New world order
The term "
new world order" has been used to refer to a new period of history evidencing a dramatic change in world political thought and the
balance of power. The first usages of the term surrounded
Woodrow Wilson's
Fourteen Points and call for a
League of Nations following the devastation of
World War I. The phrase was used sparingly at the end of the
Second World War when describing the plans for the
United Nations and
Bretton Woods system, in part because of the negative association the phrase would bring to the failed League of Nations. In retrospect however, many commentators have applied the term retroactively to the order put in place by the WWII victors as a "new world order." The most recent, and most widely discussed, application of the phrase came at the end of the
Cold War. Presidents
Mikhail Gorbachev and
George H.W. Bush used the term to try and define the nature of the post
Cold War era, and the spirit of
great power cooperation that they hoped might materialize. Gorbachev's initial formulation was wide ranging and
idealistic, but his ability to press for it was severely limited by the
internal crisis of the Soviet system. Bush's vision was, in comparison, much more circumscribed and
pragmatic, perhaps even instrumental at times, and closely linked to the
First Gulf War. Perhaps not surprisingly, the perception of what the new world order entailed in the press and in the public imagination far outstripped what either Gorbachev or Bush had outlined, and was characterized by nearly comprehensive
optimism.
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President Wilson and the Origin of the League of Nations |
The phrase "new world order" was first widely used in connection with
Woodrow Wilson's designs in the period just after
World War I, during the formation of the
League of Nations. The "
war to end all wars" had been a powerful catalyst in international politics, and many felt the world could simply no longer operate as it once had. The first world war had been justified not only in terms of U.S.
national interest but in moral terms—to "make the world safe for democracy." After the war, Wilson argued for a new world order which transcended traditional great power politics, instead emphasizing collective security, democracy, and self-determination. However, the
United States Senate rejected membership of the League of Nations, which Wilson believed to be the key to a new world order. Senator
Henry Cabot Lodge argued that American policy should be based on human nature "as it is, not as it ought to be."
["The bloodhounds of history." The Economist. 10 April 1998.] |
Roosevelt and Churchill during the meeting that would result in the Atlantic Charter, precursor to the Bretton Woods system |
The term fell from use when it became clear the League was not living up to the over-optimistic expectation, and as a consequence was used very little during the formation of the
United Nations. Former
UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim felt that this new world order was a projection of the
American dream into Europe, and that, in its naïveté, the idea of a new order had been used to further the parochial interests of
Lloyd George and
Clemenceau, thus ensuring the League's eventual failure.
[Kurt Waldheim. "The United Nations: The Tarnished Image." Foreign Affairs (1984, Fall)] Although some have claimed the phrase was not used at all,
Virginia Gildersleeve, the sole female delegate to the San Francisco Conference in
April 1945, did use it in an interview with the
New York Times.
The phrase was used by some in retrospect when assessing the creation of the post-
World War II set of international institutions: the United Nations; the U.S. security alliances such as
NATO; the
Bretton Woods system of the
International Monetary Fund and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; and even the
Truman Doctrine and
Marshall Plan were seen as characterizing or comprising this new order.
H.G. Wells wrote a book published in 1940 entitled
The New World Order. The book addressed the ideal of a world without war in which law and order emanated from a
world governing body and examined various proposals and ideas.
The phrase "new world order", as used to herald in the post-Cold War era, did not have a developed or substantive definition. There appear to be three distinct periods in which it was progressively redefined, first by the Soviets, and later by the United States before the Malta Conference, and again after Bush's speech of
11 September 1990. Throughout the period of the phrase's use, the public seemed to expect much more from the phrase than any politicians did, and predictions about the new order quickly outraced the rather lukewarm descriptions made in official speeches.
#At first, the new world order dealt almost exclusively with
nuclear disarmament and security arrangements. Gorbachev would then expand the phrase to include UN strengthening, and
great power cooperation on a range of North-South, economic, and security problems. Implications for NATO, the
Warsaw Pact, and
European integration were subsequently included.#The Malta Conference collected these various expectations, and they were fleshed out in more detail by the press.
German reunification,
human rights, and the
polarity of the international system were then included.#The
Gulf War crisis refocused the term on
superpower cooperation and regional crises. Economics, North-South problems, the integration of the Soviets into the international system, and the changes in economic and military polarity received greater attention.
Gorbachev's formulation
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Time Magazine cover of January 4, 1988 featuring Mikhail Gorbachev as Man of the Year. |
The first press reference to the phrase came from Russo-
Indian talks,
21 November 1988.
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi used the term in reference to the commitments made by the USSR through the
Delhi Declaration of two years previous. The new world order which he describes is characterized by "
non-violence and the principles of peaceful coexistence." He also includes the possibility of a sustained peace, an alternative to the nuclear
balance of terror, dismantling of
nuclear weapons systems, significant cuts in strategic arms, and eventually a general and complete disarmament.
["Gorbachev and Indian Prime Minister Hold Talks on 19th November Speeches Made at Peace Prize." 21 November 1988]Three days later, a
Guardian article quotes
NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner as saying that the Soviets have come close to accepting NATO's doctrine of military stability based on a mix of nuclear as well as
conventional arms. This, in his opinion, would spur the creation of "a new security framework" and a move towards "a new world order."
["Soviets ‘in arms strategy shift'", The Guardian, 24 November 1988]But the principal statement creating the new world order concept came from Gorbachev's
7 December 1988 speech to the United Nations General Assembly. His formulation included a laundry list of ideas in creating a new order. He advocated the strengthening the central role of the United Nations, and the active involvement of all members—the Cold War had prevented the UN and its Security Council from performing their roles as initially envisioned. The de-
ideologizing of relations among states was the mechanism through which this new level of cooperation could be achieved. Concurrently, Gorbachev recognized only one world economyâ€"essentially an end to
economic blocs. Furthermore, he advocated Soviet entry into several important international organizations, such as the
CSCE and
International Court of Justice. Reinvigoration of the
UN peacekeeping role, and recognition that superpower cooperation can and will lead to the resolution of regional conflicts was especially key in his conception of cooperation. He argued that the use of force or the threat of the use of force was no longer legitimate, and that the strong must demonstrate restraint toward the weak. He foresaw, as the major powers of the world, the United States, the Soviet Union,
Europe, India,
China,
Japan, and
Brazil. He asked for cooperation on
environmental protection, on
debt relief for
developing countries, on disarmament of nuclear weapons, on preservation of the
ABM treaty, and on a convention for the elimination of
chemical weapons. At the same time he promised the significant withdrawal of Soviet forces from
Eastern Europe and
Asia, as well as an end to the jamming of
Radio Liberty.
Gorbachev described a phenomenon that could be described as a global political awakening:
In the press, Gorbachev was compared to Woodrow Wilson giving the Fourteen Points, to FDR and Churchill promulgating the
Atlantic Charter, and to Marshall and Truman building the
Western Alliance. His speech, while visionary, was to be approached with caution. He was seen as attempting a fundamental redefinition of international relationships, on economic and environmental levels. His support "for independence, democracy and social justice" was highlighted. But the principle message taken from his speech was that of a new world order based on
pluralism,
tolerance, and cooperation.
["Vision on the World Stage", Washington Post, 9 November 1988]A month later,
Time Magazine ran a longer analysis of the speech and its possible implications. The promises of a new world order based on the forswearing of military use of force was viewed partially as a threat, which might "lure the West toward complacency" and "woo Western Europe into neutered
neutralism." The more overriding threat, however, was that the
West did not yet have any imaginative response to Gorbachevâ€"leaving the Soviets with the moral initiative, and solidifying Gorbachev's place as "the most popular world leader in much of
Western Europe." The article noted as important his de-ideologized stance, willingness to give up use of force, commitment to troop cuts in Eastern Europe (accelerating political change there), and compliance with the ABM treaty. According to the article, the new world order seemed to imply: shifting of resources from military to domestic needs; a world community of states based on the
rule of law; a dwindling of security alliances like NATO and the Warsaw Pact; and, an inevitable move toward European integration. The author of the
Time article felt that Bush should counter Gorbachev's "
common home" rhetoric toward the Europeans with the idea of "common ideals," turning an alliance of necessity into one of shared values. Gorbachev's repudiation of
expansionism leaves America in a good position, no longer having to support
anti-communist dictators, and able to pursue better goals: the environment,
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, reducing
famine and poverty, and resolving regional conflicts.
["The Gorbachev Challenge", Time Magazine, 19 December 1988] Similarly, in
A World Transformed, Bush and Scowcroft's concern about losing leadership to Gorbachev is noted, and they worry that the Europeans might stop following the U.S. if it appears to drag its feet.
[George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed, ISBN 0679752595, pp. 42-43.]As Europe passed into the new year, the implications of the new world order for the
European Community surfaced. The EC was seen as the vehicle for integrating East and West in such a manner that they could "pool their resources and defend their specific interests in dealings with those superpowers on something more like equal terms." It would be less exclusively tied to the U.S., and stretch "from
Brest to
Brest-Litovsk, or at least from
Dublin to
Lublin."
["The Dog that Failed to Bark", Financial Times, 10 January 1989] By
July 1989, newspapers were still criticizing Bush for his lack of response to Gorbachev's proposals. Bush visited Europe but "left undefined for those on both sides of the
Iron Curtain his vision for the new world order", leading commentators to view the U.S. as overly cautious and reactive, rather than pursuing long-range strategic goals.
["Still searching for the Bush Doctrine", Boston Globe, 23 July 1989]The Malta Conference
In
A World Transformed, Bush and Scowcroft craft a strategy of flooding Gorbachev with proposals at the
Malta Conference in order to catch him off guard, preventing the U.S. from coming out of the summit on the defensive.
[A World Transformed, pp. 163-167.]The Malta Conference of
2-
3 December 1989 reinvigorated discussion of the new world order. Various new concepts arose in the press as elements on the new order. Commentators expected the replacement of containment with superpower cooperation. This cooperation might then tackle problems such as reducing armaments and troop deployments, settling regional disputes, stimulating economic growth, lessening East-West trade restrictions, the inclusion of the Soviets in international economic institutions, and protecting the environment. Pursuant to superpower cooperation, a new role for NATO was forecast, with the organization perhaps changing into a forum for negotiation and treaty verification, or even a wholesale dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact following the resurrection of the four-power framework from WWII (i.e. the U.S.,
United Kingdom,
France, and
Russia). However, continued U.S. military presence in Europe was expected to help contain "historic antagonisms", thus making possible a
new European order.
[Compiled from:]
*"U.S. must get involved in shaping a new world order", Boston Globe, 3 December 1989
*"New World Order Galloping Into Position", Washington Post, 25 February 1990
*"A Workmanlike Summit", New York Times, 5 June 1990In Europe, German reunification was seen as part of the new order. However,
Strobe Talbott saw it as more of a brake on the new era, and believed Malta to be a holding action on part of the superpowers designed to forestall the "new world order" because of the German question
["American Abroad; Braking the Juggernaut", Time Magazine, 18 December 1989]. Political change in Eastern Europe also arose on the agenda. The Eastern Europeans believed that the new world order didn't signify superpower leadership, but that superpower dominance was coming to an end
["Soviet hopes are undaunted", Boston Globe, 3 December 1989].
In general, the new security structure arising from superpower cooperation seemed to indicate to observers that the new world order would be based on the principles of political liberty, self-determination, and non-intervention. This would mean an end to the sponsoring of military conflicts in third countries, restrictions on global arms sales, and greater engagement in the
Middle East (especially regarding
Syria,
Palestine, and
Israel). The U.S. might use this opportunity to more emphatically promote of human rights in China and
South Africa.
Economically, debt relief was expected to be a significant issue, as East-West competition would give way to North-South cooperation. Economic tripolarity would arise with the U.S.,
Germany, and
Japan as the three motors of world growth. Meanwhile, the Soviet social and economic crisis was manifestly going to limit its ability to project power abroad, thus necessitation continued U.S. leadership.
Commentators assessing the results of the Conference, and how the pronouncements measured up to expectations, were underwhelmed. President Bush was criticized for taking refuge behind notions of "
status quo-plus" rather than a full out commitment to new world order. Others noted that Bush thus far failed to satisfy the out-of-control "soaring expectations" that Gorbachev's speech unleashed.
The Gulf War and Bush's formulation
 |
Bush greeting troops on the eve of the First Gulf War |
President Bush started to take the initiative from Gorbachev during the run-up to the Gulf War, when he began to define the elements of the new world order as he saw it, and link the new order's success to the international community's response in
Kuwait.
Initial agreement by the Soviets to allow action against Saddam highlighted this linkage in the press. The
Washington Post declared that this superpower cooperation demonstrates that the Soviet Union has joined the international community, and that in the new world order Saddam faces not just the U.S. but the international community itself.
["Summit Decision Signals Superpower Cooperation", Washington Post, 2 September 1990] A
New York Times editorial was the first to assert that at stake in the collective response to Saddam was "nothing less than the new world order which [Bush] and other leaders struggle to shape."
["The Month that Shook the World", New York Times, 2 September 1990]In
A World Transformed, Scowcroft notes that Bush even offered to have Soviet troops amongst the coalition forces liberating Kuwait. Bush places the fate of the new world order on the ability of the U.S. and the Soviet Union to respond to Hussein's aggression.
[A World Transformed, pp. 361-364.] The idea that the Gulf War would usher in the new world order began to take shape. Bush notes that the "premise [was] that the United States henceforth would be obligated to lead the world community to an unprecedented degree, as demonstrated by the
Iraqi crisis, and that we should attempt to pursue our
national interests, wherever possible, within a framework of concert with our friends and the
international community."
[A World Transformed, pp. 399-400.]A pivotal point came with President Bush's
11 September 1990 "Toward a New World Order" speech to a joint session of
Congress. This time it was Bush, not Gorbachev, whose idealism was compared to Woodrow Wilson, and to FDR at the creation of the UN. Key points picked up in the press were:
* Commitment to U.S. strength, such that it can lead the world toward rule of law, rather than use of force. The Gulf crisis was seen as a reminder that the U.S. must continue to lead, and that military strength does matter, but that the resulting new world order should make military force less important in the future.
* Soviet-American partnership in cooperation toward making the world safe for democracy, making possible the goals of the UN for the first time since its inception. Some countered that this was unlikely, and that ideological tensions would remain, such that the two superpowers could be partners of convenience for specific and limited goals only. The inability of the USSR to project force abroad was another factor in skepticism toward such a partnership.
* Another caveat raised was that the new world order was based not on U.S.-Soviet cooperation, but really on Bush-Gorbachev cooperation, and that the personal diplomacy made the entire concept exceedingly fragile.
* Future cleavages were to be economic not ideological, with the First and Second world cooperating to contain regional instability in the
Third World. Russia could become an ally against economic assaults from Asia,
Islamic
terrorism, and
drugs from
Latin America.
* Soviet integration into world economic institutions, such as the
G7, and establishment of ties with the European Community.
* Restoration of German
sovereignty and
Cambodia's acceptance of the
UN Security Council's peace plan on the day previous to the speech were seen as signs of what to expect in the new world order
* The reemergence of Germany and Japan as members of the great powers, and concomitant reform of the UN Security Council was seen as necessary for great power cooperation and reinvigorated UN leadership
* Europe was seen as taking the lead on building their own world order, while the U.S. was relegated to the sidelines. The rationale for U.S. presence on the continent was vanishing, and the Gulf crisis was seen an incapable of rallying Europe. Instead Europe was discussing the European Community, the CSCE, and relations with the USSR. Gorbachev even proposed an all-European security council to replace the CSCE, in effect superseding the increasingly irrelevant NATO.
* A very few postulated a bi-polar new order of U.S. power and UN moral authority, the first as global policeman, the second as global judge and jury. The order would be collectivist, in which decisions and responsibility would be shared.These were the common themes that emerged from reporting about Bush's speech and its implications.
[Compiled from:]
*"Evoking the memory of Wilson and 'a new world order'", Boston Globe, 12 September 1990
*"Superpowers to Superpartners", Newsweek, 17 September 1990
*"Steps to a new world order", Financial Times, 17 September 1990
*"U.S. leads the new world order", Toronto Star, 19 September 1990
*"Europe choreographs new world order, but Bush is out of step", Boston Globe, 21 November Critics held that Bush and Baker remained too vague about what exactly the order entailed.
The
New York Times observed that the
American left was calling the new world order a "rationalization for imperial ambitions" in the Middle East, while the
right rejected new security arrangements altogether and fulminated about any possibility of UN revival.
["George Bush Meet Woodrow Wilson", New York Times, 20 November 1990] Pat Buchanan predicted that the Gulf War would in fact be the demise of the new world order, the concept of UN peacekeeping, and the U.S.'s role as global policeman.
[A World Transformed, pp. 426.]A vision of unipolarity
The
LA Times reported that the speech signified more than just the rhetoric about superpower cooperation. In fact, the deeper reality of the new world order was the United States' emergence "as the single greatest power in a multipolar world." Moscow was crippled by internal problems, and thus unable to project power abroad. The United States, while hampered by economic malaise, was militarily unconstrained for the first time since the end of WWII. Militarily, it was now a unipolar world, as illustrated by the Gulf crisis. While diplomatic rhetoric stressed a U.S.-Soviet partnership, the U.S. was deploying troops to
Saudi Arabia, a mere 700 miles from the Soviet frontier, and was preparing for war against a former Soviet
client state. Further, U.S. authority over the Soviets was displayed in 1) the unification of Germany, withdrawal of Soviet forces, and almost open appeal to Washington for aid in managing the Soviet transition to democracy, 2) withdrawal of Soviet support for Third World clients, and 3) Soviets seeking economic aid through membership in Western international economic and trade communities.
["With Moscow Crippled, U.S. Emerges as Top Power", LA Times, 12 September 1990]The past is prologue
|
James Baker, Secretary of State under George H.W. Bush |
The Economist published an article explaining the drive toward the Gulf War in terms presaging the run-up to the
Iraq War of 2003. The author notes directly that despite the coalition, in the minds of most governments this is America's war, and Bush that "chose to stake his political life on defeating Mr Hussein." An attack on Iraq would certainly shatter Bush's alliance, they assert, predicting calls from Security Council members saying that diplomacy should have been given more time, and that they will not wish to allow a course of action "that leaves America sitting too prettily as sole remaining superpower." When the unanimity of the Security Council ends, "all that lovely talk about the new world order" will too. And when casualties mount, "Bush will be called a warmonger, an
imperialist and a bully." The article goes on to say that Bush and
James Baker's speechifying cannot save the new world order once they launch a controversial war. It closes noting that a wide consensus is not necessary for U.S. actionâ€"only a hard core of supporters: Saudi Arabia,
Persian Gulf Arab States,
Egypt, and Britain. The rest need only not interfere.
["New World Order Inc", The Economist, 10 November 1990]In a passage with similar echoes of the future, Bush and Scowcroft explain in
A World Transformed the role of the
UN Secretary General in attempting to avert the Gulf War. UN Secretary General
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar arrived at
Camp David to ask what he could do to head off the war. Bush told him that it was important that we get full implementation on every UN resolution. "If we compromise, we weaken the UN and our own credibility in building this new world order," I said. "I think Saddam Hussein doesn't believe force will be usedâ€"or if it is, he can produce a stalemate." Additional meetings between Baker or Pérez and the Iraqis are rejected for fear that they will simply come back empty-handed once again. Bush fears that Javier will be cover for Hussein's manipulations. Pérez suggests another Security Council meeting, but Bush sees no reason for one.
[A World Transformed, pp. 440.]Following the Gulf conflict
Following the Gulf conflict—which was seen as the crucible in which great power cooperation and collective security would emerge the new norms of the era—several academic assessments of the "new world order" idea were published.
John Lewis Gaddis, a Cold War historian, wrote in
Foreign Affairs about what he saw as the key characteristics of the potential new order: unchallenged American primacy, increasing integration, resurgent
nationalism and religiosity, a diffusion of security threats, and collective security. He casts the fundamental challenge as one of integration versus fragmentation, and the concomitant benefits and dangers associated with each. Changes in
communications, the international economic system, the nature of security threats, and the rapid spread of new ideas would prevent nations from retreating into
isolation. In light of this, Gaddis sees a chance for the
democratic peace predicted by
liberal international relations theorists to come closer to reality. However, he illustrates that not only is the fragmentary pressure of nationalism manifest in the former Communist bloc countries and the
Third World, but is also a considerable factor in the West. Further, a revitalized
Islam could play both integrating and fragmenting roles—emphasizing common identity, but also contributing to new conflicts that could resemble the
Lebanese Civil War. The integration coming from the new order could also aggravate
ecological,
demographic, and
epidemic threats. National
self-determination, leading to the breakup and reunification of states (such as Yugoslavia on one hand, and Germany on the other) could signal abrupt shifts in the balance of power, with a destabilizing effect. Integrated markets, especially energy markets, are now a security liability for the world economic system, as events affecting energy security in one part of the globe could threaten countries far removed from potential conflicts. Finally, diffusion of security threats requires a new security paradigm involving low-intesity but more frequent deployment of peacekeeping troops—a type of mission that is hard to sustain under budgetary or public opinion pressure. Gaddis calls for aid to Eastern European countries, updated security and economic regimes for Europe, UN-based regional conflict resolution, a slower pace of international economic integration, and paying off the U.S.
deficit.
[John Lewis Gaddis. "Toward the Post-Cold War World." Foreign Affairs 1991, Spring]However, statesman
Strobe Talbott wrote of the new world order that it was only in the aftermath of the Gulf War that the United Nations took a step toward redefining its role to take account of both interstate relations and intrastate events. Furthermore, he asserted that it was only as an unintended postscript to Desert Storm that President Bush gave meaning to the "new world order" slogan. But, by the end of the year President Bush stopped talking about a new world order. His advisers explained that he had dropped the phrase because he felt it suggested more enthusiasm for the changes sweeping the planet than he actually felt. He wanted, as an antidote to the uncertainties of the world, to stress the old verities of territorial integrity, national sovereignty and international stability.
[Strobe Talbott. "Post-Victory Blues." Foreign Affairs. December, 1991 January, 1992] David Gergen suggested at the time that it was the
recession of 1991-92 which finally killed the new world order idea within the White House. The economic downturn took a deeper psychological toll than expected while domestic politics were increasinly frustrated by paralysis, with the result that the United States toward the end of 1991 turned increasingly pessimistic, inward and nationalistic.
[David Gergen. "America's Missed Opportunities." Foreign Affairs. December, 1991 January, 1992]In
Joseph S. Nye, Jr.'s analysis, the collapse of the Soviet Union did not issue in a new world order per se, but rather simply allowed for the reappearance of the liberal institutional order that was supposed to have come into effect in 1945. This success of this order was not a fait accomplis, however.
[Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "What New World Order." Foreign Affairs. 1992, Spring] Three years later,
G. John Ikenberry would reaffirm Nye's idea of a reclamation of the ideal post-WWII order, but would dispute the nay-sayers who had predicted post-Cold War chaos.
[G. John Ikenberry. "The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos." Foreign Affairs. May, 1996 / June, 1996] By 1997,
Anne-Marie Slaughter produced an analysis calling the restoration of the post-WWII order a "chimera... infeasible at best and dangerous at worst." In her view, the new order was not a liberal institutionalist one, but one in which state authority disaggregated and decentralized in the face of
globalization.
[Anne-Marie Slaughter. "The Real New World Order." Foreign Affairs. September, 1997 / October, 1997]Samuel Huntington wrote critically of the "new world order" and of
Francis Fukuyama's
End of History theory in
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order::The expectation of harmony was widely shared. Political and intellectual leaders elaborated similar views. The Berlin wall had come down, communist regimes had collapsed, the United Nations was to assume a new importance, the former Cold War rivals would engage in "partnership" and a "grand bargain," peacekeeping and peacemaking would be the order of the day. The President of the world's leading country proclaimed the "new world order"...
The moment of euphoria at the end of the Cold War generated an illusion of harmony, which was soon revealed to be exactly that. The world became different in the early 1990s, but not necessarily more peaceful. Change was inevitable; progress was not... The illusion of harmony at the end of that Cold War was soon dissipated by the multiplication of ethnic conflicts and "
ethnic cleansing," the breakdown of law and order, the emergence of new patterns of alliance and conflict among states, the resurgence of neo-
communist and
neo-fascist movements, intensification of religious
fundamentalism, the end of the "diplomacy of smiles" and "
policy of yes" in Russia's relations with the West, the inability of the United Nations and the United States to suppress bloody local conflicts, and the increasing assertiveness of a rising China. In the five years after the Berlin wall came down, the word "
genocide" was heard far more often than in any five years of the Cold War.
The one harmonious world paradigm is clearly far too divorced from reality to be a useful guide to the post-Cold War world. Two Worlds: Us and Them. While one-world expectations appear at the end of major conflicts, the tendency to think in terms of two worlds recurs through-out human history. People are always tempted to divide people into us and them, the in-group and the other, our civilization and those barbarians.
[Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Simon & Schuster: New York. January 28, 1998. ISBN 0684844419. pp. 7-8.]Despite the criticisms of the new world order concept, ranging from its practical unworkability to its theoretical incoherence,
President Clinton not only signed on to the idea of the "new world order," but dramatically expanded the concept beyond Bush's formulation. The essence of Clinton's
election year critique was that Bush had done too little, not too much.
[David C. Hendrickson. "The Recovery of Internationalism." Foreign Affairs. September, 1994 / October, 1994] Following the rise of
Boris Yeltsin, eclipsing Mikhail Gorbachev, and the
election victory of
Bill Clinton over George H.W. Bush, the term "new world order" fell from common usage. It was replaced by competing, similar concepts about how the post-Cold War order would develop. Prominent among these were the ideas of the "era of
globalization," the "unipolar moment," the "end of history," and the "
Clash of Civilizations."
[Adam Garfinkle. "The Present Opportunity." The National Interest. 2001 Fall]Viewed in retrospect
A 2001 paper in
Presidential Studies Quarterly examined the idea of the "new world order" as it was presented by the Bush administration (mostly ignoring previous uses by Gorbachev). Their conclusion was that Bush really only ever had three firm aspects to the new world order:#Checking the offensive use of force;#Promoting
collective security; and,#Using great power cooperation.These were not developed into a policy architecture, but came about incrementally as a function of domestic, personal, and global factors. Because of the somewhat overblown expectations for the new world order in the media, Bush was widely criticized for lacking vision.
[Eric A. Miller and Steve A. Yetiv, "The New World Order in Theory and Practice: The Bush Administration's Worldview in Transition." Presidential Studies Quarterly, March 2001]The Gulf crisis is seen as the catalyst for Bush's development and implementation of the new world order concept. The authors note that before the crisis, the concept remained "ambiguous, nascent, and unproven" and that the United States had not assumed a leadership role with respect to the new order. Essentially, the Cold War's end was the permissive cause for the new world order, but the Gulf crisis was the active cause.
|
Dick Cheney, then Secretary of Defense under George H.W. Bush |
They reveal that in
August 1990, U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
Charles W. Freeman, Jr. sent a
cable to Washington from Saudi Arabia in which he argued that U.S. conduct in the Gulf crisis would determine the nature of the world. Bush would then refer to the "new world order" at least 42 times from the summer of
1990 to the end of
March 1991. They also note that
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney gave three priorities to the
Senate on fighting the Gulf War: prevent further aggression; protect oil supplies; and, further a new world order. The authors note that the new world order did not emerge in policy speeches until after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, maintaining that the concept was clearly not critical in the U.S. decision to deploy.
John Sununu later indicated that the administration wanted to refrain from talking about the concept until Soviet collapse was more clear. A reversal of Soviet collapse would have been the death knell for the new order.
Bush and Scowcroft were frustrated by the exaggerated and distorted ideas surrounding the new world order. They did not intend to suggest that the U.S. would yield significant influence to the UN, or that they expected the world to enter an era of peace and tranquility. They preferred
multilateralism, but did not reject
unilateralism. The new world order did not signal peace, but a "challenge to keep the dangers of disorder at bay."
Bush's drive toward the Gulf War was based on the world making a clear choice. Baker recalls that UNSCR 660's "language was simply and crystal clear, purposely designed by us to frame the vote as being for or against aggression". Bush's motivation centered around 1) the dangers of
appeasement, and 2) failure to check aggression could spark further aggression. Bush repeatedly invoked images of World War II in this connection, and became very emotional over
Iraqi atrocities being committed in Kuwait. He also believed that failure to check Iraqi aggression would lead to more challenges to the U.S.-favored status quo and global stability. While the end of the Cold War increased U.S. security globally, it remained vulnerable to regional threats. Furthermore, Washington believed that addressing the Iraqi threat would help reassert U.S. predominance in light of growing concerns about relative decline, following the resurgence of Germany and Japan.
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Eduard Shevardnadze, then Soviet Foreign Minister |
The Gulf War was also framed as a test case for UN credibility. As a model for dealing with aggressors, Scowcroft believed that the United States ought to act in a way that others can trust, and thus get UN support. It was critical that the U.S. not look like it was throwing its weight around. Great power cooperation and UN support would collapse if the U.S. marched on the
Baghdad to try and remake Iraq. However, practically, superpower cooperation was limited. For example, when the U.S. deployed troops to Saudi Arabia, Soviet Foreign Minister
Eduard Shevardnadze became furious at not being consulted.
By 1992, the authors note, the U.S. was already abandoning the idea of collective action. The leaked draft of the (
Wolfowitz-
Libby) 1992 Defense Guidance Report effectively confirmed this shift, as it called for a unilateral role for the U.S. in world affairs, focusing on preserving American dominance.
In closing
A World Transformed, Scowcroft sums up what his expectations were for the new world order. He states that the U.S. has the strength and the resources to pursue its own in interests, but has a disproportionate responsibility to use its power in pursuit of the common good, as well as an obligation to lead and to be involved. The U.S. is perceived as uncomfortable in exercising its power, and ought to work to create predictability and stability in international relations. America need not be embroiled in every conflict, but ought to aid in developing multilateral responses to them. The U.S. can unilaterally broker disputes, but ought to act whenever possible in concert with equally committed partners to deter major aggression.
[A World Transformed, pp. 565-566.]Also see:
New World Order (conspiracy)
