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The Indian Ocean raid was a naval sortie by the Fast Carrier Strike Force of the Imperial Japanese Navy from 31 March to 10 April 1942 against Allied shipping and bases in the Indian Ocean. It was an early engagement of the Pacific campaign of World War II.

First Moves

Following the destruction of the ABDA forces in the battles around Java in February and March, the Japanese sortied into the Indian Ocean to destroy British seapower there and support the invasion of Burma. The Japanese force, commanded by Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, had six carriers: Akagi, Ryujo, Hiryu, Soryu, Shokaku, and Zuikaku. This powerful force left Staring Bay, Celebes on 26 March 1942.

Signal decrypts provided the British commander of the Eastern Fleet, Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville with warning of the Japanese sortie, and he retreated to Addu Atoll in the Maldive Islands, expecting an attack on 1 April or 2 April.

The first raids were against shipping in the Bay of Bengal by the carrier Ryujo and six cruisers under the command of Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa. They sank 23 ships, and five more were sunk by submarines off India's west coast.

When the expected attack on Ceylon failed to take place, Somerville sent the slow carrier Hermes back to Trincomalee for repairs, escorted by the heavy cruisers Cornwall and Dorsetshire, and the Australian destroyer HMAS Vampire.

On the evening of 4 April, the Japanese fleet was detected 400 miles south of Ceylon by a PBY Catalina flown by Squadron Leader Leonard Birchall of 413 Squadron. The location of the fleet was transmitted before the Catalina was shot down by a Zero fighter from the Hiryu.

Colombo

On 5 April 1942 the Japanese struck with a force of 125 aircraft, made up of 36 'Val' dive bombers and 53 'Kate' attack bombers with 36 Zero fighters as escort. The aircraft, under the command of Commander Mitsuo Fuchida of the Akagi, who had led the attack on Pearl Harbour, made landfall near Galle. They flew up the coast for half an hour in full view of everybody, but nobody informed the RAF at Ratmalana, whose aircraft were still on the ground as the Japanese flew overhead.

The Japanese attacked the naval base at Colombo, Ceylon, sinking the auxiliary cruiser Hector and the old destroyer Tenedos in the harbour, but losing a claimed eighteen planes to heavy flak (the Japanese only admitted to 5, three of them over land - as only three destroyed planes were discovered on land). The RAF lost at least 27 planes. Then Japanese search planes discovered the Cornwall and Dorsetshire, commanded by Captain Augustus Agar, 200 miles southwest of Ceylon and sank them, killing 424 men. A fuller account of the loss of these two ships is found in the article about Captain Agar.

On 6 April 1942 the Indian sloop Indus was sunk by air attack off the coast of Burma, off Akyab.

Trincomalee and Batticaloa

On 9 April 1942 the Japanese attacked the harbor at Trincomalee at 07:00. The British again had warning of the attack, and Hermes and her escorts had left the night before. They were returning to port when they were discovered at 08:55. Hermes had no aircraft on board, and so was defenceless when 70 bombers attacked her at 10:35 off Batticaloa. Hit 40 times, Hermes sank with the loss of 307 men. Vampire and the corvette Hollyhock were also sunk. The hospital ship Vita later picked up 590 survivors. The Royal Australian Air Force lost at least 8 Hurricanes and the Fleet Air Arm one Fairey Fulmar. The Japanese lost 5 bombers and 6 fighters, one in a suicide attack on the Trincomalee fuel tanks.

Results

The sortie demonstrated Japanese superiority in carrier operations, and exposed the unprofessional manner in which the RAF was run in the East, but it did not destroy British naval power in the Indian Ocean. It is arguable that, by making full use of signal intercepts, decryption, reconnaissance and superior radar, Somerville was able to save his fast carriers Indomitable and Formidable to fight another day. However, it might equally be said that the blunders made by the Royal Navy meant that the main fleet from Addu was not able to make contact with Nagumo's force as it intended.

Ceylon held most of the British Empire's resources of rubber after the fall of Malaya, and its occupation would have made the British position in India untenable. The failure of the Japanese to appreciate the strategic importance of the island led to their making no attempt to capture it. An invasion was feared by the British, who interpreted the Japanese failure to do so as due to heavy losses over Ceylon - and hence led to claims of a British victory.

References

* Noel Crusz, The Cocos Islands Mutiny, Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 2001.
* Michael Tominson, The Most Dangerous Moment: The Japanese Assault on Ceylon 1942, London: Granada, 1979.

External links

*Order of battle
*WW2DB.com: Raids into Indian Ocean
*Royal Air Force History: Battle for Ceylon

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Indian Ocean raid: Encyclopedia BETA

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