Network-centric warfare

Network-centric warfare (NCW), now commonly called Network-centric operations (NCO), is a new military doctrine or theory of war pioneered by the United States Department of Defense. NCW/NCO is an emerging theory of war in the information age that seeks to translate an information advantage into a competitive warfighting advantage through the robust networking of well informed geographically dispersed forces allowing new forms of organizational behavior. [1] This "networking" utilizes information technology via a robust network to allow increased information sharing, collaboration, and shared situational awareness, which, theoretically allows greater self-synchronization, speed of command, and mission effectiveness. The theory hypothesis has four basic tenets:
*A robustly networked force improves information sharing;
*Information sharing enhances the quality of information and shared situational awareness;
*Shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-synchronization, and enhances sustainability and speed of command; and
*These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness.

Network Enabled Capability (NEC) is a term used in the United Kingdom and elsewhere for a similar doctrine.

Background and history

The doctrine or theory of network-centric warfare for the United States military draws upon the work of many military strategists and policy theorists, including that of Vice-Admiral Arthur Cebrowski (often referred to as the "Godfather" of network-centric warfare)[2], Dr. David S. Alberts, who is credited with unifying and evolving the concepts of information superiority and network-centric warfare in a universal command and communications theory, called Power to the Edge, and John J. Garstka of the Office of Force Transformation in the United States Department of Defense (US DoD).

Network-centric warfare/operations is a cornerstone of the ongoing transformation effort at the Department of Defense initiated by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. It is also one of the five goals of the Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

See Revolution in Military Affairs for further information on what is now known as "defense transformation" or "transformation".

Vision

The vision for NCW/NCO is to exploit the power of networking and information sharing to improve operational effectiveness.

Tenets of Network Centric Operations:
* A Robustly Networked Force Improves Information Sharing
* Information Sharing And Collaboration Enhances the Quality of Information and Shared Situational Awareness
* Shared Situational Awareness Enables Collaboration and Self Synchronization and Enhances Sustainability and Speed of Command
* These in Turn Dramatically Increase Mission Effectiveness

Networking has the potential to provide significantly improved access to timely and relevant information to all warfighters and decision-makers at every echelon in the military hierarchy. A goal of improved networking is to provide ubiquitous connectivity throughout the organization, including individual infantry soldiers and ground vehicles, command centers, aircraft and naval vessels, and spacecraft. This improved networking has the potential to enable all elements to share information collected to be combined into a coherent, accurate picture of the battlefield, which is made available to all units. Every unit "sees" the sum of what all other units "see" and thus enjoy a greatly increased situation awareness. Evidence from ongoing military operations has demonstrated that having rapid access to reliable situational awareness and a relevant common operational picture will result in improved planning and more effective tactical decisions.

Related technologies and programs

The US DoD has mandated that the Global Information Grid (GIG) will be the primary technical framework to support NCW/NCO. Under this directive, all advanced weapons platforms, sensor systems, and command and control centers are eventually to be linked via the GIG. The term system of systems is often used to describe the results of these types of massive integration efforts.

The topic Net-Centric Enterprise Services addresses the applications context of the GIG.

A number of significant U.S. military programs are taking technical steps towards supporting network-centric warfare. These include the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) of the United States Navy and the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program in the United States Army.

Net-Centric Enterprise Solutions for Interoperability (NESI) provides, for all phases of the acquisition of net-centric solutions, actionable guidance that meets DoD Network-Centric Warfare goals. The guidance in NESI is derived from the higher level, more abstract concepts provided in various directives, policies and mandates such as the Net-Centric Operations and Warfare Reference Model (NCOW RM) and the ASD(NII) Net-Centric Checklist.

Doctrinal tenets of network-centric warfare

The doctrine of NCW for the United States armed forces draws its highest level of guidance from the concept of "team warfare", meaning the integration and synchronization of all appropriate capabilities across the various services, ranging from Army to Air Force to Coast Guard. This is part of the principle of joint warfare.

Some architectural and design challenges

* The complexity of the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) offers insight into the challenges of integrating numerous different communications systems into a unified whole. It is intended to be a software-defined radio for battlefield communications that will be backwards compatible with a very large number of other military and civilian radio systems.
* The problem of coordinating bandwidth usage in a battlespace is a significant challenge, when every piece of mobile equipment and human participant becomes a potential source (or relay) of RF emissions.
* It is difficult to efficiently transfer information between networks having different levels of security classification. Although multi-level security systems provide part of the solution, human intervention and decision-making is still needed to determine what specific data can and cannot be transferred.
* Accurate locational awareness is limited when maneuvering in areas where Global Positioning System (GPS) coverage is weak or non-existent. These areas include inside buildings, caves, etc. as well as built-up areas and urban canyons, which are also the settings for many modern military operations. Much work on reliable fusion of positional data from multiple sensors remains to be done.
* Providing secure communications in NCW/NCO is difficult, since successful key management for encryption is typically the most difficult aspect of cryptography, especially with mobile systems. The problem is exacerbated with the need for speedy deployment and nimble reconfiguration of military teams, to respond to rapidly changing conditions in the modern battlespace.

International activities

There is significant need to harmonize the technical and operational aspects of net-centric warfare and net-centric operations among multiple nations, in order to support coalition activities, joint operations, etc. STANAG is the coordinating vehicle for establishing shared technical standards among NATO nations.

See also Partnership for Peace for information on extending coordination efforts to non-NATO nations that are keen to support MOOTW (military operations other than war) activities, such as international peacekeeping, disaster response, humanitarian aid, etc.

Supporting comments

"With less than half of the ground forces and two-thirds of the military aircraft used 12 years ago in Desert Storm, we have achieved a far more difficult objective ... In Desert Storm, it usually took up to two days for target planners to get a photo of a target, confirm its coordinates, plan the mission, and deliver it to the bomber crew. Now we have near real-time imaging of targets with photos and coordinates transmitted by e-mail to aircraft already in flight. In Desert Storm, battalion, brigade, and division commanders had to rely on maps, grease pencils, and radio reports to track the movements of our forces. Today, our commanders have a real-time display of our armed forces on their computer screen." STSC Crosstalk -- Vice President Richard Cheney .

"Net-centric warfare's effectiveness has greatly improved in 12 years. Desert Storm forces, involving more than 500,000 troops, were supported with 100 megabit per second (Mbit/s) of bandwidth. Today, OIF forces, with about 350,000 warfighters, had more than 3,000 Mbit/s of satellite Bandwidth, which is 30 times more bandwidth for a force 45 percent smaller. U.S. troops essentially used the same weapon platforms used in Operation Desert Storm with significantly increased effectiveness." [3]-- Lt. Gen. Harry D. Raduege Jr., Defense Information Systems Agency

Dissenting views

"Our incipient NCW plans may suffer defeat by [adversaries] using primitive but cagey techniques, inspired by an ideology we can neither match nor understand; or by an enemy who can knock out our vulnerable Global Positioning System or use electromagnetic pulse weapons on a limited scale, removing intelligence as we have construed it and have come to depend upon. Fighting forces accustomed to relying upon downlinks for information and commands would have little to fall back upon." -- Charles Perrow, Information Assurance, National Defense University, May 2003

The aspiration of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to embrace NCW is outlined in the document ADF Force 2020. This vision has been criticized by Aldo Borgu, director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). By developing interoperability with U.S. systems, in his view, the three arms of the Australian Defence Force could end up operating better with their sister United States services than with each other. See Max Blenkin, AAP General News (Australia), 9/17/2003.