After hearing of Rome's nearly disastrous defeat at the hands of Hannibal at
Cannae in
216 BC, Philip sent ambassadors to Hannibal's camp in Italy, to negotiate an alliance. There they concluded in the summer of
215 BC a treaty, the text of which is given by Polybius. In it they pledge in general terms, mutual support and defense and to be enemies to each other's enemies (excepting current allies). Specifically they promise support against Rome, and that Hannibal shall have the right to make peace with Rome, but that any peace would include Philip and that Rome would be forced to give up control of
Corcyra,
Apollonia,
Epidamnus,
Pharos,
Dimale,
Parthini, and
Atitania and "to restore to Demetrius of Pharos all those of his friends now in the dominion of Rome."
The treaty as set down by Polybius, makes no mention of an invasion of Italy by Philip, the debacle at Sazon perhaps having soured Philip on such a venture — something which in any case Hannibal may not have desired.
On their way back to Macedon, Philips' emissaries along with emissaries from Hannibal were captured, by Publius Valerius Flaccus, commander of the Roman fleet patrolling the
Calabrian coast. A letter from Hannibal to Philip, and the terms of their agreement were discovered.
Philips' alliance with Carthage caused immediate dismay in Rome, hardpressed as they already were. An additional twenty-five warships were at once outfitted and sent to join Flaccus' fleet of twenty-five warships already at
Tarentum, with orders to guard the Italian
Adriatic coast, and to try to determine Philips' intent and if necessary cross over to Macedonia, keeping Philip confined there.
In the late summer of
214 BC, Philip again attempted an Illyrian invasion by sea, with a fleet of 120 lembi. He captured
Oricum which was lightly defended, and sailing up the Aous (modern
Vjosë) river he besieged
Apollonia.
Meanwhile the Romans had moved the fleet from Tarentum to
Brundisium to continue the watch on the movements of Philip and a
legion had been sent in support, all under the command of the Roman
propraetor Marcus Valerius Laevinus. Upon receiving word from Oricum of events in Illyria, Laevinus crossed over with his fleet and army. Landing at Oricum, Laevinus was able to retake the town with little fighting.
In the account given by Livy, Laevinus, hearing that Apollonia was under siege, sent 2000 men under the command of Quintus Naevius Crista, to the mouth of the river. Avoiding Philips' army, Crista was able to enter the city by night unobserved. The following night, catching Philips' forces by surprise, he attacked and routed their camp. Philip, escaping to his ships in the river, made his way over the mountains and back to Macedonia, having burned his fleet and left many thousands of men dead or prisoner, along with all of his armies possessions, behind. Laevinus and his fleet wintered at Oricum.
Twice thwarted in attempts at invasion of Illyria by sea, and now constrained by Laevinus' fleet in the Adriatic, Philip spent the next two years
213–
212 BC making advances in Illyria by land. Keeping clear of the coast, he took the inland towns of Atintania, and Dimale, and subdued the Illyrian tribes of the Dassaretae and the Parthini and at least the southern Ardiaei.
He was finally able to gain access to the Adriatic by capturing Lissus and its seemingly impregnable citadel, after which the surrounding territories surrendered. Perhaps the capture of Lissus rekindled in Philip hopes of an Italian invasion. However the loss of his fleet, meant that Philip would be dependent on Carthage for passage to and from Italy, making the prospect of invasion considerably less appealing.
Desiring to prevent Philip from aiding Carthage in Italy and elsewhere, Rome sought out land allies in Greece.
Laevinus had begun exploring the possibility of an alliance with the Aetolian League, as early as
212 BC. The Aetolians, war weary, had made peace with Philip at Naupactus in
217 BC. However five years later the pendulum had swung in the other direction, the war faction was on the ascendency, and the Aetolians were once again ready to consider taking up arms against their traditional enemy of Macedon.
In
211 BC an Aetolian assembly was convened for discussions with Rome. Laevinus pointed out the recent capture of
Syracuse and
Capua in the war against Carthage, as evidence of Rome's rising fortunes, and offered to ally with them against the Macedonians. A treaty was signed. The Aetolians would conduct operations on land, the Romans at sea. Rome would keep any slaves and other booty taken and Aetolia would receive control of any territory acquired.
Another provision of the treaty allowed for the inclusion of certain allies of the League:
Elis,
Sparta,
Messenia and
Attalus I of
Pergamon, as well as two Roman clients, the Illyrians
Pleuratus and
Scerdilaidas.
Later that summer Laevinus seized the main town of Zacynthus, except for its citadel, and the
Acarnanian town of Oeniadae and the island of Nasos which he handed over to the Aetolians. He then withdrew his fleet to
Corcyra for the winter.
Upon hearing of the Roman alliance with Aetolia, Philip's first action was to secure his northern borders. He conducted raids in Illyria at Oricum and Apollonia and seized the frontier town of Sintia in
Dardania or perhaps
Paionia. He marched rapidly south through
Pelagonia,
Lyncestis and
Bottiaea and on to
Tempe which he garrisoned with 4000 men. He turned north again into
Thrace, attacking the
Maedi and their chief city
Iamphorynna before returning to Macedon.
No sooner had Philip arrived there, when he received an urgent plea for help from his ally the Acarnanians.
Scopas the Aetolian
strategos (general), had mobilized the Aetolians army and was preparing to invade Acarnania. Desperate and overmatched, but determined to resist, the Arcanians sent their women, children and old men to seek refuge in
Epirus, and the rest marched to the frontier, having sworn an oath to fight to the death, "invoking a terrible curse" upon any who were forsworn. Hearing of the Acarnanians' grim determination, the Aetolians hesitated. Then learning of Philip's approach they finally abandoned their invasion. After which Philip retired to
Pella for the winter.
In the spring of
210 BC, Laevinus again sailed from Corcyra with his fleet, and with the Aetolians, captured
Phocian Anticyra. Rome enslaved the inhabitants and Aetolia took possession of the town.
Although there was some fear of Rome and concern with her methods, the coalition arrayed against Philip continued to grow. As allowed for by the treaty, Pergamon, Elis and Messenia, followed by Sparta, all agreed to join the alliance against Macedon. The Roman fleet together with the Pergamon fleet controlled the sea, and Macedon and her allies were threatened on land by the rest of the coalition. The Roman strategy of encumbering Philip with a war among Greeks in Greece was succeeding, so much so that when Laevinus went to Rome to take up his
consulship, he was able to report that the legion deployed against Philip could be safely withdrawn.
However the Eleans, Messenians and Spartans remained passive throughout 210 BC, and Philip continued to make advances. He invested and took Echinus, using extensive siegeworks, having beaten back an attempt to relieve the town by the Aetolian
strategos Dorimachus and the Roman fleet, now commanded by the proconsul
Publius Sulpicius Galba. Moving west Philip probably also took
Phalara the port city of
Lamia, in the
Maliac Gulf.
Sulpicius and Dorimachus took
Aegina, an island in the
Saronic Gulf, which the Aetolians sold to Attalus, the Pergamene king, for thirty
talents, and which he was to use as his base of operations against Macedon in the
Aegean Sea.
In the spring of (
209 BC), Philip received requests for help from his ally the
Achaean League in the
Peloponnesus who were being attacked by Sparta and the Aetolians. He also heard that Attalus, had been elected one of the two supreme commanders of the Aetolian League, and rumors that he intended to crossover the Aegean from
Asia Minor. Philip marched south into Greece. At Lamia he was met by an Aetolian force, supported by Roman and Pergamene auxiliaries, under the command of the Attalus' colleague as
strategos, the Aetolian
Phyrrhias. Philip won two battles at Lamia, inflicting heavy casualties on Phyrrhias' troops. The Aetolians and their allies were forced to retreat inside the city walls, where they remained, unwilling anymore to give battle.
From Lamia, Philip went to Phalara. There he met representatives from the neutral states of
Egypt,
Rhodes,
Athens and
Chios who were trying to end the war—they were trading states and the war was probably hurting trade. Livy says that they were concerned "not so much for the Aetolians, who were more warlike than the rest of the Greeks, as for the liberty of Greece, which would be seriously endangered if Philip and his kingdom took an active part in Greek politics." With them was Amynandor of
Athamania, representing the Aetolians. A truce of thirty days and a peace conference at Achaea were arranged.
Philip marched to
Chalcis in
Euboea, which he garrisoned to block Attalus' landing there, then continued on to
Aegium for the conference. The conference was interrupted by a report that Attalus had arrived at Aegina, and the Roman fleet was at Naupactus. The Aetolian representatives, emboldened by these events, at once demanded that Philip return Pylos to the Messenians, Atintania to Rome and the Ardiaei to Scerdilaidas and Pleuratus. "Indignant", Philip quit the negotiations telling the assembly that they "might bear him witness that whilst he was seeking a basis for peace, the other side were determined to find a pretext for war".
From Naupactus, Sulplicius sailed east to
Corinth and
Sicyon, conducting raids there. Philip, with his cavalry caught the Romans ashore and was able to drive them back to their ships, with the Romans returning to Naupactus.
Philip then joined
Cycliadas the Achaean general, near
Dyme for a joint attack on the city of
Elis, the main Aetolian base of operations against Achaea. However, Sulplicius had sailed into
Cyllene and reinforced Elis with 4000 Romans. Leading a charge, Philip was thrown from his horse. Fighting on foot Philip became the object of a fierce battle, finally escaping on another horse. The next day Philip captured the stronghold of
Phyricus, taking 4000 prisoners and 20,000 animals. Hearing news of Illyrian incursions in the north Philip abandoned Aetolia and returned to
Demetrias in
Thessaly.
Meanwhile Sulpicius sailed round into the Aegean and joined Attalus on Aegina for the winter. In (
208 BC) the combined fleet of thirty-five Pergamene and twenty-five Roman ships failed to take
Lemnos, but occupied and plundered the countryside of the island of Peparethos (Skopelos), both Macedonian possessions.
Attalus and Sulpicius then attended a meeting in
Heraclea of the Council of the Aetolians which included representatives from Egypt and Rhodes, who were continuing to try to arrange a peace. Learning of the conference and the presence of Attalus, Philip marched rapidly south in an attempt to breakup the conference and catch the enemy leaders, but arrived too late.
Surrounded by foes, Philip was forced to adopt a defensive policy. He distributed his commanders and forces and setup a system of beacon fires at various high places to communicate instantly any enemy movements.
After leaving Heraclea, Attalus and Sulpicius sacked both
Oreus, on the northern coast of
Euboea and
Opus, the chief city of eastern
Locris. The spoils from Oreus had been reserved for Sulpicius, who returned there, while Attalus stayed to collect the spoils from Opus. However, with their forces divided, Philip, alerted by signal fire, attacked and took Opus. Attalus caught by surprise was barely able to escape to his ships.
Although Philip considered Attalus' escape a bitter defeat, it proved to be the turning-point of the war. Attalus was forced to return to Pergamon, when he learned at Opus that, perhaps at the urging of Philip,
Prusias I, king of Bithynia and related to Philip by marriage, was moving against Pergamon. Sulpicius returned to Aegina. Free from the pressure of the combined Roman and Pergamon fleets, Philip was able to resume the offensive against the Aetolians. He captured Thronium, followed by the towns Tithronium and Drymaea north of the
Cephisus, controlling all of Epicnemidian
Locris, and took back control of Oreus.
The neutral trading powers were ever trying to arrange a peace. At
Elateia, Philip had met with the same would be peacemakers from Egypt and Rhodes, who had been at the meeting in Heraclea, and again in the spring of
207 BC, but to no avail. Representatives of Egypt, Rhodes,
Byzantium, Chios,
Mytilene and perhaps
Athens also met again with the Aetolians that spring. The war was going Philips way, but the Aetolians, although now abandoned by both Pergamon and Rome, were not yet ready to make peace on Philip's terms. However, after another season's fighting, they finally were. In
206 BC, the Aetolians, without Rome's consent, sued for a separate peace on conditions imposed by Philip.
The following spring the Romans sent
Puplius Sempronius Tuditanus with 35 ships and 11,000 men to
Dyrrachium in Illiria, where he incited the Parthini to revolt and laid siege to Dimale. However when Philip arrived Sempronious broke off the siege and withdrew inside the walls of Apollonia. Sempronius tried unsuccessfully to entice the Aetolians to break there peace with Philip. With no more allies in Greece, but having achieved their objective of preventing Philip from aiding Hannibal, the Romans were ready to make peace. A treaty was drawn up at Phoenice in
205 BC, the so-called "
Peace of Phoenice", formally ended the First Macedonian War.
Polybius
2.11 Polybius
3.16,
3.18–19,
4.66 Polybius,
5.101 Polybius
5.102 Polybius
5.103–-105 Polybius 5.103
Polybius 5.104
. According to Walbank p 66, footnote 5, this speech, "nonwithstanding rhetorical elements … bears the mark of a true version based on contemporary record." Polybius 5.109
Walbank p. 69, Polybius, 5.1
, 5.95
, 5.108
Polybius 5.109
Wilkes p. 157, Polybius, 2.3
Polybius 5.109
Polybius 5.108
Walbank p. 69
Polybius 5.110
Polybius 7.9
According to Walbank p. 71, note 1, the version of the treaty described in Livy 23.33.9-12,
which mention an Italian invasion by Philip, "are worthless annalistic fabrications".
Walbank p. 69, note 3
Livy 23.34
Livy 23.38
. Livy says that 20 ships were outfitted and along with the five ships that transported the agents to Rome, were sent to join Flaccus' fleet of 25 ships. In the same passage he says that 30 ships left Ostia for Tarentum and talks about a combined fleet of 55. Walbank p. 75 note 2, says that the 55 number given by Livy is a mistake, citing Holleaux, 187, n. 1. Walbank p. 75, Livy 24.40
Livy 24.10–11, 20
Livy 23.40
. Livy's account is suspect, see Walbank p. 76 note 1. Walbank p. 80, Livy 27.30
, 29.12
Polybius 8.15–16
Livy 24.13
, 25.23
Walbank p. 82, Livy 25.30
, 26.24
Livy 26.40
. According to Walbank, p. 84 note 2, "Livy accidentally omits Messenia and erroneously describes Pleuratus as king of Thrace." Livy 26.24
Livy 26.25
, Polybius 9.40
Livy 26.26
, Polybius 9.39
. Livy says that Anticyra was Locrian, but modern scholars disagree, see Walbank p. 87, note 2. Polybius 9.37–39
, 10.15
Polybius 9,30
Livy 26.28
Polybius 9.41–42
Livy 27.29
Walbank p. 89-90
Livy 27.30
Livy 27.31
Livy 27.32
Livy 27.33
Livy 28.5
Polybius 10.42
, Livy 28.5
Polybius 10.41
, Livy 28.5
Livy 28.6
Polybius 11.7
, Livy 28.7
Livy 28.7
, Walbank p. 96 Livy 28.8
Livy 28.7
Polybius 11.4
According to Walbank p. 102 note 2, Livy 29.12.3
"is spoilt by annalistic contamination, which, in the interests of Roman policy, tries to run the Aetolian peace and the return of the Romans as closely together as possible". Livy 29.12
*Hansen, Esther V.,
The Attalids of Pergamon, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press; London: Cornell University Press Ltd (1971). ISBN 0801406153.
*
Livy,
History of Rome, Rev. Canon Roberts (translator), Ernest Rhys (Ed.); (1905) London: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd.
*
Polybius,
Histories, Evelyn S. Shuckburgh (translator); London, New York. Macmillan (1889); Reprint Bloomington (1962).
*Walbank, F. W. (1940)
Philip V of Macedon*Wilkes, John,
The Illyrians, Blackwell Publishers (December 1, 1995). ISBN 0631198075
*
Military history of Greece*
Second Macedonian War*
Third Macedonian War*
Fourth Macedonian War
