Phrenology is regarded today as being a classic example of pseudoscience.
Pseudoscience is a term applied to a body of alleged knowledge, methodology, belief or practice that is portrayed as scientific but diverges from the required standards for scientific work or is unsupported by sufficient scientific research."Pseudoscientific - pretending to be scientific, falsely represented as being scientific", from the Oxford American Dictionary, published by the Oxford English Dictionary.http://skepdic.com/pseudosc.html (See Scientific method.)
The term "pseudoscience" appears to have been first used in 1843 Magendie, F. (1843). An Elementary Treatise on Human Physiology. 5th Ed. Tr. John Revere. New York: Harper, p. 150. Magendie refers to phrenology as "a pseudo-science of the present day" (note the hyphen). as a combination of the Greek root pseudo, meaning false, and the Latinscientia, meaning knowledge or a field of knowledge. It generally has negative connotations because it asserts that things so labelled are inaccurately or deceptively described as science.However, from the "them vs. us" polarization that its usage engenders, the term may also have a positive function because "[the] derogatory labelling of others often includes an unstated self-definition "(p.266); and, from this, the application of the term also implies "a unity of science, a privileged tree of knowledge or space from which the pseudoscience is excluded, and the user's right to belong is asserted " (p.286) -- Still, A. & Dryden, W., "The Social Psychology of "Pseudoscience": A Brief History", Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, Vol.34, No.3, (September 2004), pp.265-290. As such, those labelled as practicing or advocating a "pseudoscience" normally reject this classification.
The standards for determining whether a body of alleged knowledge, methodology, field, belief, or practice is truly scientific can vary from field to field, but involve agreed principles including reproducibility and intersubjective verifiability.See, e.g., Gauch, Hugh G., Jr., Scientific Method in Practice (2003) 3-5 ff. These attempt to ensure that relevant evidence can be reproduced and/or measured given the same conditions — which allows further investigation to determine whether a hypothesis or theory related to given phenomena is both valid and reliable for use by others, including other scientists and researchers. Scientific methods are expected to be applied throughout, and bias is expected to be controlled or eliminated, either directly, through the manipulation of factors, by double-blind studies, or statistically through fair sampling procedures. All gathered data, including experimental/environmental conditions, are expected to be documented for scrutiny and made available for peer review, thereby allowing further experiments or studies to be conducted to confirm or falsify results, as well as to determine other important factors such as statistical significance, confidence intervals, and margins of error.Gauch (2003), 191 ff, especially Chapter 6, "Probability", and Chapter 7, "inductive Logic and Statistics" Fulfillment of these requirements allows other researchers and practitioners a reasonable opportunity to assess whether to rely upon those results in their own scientific work or in a particular field of applied science, technology, therapy or other form of practice.
In the mid-20th Century Karl Popper suggested the additional criterion of falsifiability.Popper, Karl, "Science, Conjectures and Refutations" (orig. 1963), in Cover, J.A., Curd, Martin (Eds, 1998) Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, 3-10. Certain theories cannot be proven false under any circumstance, for example, the theory that God created the universe. Such theories may be true, but are not scientific; they lie outside the scope of (at least present-day) science; Popper differentiated here between mythological, religious or metaphysical formulations, which may prefigure later scientifically formulated theories but do not follow a scientific methodology, and actually pseudoscientific formulations — though without providing a clear demarcation between the two.Popper, Karl, "Science: Conjectures and Refutations", reprinted in Grim, Patrick, Philosophy of Science and the Occult, Albany 1990, pp. 104-110. Popper was advocating that in addition to the expectation for a hypothesis or theory to be empirically verifiable, scientific propositions should be limited to statements that are presented in such a way that in the event they are false, they should be capable of being clearly shown to be false through further experimental testing. Another criterion applicable to theoretical work is the heuristic of parsimony, also known as Occam's Razor.Gauch (2003) 269 ff, "Parsimony and Efficiency".
Some historians and philosophers of science (including Paul Feyerabend) have argued, from a sociology of knowledge perspective, that a clear philosophical distinction between science and pseudoscience is neither possible nor desirable.Feyerabend, Paul, Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, (1975)For a perspective on Feyerabend from within the scientific community, see, e.g., Gauch (2003) at p.4: "Such critiques are unfamiliar to most scientists, although some may have heard a few distant shots from the so-called science wars." Both the theories and methodologies of science evolve, sometimes very slowly, and in other cases quite rapidly. In addition, standards applicable to one branch of science may not be those employed in another branch. For instance, physicists may expect a 100% correlation of cause and effect in certain areas of inquiry (any significant divergence from this signifying a serious lack of understanding of the causal factors, the method of measurement and/or the testing environment), whereas psychologists may find 5% statistical correlation worthy of consideration if it can be consistently repeated.See, e.g., Meyers, Anne, and Hansen, Christine H., Experimental Psychology (4th Ed., 2001)See also, e.g., Shaughnessy, John J., Research Methods in Psychology (6th Ed., 2002)
The concept of pseudoscience as antagonistic to bona fide science appears to have emerged in the mid-19th century. The first recorded use of the word "pseudo-science" appears to have been in 1844 in the Northern Journal of Medicine, I 387: "That opposite kind of innovation which pronounces what has been recognised as a branch of science, to have been a pseudo-science, composed merely of so-called facts, connected together by misapprehensions under the disguise of principles".
A field, practice, or body of knowledge is reasonably called pseudoscience or pseudoscientific when (1) it has presented itself as scientific (i.e., as empirically and experimentally verifiable); and (2) it fails to meet the accepted norms of scientific research, most importantly the use of scientific method.[1]Williams, William F. (editor) (2000) Encyclopedia of Pseudoscience: From Alien Abductions to Zone Therapy.Cover, J.A., Curd, Martin (Eds, 1998) Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, 1-82. Within the various expectations of legitimate scientific methodology, by far the most important is that of making documentation of data and methodology available for close and repeated scrutiny by other scientists and researchers, as well as making available any additional relevant information used to arrive at particular results or methods of practice.See, e.g., Gauch, Hugh G., Jr. (2003) Scientific Method in Practice, 124 ff, esp. section on "Full Disclosure". To the degree that thorough documentation of data and method is unavailable for detailed scrutiny by others, a body of knowledge, practice, or field of inquiry will tend, as a result, to meet at least several of the characteristics of pseudoscience introduced below.
The following characteristics are helpful in identifying pseudoscience. No single characteristic demonstrates pseudoscience, but as more and more of these characteristics are met, further credibility may be attached to a claim that a particular field or practice is pseudoscientific.The work Scientists Confront Velikovsky, 1976, Cornell University, also delves into these features in some detail, as does the work of Thomas Kuhn, e.g., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) which also discusses some of the items on the list of characteristics of pseudoscience. * Assertion of scientific claims that cannot be falsified in the event they are incorrect, inaccurate, or irrelevant (see also: falsifiability) Lakatos, Imre. "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." in Lacatos, Imre, and Musgrave, Alan. (eds.). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970) 91-195.Popper, Karl (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery. * Assertion of scientific claims that are vague rather than precise, and that lack specific measurements as a basis See, e.g., Gauch (2003), op cit at 211 ff (Probability, "Common Blunders"). * Assertion of claims that a theory predicts something that it has not been shown to predict (see, e.g.:validity, relevance, Ignoratio elenchi; Argument from ignorance) See, e.g., Gauch (2003), op cit at 178 ff (Deductive Logic, "Fallacies"), and at 211 ff (Probability, "Common Blunders").See, e.g., [2]Macmilllan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol 3, "Fallacies" 174 'ff, esp. section on "Ignoratio elenchi". * Assertion of claims of secrecy or proprietary knowledge in response to requests for review of data or methodology Gauch, op cit (2003) at 124 ff, "Full Disclosure" * Assertion of claims of a conspiracy on the part of the scientific community to suppress the results An example of such a Web site is archivefreedom.org which claims that "The list of suppressed scientists even includes Nobel Laureates!" * Assertion that claims which have not been proven false must necessarily be true, and vice versa (see: Argument from ignorance) Argument from ignorance is also properly termed "argument to ignorance", "argumentum ad ignorantiam". For a definition, see, e.g.,[3]Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol 3, "Fallacies" 174 'ff, esp. 177-178. * Failure to make use of operational definitions For a well-developed explanation of operational definitions, see, e.g., [4] * Evasion of peer review prior to publicizing them (called "science by press conference") Peer review and the acceptance of new scientific ideas (Warning: 469 kBPDF)*Peer review â€" process, perspectives and the path aheadLilienfeld Scott O. (2004) Science and Pseudoscience in Clinical Psychology. Guilford Press (2004) ISBN 1593850700For an opposing perspective, see, e.g.: Peer Review as Scholarly Conformity Many proponents of pseudoscience avoid subjecting their work to the often ego-bruising process of peer review, somtimes on the grounds that peer review is inherently biased against claims that contradict established paradigms, and sometimes on the grounds that assertions cannot be evaluated adequately using standard scientific methods. By remaining insulated from the peer review process some proponents of pseudoscience forfeit an invaluable opportunity to obtain corrective feedback from informed colleagues.Ruscio, J. (2001) Clear thinking with psychology: Separating sense from nonsense. Pacific Grove, CA: Wadsworth. * An emphasis on confirmation rather than refutation: Fenyman (1985) states that science is bending over backwards to prove one's self wrong, whereas in contrast, pseudo-scientists tend to seek only confirming evidence for their claims. Popper (1959) states that a determined advocate can find at least some supportive evidence for virtually any claim. * Failure to provide adequate information for other researchers to reproduce the claimed results Gauch, op cit (2003) at 124 ff, "Full Disclosure" * Failure to progress towards additional evidence of its claims Lakatos, Imre. "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." in Lacatos, Imre, and Musgrave, Alan. (eds.). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970) 91-195.Thagard, Paul R. "Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience" (1978) In PSA 1978, Volume 1, edited by P.D. Asquith and I. Hacking (East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1978) 223 ff. Thagard writes, at 227, 228: "We can now propose the following principle of demarcation: A theory or discipline which purports to be scientific is pseudoscientific if and only if: it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and faces many unsolved problems; but the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory towards solutions of the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to others, and is selective in considering confirmations and disconfirmations." * Lack of self correction: Scientific and pseudoscientific research programmes make mistakes though most scientific research programs tend to eliminate these errors, whereas most pseudoscientific research programs do not. Intellectual stagnation is a hallmark of most pseudoscientific research programs.Ruscio, J. (2001) Clear thinking with psychology: Separating sense from nonsense. Pacific Grove, CA: Wadsworth, p120. * Failure to adhere to the principle of parsimony, i.e. failing to seek an explanation that requires the fewest possible additional assumptions when multiple viable explanations are possible (see: Occam's Razor) Gauch, op cit (2003) 269 ff, "Parsimony and Efficiency" * Attacking the motives or character of anyone who questions the claims (see Ad hominem fallacy.) See, e.g., [5]Devilly, Grant J. (2005) "Power Therapies and possible threats to the science of psychology and psychiatry", in Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, Volume 39, Number 6, June 2005, pp. 437-445(9) * Comparisons of rejection to the rejection of famous scientists of the past * Selective use of experimental evidence: presentation of data that seems to support its own claims while suppressing, ignoring, discarding, or refusing to consider data that conflict with its claims Thagard, op cit (1978) at 227, 228. * Reversed burden of proof. In science, the burden of proof rests invariably on the individual making a claim, not on the critic. According to Lilienfeld (2004:20) pseudoscientists frequently neglect this principle and instead demand that skeptics demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a claim (e.g., an assertion regarding the efficacy of a novel therapeutic technique) is false. It is essentially impossible to prove a universal negative, so this tactic incorrectly places the burden of proof on the skeptic rather than the claimant.Lilienfeld Scott O. (2004) Science and Pseudoscience in Clinical Psychology. Guilford Press, p20. ISBN 1593850700 * Overreliance on testimonials and anecdotes. Testimonial and anecdotal evidence can be useful for discovery (i.e., hypothesis generation) but should not be used in the context of justification (i.e., hypothesis testing). Proponents of pseudoscientific claims frequently invoke reports from selected cases as a means of furnishing positive evidence for these claims. * Use of obscurantist language. Many proponents of pseudoscienceuse use grandiose or highly technical jargon in an effort to provide their disciplines with the superficial trappings of science. * Lack of boundary conditions: Most well-supported scientific theories possess boundary conditions (well articulated limitations) under which the predicted phenomena do and do not apply. In contrast, many or most pseudoscientific phenomena are purported to operate across an exceedingly wide range of conditions.Hines, T. (1988) Pseudoscience and the Paranormal: A Critical Examination of the Evidence. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books. A Skeptical Inquirer Reader. * The mantra of holism: Proponents of pseudoscientific claims, especially in organic medicine and mental health, often resort to the "mantra of holism" to explain away negative findings.Ruscio, J. (2001) Clear thinking with psychology: Separating sense from nonsense, Pacific Grove, CA: Wadsworth. Some characteristics that are often true of pseudoscience are also true to some extent of some new genuinely scientific work. These include: * claims or theories unconnected to previous experimental results * claims which contradict experimentally established results * work failing to operate on standard definitions of concepts * comparisons of rejection to the rejection of famous scientists of the past * emotion-based resistance to new claims or theories by the scientific community Kuhn, Thomas, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962)
Non-scientific fields that are not pseudoscience
Pseudoscience is distinguishable from revelation, theology, or spirituality in that it claims to offer insight into the physical world obtained by "scientific" means. Systems of thought that rely upon "divine" or "inspired" knowledge are not considered pseudoscience if they do not claim either to be scientific or to overturn well-established science. There are also bodies of practical knowledge that are not claimed to be scientific. These are also not pseudoscience.
The term "pseudoscience" may by used by adherents of fields considered pseudoscientific to criticize their mainstream critics and vice versa, in which case the appearance is of two opposing camps both accusing each other of pseudoscience. Such situations can in general only be assessed by applying the above methodological and substantial criteria. Some statements and commonly held beliefs in popular science may not meet the criteria of science. "Pop" science may blur the divide between science and pseudoscience among the general public, and may also involve science fiction.http://www.popularscience.co.uk/features/feat20.htm Indeed, pop science is defined by the fact that it is disseminated to, and can also easily emanate from, persons not accountable to scientific methodology and expert peer review.
Another class of pseudoscience dubbed pseudoskepticism by the late professor of sociology, Marcello Truzzi, refers to a non-rigorous skepticism that is itself erroneously presented as skepticism, and taking a stance of denial, rather than doubt.Marcello Truzzi, Editorial, Zetetic Scholar, 12â€"13 (1987) 3â€"4. "Since 'skepticism' properly refers to doubt rather than denial â€" nonbelief rather than belief â€" critics who take the negative rather than an agnostic position but still call themselves 'skeptics' are actually pseudo-skeptics and have, I believed, gained a false advantage by usurping that label." Truzzi noted that while "Many claims of anomalies are bunk and deserve proper debunking .. those I term scoffers often make judgements without full inquiry"Marcello Truzzi, "Pseudoscience," in Gordon Stein, editor, Encyclopedia of the Paranormal. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books. Pp. 560-575. Also described in "Anomalistics" (1998)
Pseudoscience also differs from protoscience. Protoscience is a term sometimes used to describe a hypothesis that has not yet been adequately tested by the scientific method, but which is otherwise consistent with existing science or which, where inconsistent, offers reasonable account of the inconsistency. It may also describe the transition from a body of practical knowledge into a scientific field. Popper, op. cit.
Pseudoscience, in contrast, is characteristically inadequately tested; indeed, it may even be untestable in principle. If tests appear to contradict its evidence, supporters may insist that the existing scientific results are false. Pseudoscience is often unresponsive to ordinary scientific procedures (for example, peer review, publication in standard journals). If untestable claims have been made, the failure to test and disprove these claims is often cited as evidence of the truth of the pseudoscience.
The boundaries between pseudoscience, protoscience, and "real" science are often unclear to non-specialist observers and sometimes even to experts. Especially where there is a significant cultural or historical distance (as, for example, modern chemistry reflecting on alchemy), protosciences can be misinterpreted as pseudoscientific. Many people have tried to offer objective distinctions, with mixed success. Often the term pseudoscience is used simply as a pejorative to express the speaker's low opinion of a given field, regardless of any objective measures.
If the claims of a given field can be experimentally tested and methodological standards are upheld, it is real scientific work, however odd, astonishing, or counter-intuitive. If claims made are inconsistent with existing experimental results or established theory, but the methodology is sound, caution should be used; much of science consists of testing hypotheses that turn out to be false. In such a case, the work may be better described as as yet unproven or research in progress. Conversely, if the claims of any given "science" cannot be experimentally tested or scientific standards are not upheld in these tests, it fails to meet the modern criteria for a science.
In such circumstances it may be difficult to distinguish which of two opposing "sciences" is valid; for example, both the proponents and opponents of the Kyoto Protocol on global warming have recruited the help of scientists to endorse their contradictory positions, because of differing political goals. The enlistment of science in the service of politics or business is sometimes called "junk science".
After over a century of dialogue among philosophers of science and scientists in varied fields, and despite broad agreement on the basics of scientific method,Gauch, Hugh G., Jr., Scientific Method in Practice (2003) 3-7. the boundaries between science and non-science continue to be debated.Cover, J.A., Curd, Martin (Eds, 1998) Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, 1-82. This is known as the problem of demarcation.
Many commentators and practitioners of science, as well as supporters of fields of inquiry and practices labelled as pseudoscience, question the rigor of the demarcation since some disciplines now accepted as science previously had features cited as those of pseudoscience, such as lack of reproducibility, or the inability to create falsifiable experiments. Many accepted scientific concepts including: plate tectonics,http://www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/geology/techist.html , regarding plate techtonics' early reception. and the Big Bang,http://map.gsfc.nasa.gov/m_uni/uni_101bb1.html , regarding the Big Bang. were criticized by some as being pseudoscientific when they were first proposed.
It has been argued by several very notable commentators that experimental verification is not in itself decisive in scientific method. Thomas Kuhn states that in neither Popper's nor his own theory "can testing play a quite decisive role."Kuhn, Thomas, "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" in Grim, op. cit., p. 125.Daniel Rothbart has noted that "the defining feature of science does not seem to be experimental success, for most clear cases of genuine science have been experimentally falsified."Rothbart, Daniel, "Demarcating Genuine Science from Pseudoscience", in Grim, op. cit., pp. 114. The latter proposed that a scientific theory must "account for all the phenomena that its rival background theory explains" and "must clash empirically with its rival by yielding test implications that are inconsistent with the rival theory". A theory is thus scientific or not depending upon its historical situation; if it betters the current explanations of phenomena, it marks scientific progress. "Many domains in ancient Greece, for example, domains that today are called superstition, religion, magic and the occult, were at that time clear cases of legitimate science." This is an explicitly competitive model of scientific work; Rothbart also notes that it is not a completely effective model.Rothbart, Daniel, op. cit., pp. 114-20.
Kuhn postulated that proponents of competing paradigms may resort to political means (such as invective) to garner support from a public which lacks the ability to judge competing scientific theories on their merits. Philosopher of science Larry Laudan has suggested that pseudoscience has no scientific meaning and mostly describes our emotions: "If we would stand up and be counted on the side of reason, we ought to drop terms like ‘pseudo-science' and ‘unscientific' from our vocabulary; they are just hollow phrases which do only emotive work for us".Laudan, Larry, "The demise of the demarcation problem" in Ruse, Michael, But Is It Science?: The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy (1996) 337-350.
A significant number of presently accepted scientific theories were once rejected by mainstream scientists of their time as being pseudoscientific, irrational or obviously false. None of these fields are considered as pseudoscientific any more. These include: *Big Bang theoryEOP *Black holesEOP, p. 156 *Continental driftEOP *CosmologyStephen Hawking, Hawking on the Big Bang and Black Holes (1993) World Scientific, ISBN 9810210787. "Cosmology was thought of as pseudoscience where wild speculation was unconstrained by any possible observations". *Electromagnetic fieldsAlbert Einstein: "It is possible that there exist emanations that are still unknown to us. Do you remember how electrical currents and 'unseen waves' were laughed at?" *Germ theory of diseaseEOP *MeteorsSee here *Newtonian physics' assertion of action at a distance *PsychiatryEOP, p. 280 *Tides in connection with the moon At least by Galileo: '...when Kepler suggested that the tides are due to attractive forces emanating from the moon, Galileo shrugged the idea off as an "occult fancy" because it involved action-at-a-distance and thus contradicted the "laws of nature"'. Arthur Koestler, The Perversity of Physics
At the time these theories were not accepted, each was backed up by varying levels of evidence, or none at all. The scientific method itself has gradually evolved as well, affecting how each theory and its evidence was received and understood.
Pseudomathematics is a mathematics-like activity undertaken either by non-mathematicians or mathematicians themselves which does not conform to the rigorous standards usually applied to mathematical theories.
In the United States, the National Science Foundation indicated that public belief in pseudoscience rose during the 1990's, peaked near 2001 and has mildly declined since. Nevertheless, pseudoscientific beliefs remain ubiquitous. [6] National Science Board. 2006. Science and Engineering Indicators 2006. Two volumes. Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation (volume 1, NSB-06-01; NSB 06-01A).
Neurologists and clinical psychologists such as Drenth (2003:38), Lilienfeld (2004:20) and Beyerstein (1991:34) are concerned about the increasing amount of what they consider pseudoscience promoted in psychotherapy and popular psychology, and are also concerned about what they see as pseudoscientific therapies such as Neurolinguistic Programming, Rebirthing, Reparenting, and Primal Scream Therapy being adopted by government and professional bodies and by the public. The specific criticisms of these therapies are that they are scientifically unsupported, they may harm vulnerable members of the public, undermine legitimate therapies, and tend to spread misconceptions about the nature of the mind and brain to society at large. Organizations and publications such as the Scientific Review of Mental Health Practice (SRMHP) [7] and the publication Scientific Review of Alternative Medicine (SRAM) [8] have been created to raise awareness of pseudoscientific practices in medicine, self help, and business education.
The following is a list of theories and fields of endeavor that critics have characterized as pseudoscientific. Note that some of these fields, or parts of them, may be the subject of scientific research and may not be wholly dismissed by the scientific community; see the individual articles for more information.
* Erich von Däniken : controversial Swiss author who is best known for authoring works about prehistoric times. * John Hutchison * Michael Shermer : science writer, founder of The Skeptics Society, and editor of its magazine Skeptic. * Marcello Truzzi : professor of sociology at Eastern Michigan University and director for the Center for Scientific Anomalies Research. * Ernest Muldashev : Russian ufologist
# Beyerstein,D. (1996) A Skeptical Look at Alternative Healthcare. The Rational Enquirer. Vol 12, No. 2, Nov, 02 # Hines, Terence, Pseudoscience and the Paranormal: A Critical Examination of the Evidence, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY, 1988. ISBN 0-87975-419-2.# Beyerstein, B.L. (1990) Brainscams: Neuromythologies of the New Age. Int'l. J. of Mental Health, 19(3):27-36.# Carroll, Robert Todd, (2003). The Skeptic's Dictionary: A Collection of Strange Beliefs, Amusing Deceptions, and Dangerous Delusions, John Wiley & Sons, ISBN 0-471-27242-6# Lilienfeld S.O. (2004) Science and Pseudoscience in Clinical Psychology. Guilford Press (2004) ISBN 1593850700# # Shermer, Michael, Why People Believe Weird Things: Pseudoscience, Superstition, and Other Confusions of Our Time, Owl Books, New York, NY, 2002, ISBN 0-805-07089-3 # # Williams, William F. (editor) (2000). Encyclopedia of Pseudoscience: From Alien Abductions to Zone Therapy, Facts on File, ISBN 0-8160-3351-X# Wilson, Fred, The Logic and Methodology of Science and Pseudoscience, Canadian Scholars Press, 2000. ISBN 155130175X#Plate Tectonics: The Rocky History of an Idea by Anne Weil, University of California, Berekley, Museum of Palenotology, retrieved Aug 2, 2006 #Big Bang Cosmology by Gary Hinshaw, WMAP, NASA, retrieved Aug 2, 2006#A History of Quantum Mechanics by J J O'Connor and E F Robertson, JOC/EFR May 1996, retrieved Aug 2, 2006* Aczel, Amir D. (2005), Descartes' Secret Notebook, Broadway Books, New York, NY. * Beyerstein, B.L. (1990) Brainscams: Neuromythologies of the New Age. Int'l. J. of Mental Health, 19(3):27-36. * Drenth, J.D. (2003) Growing anti-intellectualism in Europe; a menace to science. Studia Psychologica, 2003, 45, 5-13 www.allea.org/pdf/59.pdf * Putnam, Hilary (1990), "A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy", Southern California Law Review 63 (1990), 1671â€"1697. Reprinted with modifications in (Putnam 1992). * Hyman, Ray. "The Mischief-Making of Ideomotor Action", Scientific Review of Alternative Medicine 3(2):34-43, 1999. * McComas, William, Ten myths of science: Reexamining what we think we know...., Vol. 96, School Science & Mathematics, 01-01-1996, pp 10.Pdf version * Putnam, Hilary (1992), Renewing Philosophy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. *Ruscio, J. (2001). Clear thinking with psychology: Separating sense from nonsense. Pacific Grove, CA: Wadsworth. * Kenny et al. "Applied Kinesiology Unreliable for Assessing Nutrient Status", Journal of the American Dietetic Association 88:698-704, 1988. * Runes, Dagobert D. (ed., 1972), Dictionary of Philosophy, Littlefield, Adams, and Company, Totowa, NJ. * Thagard, Paul (1992), Conceptual Revolutions, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. * Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition, Unabridged, W.A. Neilson, T.A. Knott, P.W. Carhart (eds.), G. & C. Merriam Company, Springfield, MA, 1950.
;Main works of modern philosophy of science * Feyerabend, Paul K., Against Method, Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, 1st published, 1975. Reprinted, Verso, London, UK, 1978. * Kuhn, Thomas S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1962. 2nd edition 1970. 3rd edition 1996. * Popper, Karl R., The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 1959.
;Further reading * Bernstein, Richard J., Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, PA, 1983. * Brody, Baruch A., and Grandy, Richard E., Readings in the Philosophy of Science, 2nd edition, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1989. * Brookfield, Stephen D., Developing Critical Thinkers, Challenging Adults to Explore Alternative Ways of Thinking and Acting, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA, 1987. * Burks, Arthur W., Chance, Cause, Reason â€" An Inquiry into the Nature of Scientific Evidence, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1977. * Dewey, John, How We Think, D.C. Heath, Lexington, MA, 1910. Reprinted, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY, 1991. * Earman, John (ed.), Inference, Explanation, and Other Frustrations: Essays in the Philosophy of Science, University of California Press, Berkeley & Los Angeles, CA, 1992. * Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Reason in the Age of Science, Frederick G. Lawrence (trans.), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1981. * Gardner, Martin, Fads and Fallacies in the Name of Science, 2nd edition, Dover Publications, New York, NY, 1957. 1st published, In the Name of Science, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1952. -->
