Phalanx formation
|
A modern reconstruction of Greek hoplites forming a phalanx formation. In reality equipment was not uniform (with the notable exception of Sparta) since each soldier would procure his own equipment and decorate them at will |
A
phalanx (plural
phalanxes or
phalanges) is a
rectangular mass military
formation, usually composed entirely of heavy infantry armed with
spears,
pikes, or similar
weapons. The troops were disciplined to hold a line which created a nearly impenetrable forest of points to the front. The phalanx is a hallmark of
Hellenistic or
ancient Greek warfare; indeed, the word phalanx is derived from the Greek word
phalangos, meaning finger.
The earliest known depiction of a phalanx-like formation occurs in a Sumerian
stele. In this particular instance the troops seem to have been equipped with
spears,
helmets, and large
shields covering the whole body. Egyptian infantry were also known to have employed similar formations. However, historians have not arrived at a consensus regarding the relationship between the Greek formation and these antecessors; the principles of shield wall and spear hedge were almost universally known among the armies of major civilizations throughout history, and as such it is impossible to reject the possibility that the similarities were due to convergent evolution instead of actual diffusion.
Some
historians and authorities date the formation of the
hoplite phalanx of ancient
Greece to the
eighth century BC in
Sparta, though this is being revised as it is more likely that the formation was devised in the
seventh century BC after the introduction of the
Aspis shield (popularly but mistakenly known as the
hoplon) by the city of
Argos, which would have made the formation possible.
Overview
The
hoplite phalanx was a formation in which the hoplites would line up in ranks, no less than four deep, in very close order. In this formation, the hoplites would lock their
shields together, while the first few ranks of soldiers would project their spears out over the first rank of shields, thus allowing for the first three or so ranks of spearmen to engage their spears against the enemy. Therefore, one might say that the phalanx was essentially a formation in which the hoplites created a mass spear and
shield wall. The effectiveness of the phalanx depended upon how well the hoplites could maintain this formation while in
combat, especially when engaged against another phalanx. The main enemy of a phalanx was not the opposition forces (the majority of the soldiers would remain unengaged in a phalanx versus phalanx pushing match) but fear. The more disciplined and courageous the army the more likely it was to win - often disputes between the various city-states of Greece would be resolved by one side fleeing before the engagement. The Greek word
dynamis, the "will to fight", expresses the drive that kept hoplites in formation.
Before the advance both sides would sing their
paean, the battle-hymn (notably, the Spartans eschewed a battle-hymn, thinking it needless bravado), than advance to the cadence (a marching beat) - on trumpets, pipes, drums or shouted by senior men (essentially the equivalent of the modern day sergeant). When nearing the enemy the phalanx would break into a run sufficient to create momentum but not too much as to lose cohesion. Both sides would collide viciously, breaking many of the spears of the front row. The battle would then rely on the valor of the men in the front line and the rear men to maintain a push forward with their shields.
"Now of those, who dare, abiding one beside another, to advance to the close fray, and the foremost champions, fewer die, and they save the people in the rear; but in men that fear, all excellence is lost. No one could ever in words go through those several ills, which befall a man, if he has been actuated by cowardice. For ‘tis grievous to wound in the rear the back of a flying man in hostile war. Shameful too is a corpse lying low in the dust, wounded behind in the back by the point of a spear." [Tyrtaeus:
The War Songs Of Tyrtaeus]
The natural tendency during battle would be to drift towards the right side, or even for both lines to "wheel" as one side gave ground and the other advanced. This is because the individual hoplites carried their shields on their left arm, protecting not themselves but the soldier to the left (thus giving an incentive to stand very close together). Battles were won when the exposed right side (carrying spears) could overpower the opposing army's left side (carrying shields). When in combat, the whole formation would consistently press forward trying to break the enemy formation; thus when two phalanx formations engaged, the struggle essentially became a pushing match, in which, as a rule, the deeper phalanx would almost always win, with very few recorded exceptions.
|
Hoplites clashing. Note the piper calling the cadence, and the overarm use of the spears |
The Doru
The
doru was a type of spear in general use in the Hellenistic world. Although accounts of the weapon's length vary, it is usually held today to have been between seven and nine feet long. It was held one-handed, the other hand holding the hoplite's
aspis (shield). The front spearhead was usually a curved leaf shape, while the other contained a spike called a
sauroter ("lizard-killer") which was used to stand the spear in the ground (hence the name), as a secondary weapon if the main shaft snapped or for the rear ranks to finish off fallen opponents as the phalanx advanced over them. There is debate as to whether the soldier would wield his spear above or below the shoulder. If it was held under-hand the thrusts would have been less powerful but under more control and vice versa. It seems likely that both motions were used, depending on the situation. If attack was called for, an overhand motion was more likely to break through an opponent's defensive set-up and hit a vital area. The upward thrust is more easily deflected by armour due to its less leverage. However, when defending, an underarm carry absorbed more shock and could be "couched" under the shoulder for maximum stability. It should also be said that an overarm motion would allow more effective combination of the
aspis and
doru if the shield wall had broken down, the underarm motion more effective when the shield had to be interlocked with your neighbours in the battle-line. It is certain, however, that hoplites in the rows behind the lead would thrust overhand. The rear ranks raised their spears upwards at increasing angles. This was an effective defence against missiles, deflecting their force.
The Sarissa
The
sarissa was the spear used by the Macedonian forces that conquered most of the known world. The actual length of the
sarissa is now unknown to us, but it appears to have been at least twice as long. This makes it a minimum of 14 feet, although 18 appears more likely (the cavalry xyston was 12.5 feet, for comparison). Due to its greater length and consequent weight and balance difference a
sarissa was wielded two-handed. This meant that the
aspis was no longer a practical defence. Instead, the phalangites strapped a smaller
pelte shield (usually reserved for light skirmishers - "peltasts") to their left forearm. Although this reduced the shield wall the extreme length of the spear prevented most enemies from closing, as the first three ranks could all be brought to bear in front of the front row. This spear had to be held underhand, as the shield would have obscured the soldier's vision had it been held overhead. It would also be very hard to remove a
sarissa from anything it had become stuck on (the earth, shields and opposition soldiers, usually) if it was thrusted downwards due, once again, to its great length.
Sarissa troops gained a reputation for complete immobility at the battle-line. This immobility allowed cavalry to wheel around opposed infantry and strike from the flanks or rear - a tactic used to great effect by the
Macedonians.
While a largely inflexible formation, commanders did experiment with the possibilities provided by a phalanx. Not just content with the simple pushing match (which in any case was the complete dominion of the Spartans) generals began to change the formation in different ways to adapt to the needs of the situation. A famous example of this adaptation occurred at the
Battle of Marathon (490 BC) in which the Athenians thinned out their phalanx and consequently lengthened their front. This minimised the casualties from the overwhelming Persian archers and prevented the Athenians from being outflanked by the numerical superior forces of
Darius. The eventual result was a
double envelopment and by all accounts a crushing victory for Athens. Despite this demonstration of possible innovation, the superiority of Sparta at this form of warfare would continue for another century.
|
Top: Traditional hoplite order of battle and advance.
Bottom: Epaminondas's strategy at Leuctra. The strong left wing advanced while the weak right wing retreated or remained stationary. The red blocks show the placement of the elite troops within each phalanx. |
At the
Battle of Leuctra (371 B.C.) the Theban general
Epaminondas devised a phalanx tactic that would defeat Sparta. The tactic involved thinning out the right and center in order to put a massive 50-rank deep phalanx on their left, the hitherto weak flank. This formation, known as the oblique phalanx, allowed the Thebans to turn the Spartan right flank even as the Spartans pushed back the right and center of the Theban line. As the Spartan king and his
agema (elite bodyguard) were always stationed on the right, by breaking the strong enemy wing Epaminondas struck a decisive blow and routed the Spartan leadership. The Spartans were decisively defeated, shattering the myth of Sparta's invincibility in land warfare.
The
Macedonian phalanx is an important variant of the basic Greek formation. Based on the reforms of
Iphicrates and Epaminondas (King
Philip II of Macedon was a hostage at Thebes in his youth and may have learned from Epaminondas), the soldiers in this new phalanx (
phalangites) carried the long pikes called
sarissa. Their longer pikes allowed more ranks to project the heads of their weapons beyond the front of the formations. At the same time, the weight and coverage of their armor was lessened in order to reduce the expense of equipping them.
As a result of these developments
Philip II was able to raise an army of competent, well-drilled infantry at a much lower cost (in terms of both time and money) than the Greek city-states to the south. Even though the longer weapons of the Macedonian phalanx also meant that their formation was less flexible than that of the Greeks, it was not seen as a great disadvantage since the phalanx was meant to serve only as a part of a combined-arms force that also included a variety of
skirmishers and
mounted troops, most notably the
prodromoi scouts and the famous
Companion cavalry. The Macedonian phalanx generally worked to pin the center of the enemy line while the Companions attacked the flanks and the light infantry hovered around to cover the phalanx's immediate flanks and plug any gaps in the line caused by advancing through difficult terrain. The Macedonian combined arms phalanx/cavalry was far superior to any static Greek hoplite army. For example, at the
Battle Of Chaeronea Philip II's Macedonians crushed the Theban phalanx, which was itself advancing in the oblique. It had been inconceivable to phalanxes before this battle that a force of cavalry would dare charge straight through and over the spears, but the Companion cavalry under
Alexander III, the crown prince, ran right over and annihilated the elite Theban
Sacred Band. This battle marked the beginning of the end of a single phalanx as a dominant force in warfare.
While the phalanx formation was formidable and nearly indestructible from the front, the formation would find it difficult to protect its own flanks and rear because it was a relatively slow-moving formation and once engaged it could not easily disengage or redeploy itself to face a threat from those directions. Therefore, when the phalanx was flanked (attacked from either the left or right side) it was rendered nearly defenseless. We see this at the
battle of Cynoscephalae, in which a force of
Roman legionaries defeated one wing of a Macedonian army and then detached several cohorts from the victorious wing to strike the flank of the other Macedonian wing. The
Macedonian phalanx could also be disordered while moving through broken terrain and in this condition it had to be supported by friendly
light infantry standing ready to plug any gaps in the phalanx line as they appear. When these light troops were either absent or failed to do their duty, as in the
battle of Pydna, the phalanx would become extremely vulnerable to attack by more flexible troops such as (again) the Roman legions.
Another weakness the phalanx faced was light missile troops such as
archers or
slingers. These troops could stay a safe distance from the phalanx while at the same time subjecting it to missile fire, thus forcing it to either
surrender or
retreat. An example of this is the
battle of Lechaeum, where an
Athenian army led by
Iphicrates, containing a considerable proportion of light missile troops armed with
javelins and
bows, succeeded in routing an entire Spartan
mora (a Spartan unit numbering anywhere from five to nine hundred hoplites).
|
A Spartan Hoplite in distinctive uniform panoply |
It was due to the two above mentioned weaknesses that after the Peloponnesian War the phalanx did not perform very well unless included as part of a combined-arms force. When the phalanx was employed without
cavalry and/or
light infantry support, it could not cope with the greater tactical flexibility of the
Roman legion. It was dethroned from its prestigious position among ancient tactical formations after the
battle of Pydna (
168 BC), after which
Macedonia and
Hellas were made
Roman provinces. Some legends (with little to no historical support) state that a
Spartan phalanx drove off marauding
Visigoths after the
Battle of Adrianople in
AD 378.
The phalanx never quite died out; the
Roman legionaries at the time of
Caesar and
Arrian were known to have defended against (and even attacked) cavalry by using their
pila as thrusting spears instead of thrown javelins. In the
3rd century the Roman army even directly adopted the phalanx formation for units campaigning in the East, such as the
Legio II Parthica. The phalanx also formed an important part of the
skoutatoi formations in the later phases of the
Eastern Roman Empire.
In addition, the
Viking-era
swine array and the Anglo-Saxon
shieldwall bore striking similarities to the early hoplite phalanx. The Frankish army at the
Battle of Tours might have used a phalanx-like formation. Later on the pike phalanx enjoyed a major revival in the form of the Scottish
Schiltron and
Swiss pike square (see also
Landsknecht). The Swiss phalanx was a much narrower formation than the hoplite phalanx, usually no more than 20 or 30 men wide but considerably deeper. The Swiss phalanx had great success â€" particularly against
French cavalry â€" for almost a half century, but their ascendancy came to an end with the Swiss defeat in the
battle of Marignano in
1515. It was replaced by the
Spanish tercio, which combined the solidity of the phalanx with the flexibility and firepower of attached
musket formations.
The image of the men of the
polis (the city-state) taking up arms together in defence of their country remains linked with the Ancient Greek culture. Many grave markers that have survived to the present contain the phrase "died in the front line". The Athenian playwright Aeschylus' grave says nothing of his literary career and marks only his participation at the battle of Marathon. Aeschylus' play
The Persians is a celebration of that victory. Some of the abiding images of Grecian art, such as Polycleitus'
doryphoros, "spear-bearer" (to the right), contain the image of the warrior (The spear in his right hand, since it was likely bronze, has been lost to time). The attraction is that fear is the main enemy, and if a soldier succumbed he would leave his comrades unprotected. Often the comrade would be a family member or close friend (supposedly in the Theban Sacred Band the line would be composed of pairs of lovers). The valor in protection of your friends and country came to be the most prized attribute of a Greek. The Spartan poet Tyrtaeus wrote:
"''It is beautiful when a brave man of the front ranks''falls and dies, battling for his homeland...''Young men, fight shield to shield and never succumb ''to panic or miserable flight,''but steel the heart in your chests with''magnificence and courage. ''Forget your own life
when you grapple with the enemy." [Tyrtaeus:
The War Songs Of Tyrtaeus]
or from a less warrior-oriented culture, Euripides the Athenian (from his diatribe against Herakles):
"a man who has won a reputation for valor in his contests with beasts, in all else a weakling; who ne'er buckled shield to arm nor faced the spear, but with a bow, that coward's weapon, was ever ready to run away. Archery is no test of manly bravery; no! he is a man who keeps his post in the ranks and steadily faces the swift wound the spear may plough"This seems to represent the prevailing view upon valor in the Hellenistic world. Grave markers proudly note death in the front rank, presence at great battles and acts of courage. Much of the art of Ancient Greece, therefore, reflects their desire for recognised bravery.
Hoplites supplied their own "panoply" (in this context meaning his armour and weapons, from which English has derived the meaning of splendour) from their own personal equipment. This would mean procuring a helmet, cuirass and greaves as well as a spear, sword and shield. As a result no phalanx was uniform (except the Spartans, who had their gear provided). This total kit must have weighed between fifty and seventy pounds, and would have cost quite a few drachma. As a result, hoplites had to be at least middle-class. To illustrate this one should consider the Athenian class system of the Solon constitution. The four classes (upwards) were thetes, zeugites, hippeis and pentacosiomedimnoi (measured in produce per year of land). The three lower classes were drafted into the military according to what they could provide. The thetes rowed the vast Athenian fleet of ships, the hippeis, capable of supporting a horse (an aristocratic animal, never used agriculturally) formed cavalry and the zeugites formed the phalanx. It was also necessary to be physically fit and able bodied to fight as a hoplite, since the armour was heavy and allowed no ventilation (instant heat and sweating would result). The better nourished middle-class were more likely to be able to cope with the strain. Hoplite armour may also explain the preference for beards among the Greeks. The one piece helmet had no padding, so a beard (and long hair) acted as shock absorbers and kept the helmet from chafing the skin. The solidarity of a phalanx also comes across in the bonds of friendship and love among male Greeks. Although there is debate on the widespreadedness of homosexuality among Greeks of the same generation, it is certain that deep friendships were forged in the battle line. The
symposium of peace-time would likely contain several veterans of a phalanx who had fought with each other. Although slightly puzzling to the modern western world, considering the social climate of the times along with the predominant form of warfare goes some way towards understanding the differences in male relations.
*
Essay on Hoplite Warfare*
Tyrtaeus wikipedia page.
*
Livius page on hoplite warfare.
*
Victor David Hanson:
The Western Way of War New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989.
*
Woodford, S:
An Introduction To Greek Art*
Hoplite*
Pike*
Peltast*
Spear*
Sarissa, a kind of pike used by Macedonian phalangites
*
Roman infantry tactics, strategy and battle formations*
EpaminondasSimilar formations:
*
Macedonian phalanx*
Schiltron*
Shield wall*
Maniple
