Sandinista National Liberation Front
This article is about the Nicaraguan left-wing political party. For the album by The Clash, see Sandinista!. The
Sandinista National Liberation Front () is a Nicaraguan political party founded on broad
socialist principles. It led a popular revolution that in 1979 overthrew the
Somoza political dynasty. Following their seizure of power, the Sandinistas ruled
Nicaragua for roughly 12 years from 1979 to 1990, during which time they established democratic elections and a national constitution, among other sweeping populist reforms. Their organization is generally referred to by the initials
FSLN and its members are called, in both English and Spanish,
Sandinistas. The Opposition to the
Somoza government began with the anti-imperialist imperatives of
Augusto C. Sandino, decades prior to the
Nicaraguan Revolution.
The Sandinistas were the product of three disparate social and ideological groups uniting together in cooperation against the Somoza regime. The earliest of the groups was organized by
Eden Pastora in the late 1950's. Pastora was a close family friend of Panama's dictator
Omar Torrijos and rose to become the Sandinista's military commander in chief. Another group was put together in
1961 by a few young
Marxist students whose leader was
Carlos Fonseca. These two groups unified, and for many years this incarnation of the FSLN was the main group opposing the dictatorship of the Somoza family. Later, during the mid-1970's, these two groups were joined by a junta of urban business men and professionals led by a powerful Nicaraguan corporate lawyer,
Joaquin Chamorro, through whom was also persuaded
Arturo Cruz, a wealthy banker who was intimate with the wealthy and influential among the Nicaraguan professional class. Together, these three groups made up the incarnation of the FSLN that eventually succeded in ending Somoza's rule.
After emerging victorious from the
civil war the FSLN formed a government and led it from 1979 until 1990. Organizing first a literacy drive to prepare the largely illiterate electorate for the elections, the Sandinistas then coordinated Nicaragua's first multiparty election in 1984, at which time the Sandinistas won a large majority of the popular vote. By the time of the next elections the Sandinistas lost the mandate to rule and assumed the role of Nicaragua's primary opposition party.
During this nascent period of the new Nicaraguan state, the FSLN faced an insurgency by the
Contras, significant elements of which were proxy armies organized, trained and supported by the
United States and its ally, the military dictatorship ruling
Argentina.
[For more sources see: Sources about the Iran-Contra Scandal, Sources about Contras] Today the FSLN remains one of Nicaragua's two leading parties, representing some 40% or more of the Nicaraguan electorate. The FSLN often polls in opposition to the
Constitutional Liberal Party, or PLC, which represents a roughly similar portion (though perhaps slightly larger) of the Nicaraguan population. Despite the fact that the FSLN is no longer the ruling party in Nicaragua, its revolution affected many facets of Nicaraguan society and its legacy has left a lasting impression in the country.
The Sandinistas took their name from
Augusto César Sandino (1895–1934), the charismatic and historical leader of the country's nationalist rebellion against the U.S. occupation of Nicaragua during the early 20th century, c. 1922 - 1934.
Sandino was
assassinated in 1934 by the
National Guard (), a police force trained and equipped by the United States military which was established to permit the U.S. puppet
Anastasio Somoza García to consolidate his control of the country.
The Somoza family ruled the country from 1936 until their overthrow by the Sandinistas in 1979.
The Sandinistas were initially several disparate groups that came together from various Nicaraguan regions to cooperate in the overthrow of the
Somoza regime. In general, the groups were organized locally from among peasants and aboriginal inhabitants outraged by the martial excesses and economic and social injustices that had become common institutional features of the Somoza regime.
The first of these groups was organized by Eden Pastora, an activist who was later to become more widely known as "Commander Zero". Pastora organized his group in the late 1950's, and was the first group to call itself "Sandinistas".
During 1961, another group was formally organised by three
Marxist students from Managua,
Carlos Fonseca Amador,
Tomás Borge Martínez and
Silvio Mayorga. In a disputed book published under one "
Mitrokhin" it has been asserted that these students were recruits of the KGB. This view has yet to be verified by indpendent research other than secret, non-public evaluation undertaken by agents of Britain's Intelligence branch, MI6. Consequently, there is some question as to the authenticity of the documents presented by "
Mitrokhin", and until further corroborating material comes to light his assertions remain questionable, at best.
What is undeniable was its close cooperation and reliance upon the government of
Cuba, which provided the FSLN with materiel, organizational training, and strategic and tactical support throughout its years of revolutionary conflict. Nevertheless, during these early years the FSLN was never completely subsumed to
Cuban leadership, largely because of its commander-in-chief,
Eden Pastora's close relationship with the Panamanian leading political family.
The word "Sandinista" in reference to the FSLN appeared two years later, when the nascent organization combined its forces with those of Pastora. This new incarnation of the Sandinistas continued to present its struggle as a "movement for national liberation", pointing to the injustices committed by the
kleptocratic, U.S.-imposed
Somoza dictatorship its oppressive, exploitative hold over the Nicaraguan, their rights, and the national economy.
Allegations of KGB Orchestration
According to
Vasili Mitrokhin, as part of
Aleksandr Shelepin's grand strategy of using national liberation movements as a spearhead of the
Soviet Union's foreign policy in the
Third World, in 1960 the KGB organized funding and training for twelve individuals that Fonseca handpicked. These individuals were to be the core of the new Sandinista organization. In the following several years, the FSLN tried with little success to organize
guerrilla warfare against the government of
Luis Somoza Debayle. After several failed attempts to attack government strongholds and little initial support from the local population, the National Guard nearly annihilated the Sandinistas in a series of attacks in
1963 . Disappointed with the performance of Shelepin's new Latin American "revolutionary vanguard", the KGB reconstituted its core of the Sandinista leadership into the ISKRA group and used them for other activities in Latin America.
Vasili Mitrokhin's allegations have not been corroborated by third parties, and may not represent the true historical record.
According to Andrew, who quotes Mitrokhin, during the following three years the KGB handpicked several dozen Sandinistas for intelligence and sabotage operations in the
United States. Andrew, quoting Mitrokhin, says that in 1966, this KGB-controlled Sandinista sabotage and intelligence group was sent to the U.S.-
Mexican border. Their primary targets were southern
NORAD facilities the oil pipeline running from
El Paso, Texas to
Costa Mesa, California.
[ ] These allegations have not been supported by third parties, and indeed form part of the plot of the early 1980's motion picture
Red Dawn; suggesting confabulation on Mitrokhin's part.
A support group, codenamed SATURN, passed as migrant farm workers to conceal themselves and smuggle in arms caches. In 1967, the reconstituted Sandinista forces suffered another major defeat during a major
National Guard offensive. One of the original Sandinista founders,
Rigoberto Cruz Arguello, was killed in this attack.
After a Cuban reorganization of the FSLN structure and tactics in the 1970s, it began to attract significant support from the country's increasingly politicised
peasantry and from other sectors of the population in response to the U.S.-supported dictatorship's brutality and
corruption, especially after the
earthquake that levelled the capital city,
Managua, on
23 December 1972. The earthquake killed 20,000 of the city's 400,000 residents and left another 250,000 homeless.
Anastasio Somoza Debayle's National Guard embezzled much of the international aid that flowed into the country to assist in reconstruction, and several parts of downtown Managua were never rebuilt because they stood on top of active fault lines. This overt corruption caused even people who had previously supported the regime, such as business leaders, to turn against Somoza and call for his overthrow. U.S. President
Jimmy Carter requested Somoza to repay the U.S. aid for the 1972's earthquake because it was "a loan and not a gift." Somoza had given several millions of dollars to the "Group of Twelve" () to appease them politically during the "Triumvirate" years (1972–1975). The "Group of Twelve," a group of "indignant businessmen," funded the Sandinistas after Somoza asked them to give back the millions he gave them so he could pay back the United States. The "Twelve" threw the country into open warfare instead of giving back the money, which was originally intended to feed and to clothe the homeless.
On
10 January 1978, the assassination of
Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, editor of the anti-Somoza newspaper
La Prensa, sparked a broad uprising against the regime. The Sandinistas led a combination of
general strikes, urban uprisings and rural guerrilla attacks that increasingly demoralised the National Guard. With the moral and material aid of many Latin American countries, the Sandinistas launched a liberation war from
Costa Rican territory. Despite an overwhelming superiority in arms and ruthless tactics that included the aerial bombardment of Nicaraguan cities, Somoza's army disintegrated; he fled the country on
17 July 1979, and was later assassinated in
Paraguay. Two days after Somoza's departure, the Sandinistas entered Managua and were greeted by huge crowds as national liberators.
Through the media and the works of FSLN leaders such as
Carlos Fonseca, the life and times of
Augusto César Sandino became the unique symbol of this revolutionary force in
Nicaragua. The ideology of Sandinismo gained momentum in 1974, when a Sandinista initiated hostage situation resulted in the Somoza government adhering to FSLN demands and publicly printing and airing work on Sandino in well known newspapers and media outlets.
During the long struggle against Anastasio Somoza Debayle, the FSLN leaders' internal disagreements over strategy and tactics were reflected in three main factions:
*The (GPP, "prolonged popular war") faction was rural-based and sought long-term "silent accumulation of forces" within the country's large peasant population, which it saw as the main social base for the revolution.
*The (TP, "proletarian tendency"), led by
Jaime Wheelock, reflected an orthodox
Marxist approach that sought to organise urban workers.
*The
/ (TI, "third way/insurrectionist") faction, led by
Humberto and
Daniel Ortega Saavedra, was ideologically eclectic, favouring a more rapid insurrectional strategy in alliance with diverse sectors of the country, including business owners, churches, students, the middle class, unemployed youth and the inhabitants of shantytowns. The also helped attract popular and international support by organising a group of prominent Nicaraguan professionals, business leaders, and clergymen (known as "the Twelve"), who called for Somoza's removal and sought to organise a provisional government from Costa Rica.
Nevertheless, while ideologies varied between FSLN leaders, all leaders essentially agreed that Sandino provided a path for the Nicaragua masses to take charge, and the FSLN would act as the legitimate vanguard. The extreme end of the ideology links Sandino to
Catholicism and portrays him as descending from the mountains in Nicaragua knowing he would be betrayed and killed. Generally however, most Sandinistas associated Sandino on a more practical level, as a heroic and honest person who tried to combat the evil forces of imperialist national and international governments that existed in Nicaragua's history.
US involvement with Nicaragua dates back at least to
William Walker (1824–1860) declaring himself president of Nicaragua in 1856, making English the national language and protecting the interests of the slave system. Interests in Nicaragua included business such as the
gold rush, slavery and the country's geographic location as a transit route across the
isthmus. Even after Walker's presidency, puppet rulers such as
Patricio Rivas guaranteed him control over the region. Since then, the US government has attempted to assert its policies in Nicaragua in line with the
Monroe Doctrine largely by supporting accommodating leaders, with the additional advantage of catering to American diplomats when they visited. The US also created a Nicaraguan national military force known as the
National Guard () under the leadership of
Anastosio Somoza and his sons. Somoza and the National Guard were a powerful entity in Nicaragua during
Juan Bautista Sacasa's reign. It is believed that these two powerful creations of the USA were instrumental in the assassination of
Sandino and the overthrow of Sacasa which allowed Somoza to begin his dictatorship.
During the four and a half decades the Somozas ruled Nicaragua, it was apparent that the US-Nicaragua relation was going to become even stronger. Such a relationship between the two parties only increased US interest in protecting the rapidly increasing American investments. In return, the US aided and gave loans to the country on a regular basis and such help went towards humanitarian issues, notably after the
1972 Managua Earthquake. However, even during the Samoza dynasty, the US-Nicaraguan relationship started to deteriorate due to the fact that the youngest of the three leaders, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, was losing support from both his people and the National Guard. Some believe that funds given to the National Guard in order to reconstruct the country after the earthquake were instead used to fund FSLN activity. Others say that the Somozas were known for pocketing money given for direct investments into the country. In 1977, when President
Jimmy Carter entered the White House, he pressured the last of the Somozas to change his image and order the National Guard to stop their violence so that the leader could gain popularity amongst his people. Due to Anastasio Somoza Dabyle's violation of human rights towards his own people, Carter gave him and his National Guard the option to stop or lose US support.
Beginning in 1967 the Cuban
General Intelligence Directorate, or DGI, had begun to establish ties with various Nicaraguan revolutionary organizations. By 1970 the DGI had managed to train hundreds of Sandinista guerrilla leaders and had vast influence over the organization. In
1969 the DGI had financed and organised an operation to free the jailed Sandinista leader
Carlos Fonseca from his prison in
Costa Rica. Fonseca was re-captured shortly after the jail break, but after a plane carrying executives from the
United Fruit Company was hijacked by the FSLN, he was freed and allowed to travel to Cuba.
DGI chief
Manuel "Redbeard" Piñeiro commented that "of all the countries in Latin America, the most active work being carried out by us is in Nicaragua." However, one should keep in mind that there were many other Cuban operations throughout the world.
The DGI, with Fidel Castro's personal blessing, also collaborated with the FSLN on the botched assassination attempt of
Turner Shelton, the U.S. ambassador in Managua and a close friend to the Somoza family. The FSLN managed to secure several hostages exchanging them for safe passage to Cuba and a one million dollar ransom.
After the successful ouster of Somoza, DGI involvement in the new Sandinista government expanded rapidly. An early indication of the central role that the DGI would play in the Cuban-Nicaraguan relationship is a meeting in Havana on
July 27,
1979, at which diplomatic ties between the two countries were re-established after more than 25 years.
Julián López Díaz, a prominent DGI agent, was named Ambassador to Nicaragua.
Cuban military and DGI advisors initially brought in during the Sandinista insurgency, would swell to over 2,500 and operated at all levels of the new Nicaraguan government. Sandinista defector Álvaro Baldizón alleged that Cuban influence in Nicaragua's Interior Ministry (MINT) was more extensive than was widely believed at the time and Cuban "advice" and "observations" were treated as though they were orders.
While the Cubans would like to have helped more in the development of Nicaragua towards socialism, they realized that they were no match for the United States' pressure on Latin America. Following the invasion of Grenada, countries previously looking for support from Cuba saw that they had little power to fight the United States when it chose to take action. [Banana Republic, Roy Gutman, 1988]
Cuban assistance after the revolution
The early years of the Nicaraguan revolution had strong ties to
Cuba.
Carlos Fonseca and
Daniel Ortega acknowledged that the FSLN owed a great debt to Cuba. The relationship was made possible because of Cuba's commitment to the strategy of revolutionary guerilla warfare. Once the Sandinistas assumed power, Cuba not only gave
Nicaragua military advice but also gave assistance and aid to the impoverished Nicaraguan economy. Cuban aid came in the form of educational assistance, healthcare, vocational training and industry building. Once the
Sandinistas assumed power, Cuba's restraint on
aid was lifted and it became an essential component of Nicaraguan development strategy. Cuban aid became important because it came in the form of grants and unconditional loans. (Roberto Perez, 1987) Nicaragua during the
Somoza period had been nearly 90% dependent on the
United States for assistance. In 1980 Cuban-Nicaraguan aid relations became formalized with the formation of the Mixed Commission for Scientific, Economic and Technical Cooperation. This commission is represented on the Cuban side by the State of Committee for Economic Cooperation and on the Nicaraguan side by the Ministry of Economic Cooperation. New aids agreements are negotiated every year within the framework of the commission. In this context the commission provides a vehicle for Nicaragua to present its various needs and for the Cubans to evaluate which ones they can fulfill (Gary Prevost, 126). The commission has overseen approximately 300 million dollars (U.S) between the years 1979 and 1987 in assistance to Nicaragua and according to Prevost it does not include military aid or the cost for schooling Nicaraguans in Cuba.
Educational assistance
Cuba was instrumental in the
Nicaraguan Literacy Campaign. Nicaragua was a country with a very high rate of illiteracy, but the campaign succeeded in lowering the rate from 50% to 12%. This was a huge campaign to take on but it succeeded with the help of Cuba. Cuba not only served as a model for Nicaragua but also provided technical assistance and advice to Nicaragua. The
Nicaraguan Literacy Campaign was one of the success stories of the Sandinistas' reign and Cuba played an important part in this; Cuba provided teachers on yearly basis after the revolution. Prevost states that "Teachers were not the only ones studying in Cuba, about 2,000 primary and secondary students were studying on the Isle of Youth and the cost was covered by the host country (Cuba)" (Prevost, 126).
Critics of the campaign contend that this effort was thinly disguised communist indoctrination, and point to the fact that elementary school books taught basic mathematics with illustrations of hand grenades. The suppression of catholic schools, and the introduction of foreigners in a lead role in this effort caused resentment among the campesino population.
Healthcare
Healthcare was another area where the Sandinistas made incredible gains and are widely recognized for this accomplishment. In this area Cuba also played a role by again offering expertise and know-how to Nicaragua. According to Prevost, over 1,500 Cuban doctors worked in Nicaragua and provided more than five million consultations. Also Cuban personnel have been essential in the elimination of
polio, decrease in
measles and lowering the infant morality rate. Prevost also states that Cuban personnel have made it possible for Nicaragua to have a truly national healthcare system reaching a majority of its citizens. (Prevost 127)
Vocational assistance
Cuba has participated in the training of Nicaraguan workers in the use of new machinery imported to Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan revolution put the country's government on the United States' black book; therefore the Sandinistas would not received any aid from the United States or even other Western countries. There was also a
trade embargo imposed by the United States in May of 1985 which made it impossible for Nicaragua to receive spare parts for American-made machines, so this led Nicaragua to look to other socialist countries for help. Cuba was the best choice because of the language and proximity and also it had imported such machinery over the years. Nicaraguans would come to Cuba for short periods of 3 to 6 months and this training closely involved close to 3,000 workers (Prevost, 128).
Industry building
Cuba has helped Nicaragua in huge projects such as building roads, railway, power plants and sugar mills. Cuba helped Nicaragua build the first overland route linking Nicaragua's Atlantic and Pacific coasts in order to expedite the flow of the $1 Billion in Soviet military aid used to enable the FSLNs iron fisted rule. The road crossed 260 miles of jungle although full completion of the road and usage was hindered by the
Contra war. Another significant feat was the building of the Tipitapa-Malacatoya sugar mill. It was completed and inaugurated during a visit by
Fidel Castro in January of 1985. The plant used the newest technology available and was built by workers trained in Cuba. Also during this visit Castro announced that all debts incurred on this project were absolved (Prevost, 127). Cuba also provided numerous technicians to aid in the sugar harvest and assist in the rejuvenation of several old sugar mills. Cubans also assisted in building schools and other projects that would ensure the survival of the Nicaraguan revolutionary government.
The Sandinistas inherited a country in ruins with a debt of 1.6
billion dollars (US), an estimated 50,000 war dead, 600,000 homeless, and a devastated economic infrastructure. To begin the task of establishing a new government, they created a Council (or ) of National Reconstruction, made up of five members – Sandinista militants
Daniel Ortega and
Moises Hassan, novelist
Sergio Ramírez Mercado (a member of "the Twelve"), businessman
Alfonso Robelo Callejas, and
Violeta Barrios de Chamorro (the widow of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro). The preponderance of power, however, remained with the Sandinistas and their mass organizations, including the Sandinista Workers' Federation (), the Luisa Amanda Espinoza Nicaraguan Women's Association (), and the National Union of Farmers and Ranchers ().
The dominant rebel leaders who controlled the FSLN such as Daniel Ortega were strongly authoritarian Marxist. However the new
junta initially contained a broad spectrum of ideologies. Upon assuming power, its political platform included the following:
*Nationalization of property owned by the Somozas and their collaborators.
*Land reform.
*Improved rural and urban working conditions.
*Free unionisation for all workers, both urban and rural.
*Control of living costs, especially basic necessities (food, clothing, and medicine).
*Improved public services, housing conditions, education (mandatory, free through high school; schools available to the whole national population; national literacy campaign).
*Nationalization and protection of natural resources, including mines.
*Abolition of torture, political assassination and the death penalty.
*Protection of democratic liberties (freedom of expression, political organization and association, and religion; return of political exiles).
*Equality for women.
*Free, non-aligned foreign policy and relations.
*Formation of a new, democratic, and popular army under the leadership of the FSLN.
*Pesticide controls
*Rain forest conservation
*Wildlife conservation
*Alternative energy programs- Notably absent from this list are such traditionally fundamental "Marxist" views (actually
Leninist,
Maoist, or
Stalinist) as the forced eradication of religious organizations, a one-party state, and the subsumption of all labor organizations, labor leadership, and political leadership into some form of "soviet" (or an organizational/political analogue, e.g. the
Maoist Red Guard). In addition, the early FSLN concerned itself with such non-"Marxist" (in the traditional sense) platforms such as the right to free unionization, the protections of free speech, free and independent political organization, the free practice of religion, and a remarkably prescient environmental concern, all of which signaled that the FSLN shared little with traditional Marxism and its fiercest progenitors of the era, the Cubans or the
Soviet.
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Political graffiti in León, 1980. It reads "If the Gringos (slang for American) intervene, the militias will stop them | !" |
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One example of the early FSLN's post-revolution successes was the literacy campaign, which saw teachers flood the countryside. Within six months, half a million people had been taught rudimentary reading, bringing the national illiteracy rate down from over 50% to just under 12%. Over 100,000 Nicaraguans participated as literacy teachers. One of the stated aims of the literacy campaign was to create a literate electorate which would be able to make informed choices at the promised elections. The great success of the literacy campaign was recognised by
UNESCO with the award of a Nadezhda Krupskaya International Prize.
The FSLN also created neighbourhood groups similar to the Cuban
Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, called
Sandinista Defense Committees ( or CDS). Especially in the early days following the overthrow of Somoza, the CDS's served as
de facto units of local governance. Their obligations included the distribution of food rations, organization of neighbourhood/regional cleanup and recreational activities, and policing to control looting, and the apprehension of remnants of the National Guard. Later, during the subsequent U.S./Contra/Nicaragua conflict, the CDS's also organised civilian defence efforts against Contra attacks and a network of intelligence systems in order to apprehend supporters. These activities led critics of the Sandinistas to argue that the CDS was a system of local spy networks for the government used to stifle political dissent, and it is true that the CDS did hold limited powers if locals refused to cooperate with the new government. After the initiation of full-scale U.S. military involvement in the Nicaraguan conflict the CDS was empowered to enforce wartime bans on political assembly and association with other political parties (i.e. -- parties associated with the "Contras").
By 1980, conflicts began to emerge between the Sandinista and non-Sandinista members of the governing junta.
Violeta Chamorro and
Alfonso Robelo resigned from the governing junta in 1980, and rumours began that members of the Ortega junta would consolidate power amongst themselves. These allegations spread, and rumors intensified that it was Ortega's goal to turn Nicaragua into a state modeled after
Cuban Communism. In 1979 and 1980, former Somoza supporters and ex-members of the widely discredited and despised National Guard formed irregular military forces, while the original core of the FSLN began to splinter. Armed opposition to the Sandinista Government eventually divided into two main groups: The Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense (FDN), a U.S. proxy army formed in 1981 by rogue elements of the CIA, U.S. State Department, and former members of the widely condemned Somoza-era Nicaraguan National Guard; and the Alianza Revolucionaria Democratica (ARDE), a group that had existed since before the FSLN and was led by Sandinista founder and former FSLN supreme commander, Eden Pastora, a.k.a. "Commander Zero". Although independent and often at conflict with each other, these guerrilla bands all became generally known as "Contras" (short for "", en. "counter-revolutionaries"). Despite the common name, the two primary groups, ARDE and FDN, rarely cooperated with each other and (in no small part because of the FDN's brutal and vicious terrorist tactics and status as U.S. puppets) largely despised one another.
The opposition militias were initially organized and largely remained segregated according to regional affiliation and political backgrounds. They conducted attacks on economic, military, and civilian targets. During the Contra war, the Sandinistas arrested suspected members of the Contra militias and censored publications they accused of collaborating with the enemy (i.e. -- the U.S., the FDN, and ARDE, among others).
In contrast to the
Cuban revolution, the Sandinista government practiced political pluralism. A broad range of new political parties emerged that had not been allowed under Somoza, ranging in political orientation from far-left to far-right. Following promulgation of a new populist constitution, Nicaragua held national elections in
1984. Independent electoral observers from around the world found that the elections had been fair. Two groups, however, disputed this: the Contra group "FDN", which was largely comprised of former Somozan-era National Guardsmen, landowners and businessmen, and their patron, the U.S. government as represented by a junta comprised of ultra-conservative elements from within the secret police agencies and espionage bureaucrats of the Reagan administration. Although initially willing to stand in the '84 elections, the FDN declined participation in the elections at the behest of President Ronald Reagan's State Department as part of a political ploy to portray the FSLN as a Marxist dictatorship. The U.S. subsequently objected to political restrictions placed on the opposition by the government (e.g. -- censorship of the press and the curtailing of free assembly), although notably these concerns were not validated by any of the UN, western European, or independent human rights organizations which sent observers.
Despite the wide selection of political parties and candidates, Daniel Ortega and Sergio Ramírez were elected president and vice-president, and the FSLN won an overwhelming 61 out of 90 seats in the new
National Assembly, having taken 63% of the vote on a turnout of 74%. Despite international validation of the elections by multiple political and independent observers (virtually all from among U.S. allies), the United States refused to recognise the elections, with President
Ronald Reagan denouncing the elections as a sham.
The women of Nicaragua prior to, during and after the revolution played a prominent role within the nation's society as they have commonly been recognized, throughout history and across all Latin American states, as its backbone. Nicaraguan women were therefore directly affected by all of the positive and negative events that took place during this revolutionary period. The victory of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in 1976 brought about major changes, which in turn reduced the great burdens that the women of Nicaragua were faced with prior to the revolution.
Supporters of the Sandinistas see their era as characterised by the creation and implementation of successful social programs which were free and made widely available to the entire nation. Some of the more successful programs for women that were implemented by the Sandinistas were in the areas of Education
Nicaraguan Literacy Campaign, Health, and Housing. Providing subsidies for basic foodstuffs and the introduction of mass employment were also memorable contributions of the FSLN. The Sandinistas were particularly advantageous for the women of Nicaraguan as they promoted progressive views on gender as early as 1969 claiming that the revolution would "abolish the detestable discrimination that women have suffered with regard to men and establish economic, political and cultural equality between men and women." This was evident as the FSLN began integrating women into their ranks by 1967, unlike other left-wing guerilla groups in the region. Considering the
Feminist Ideology During the Sandinista Revolution however, demonstrates that this goal was not fully reached because the roots of gender inequality were not explicitly challenged or deconstructed. Women's participation within the public sphere was also substantial, as many took part in the armed struggle as part of the FSLN or as part of counter-revolutionary forces.
Nicaraguan women also organized independently in support of the revolution and their cause. Some of those organizations were the Socialist Party (1963), Federación Democrática (which support the FSLN in rural areas), and
Luisa Amanda Espinoza Association of Nicaraguan Women (, AMNLAE). However, since
Daniel Ortega, was defeated in the 1990 election by the
United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) coalition headed by
Violeta Chamorro, the situation for women in Nicaragua was seriously altered. In terms of women and the labour market, by the end of 1991 AMNLAE reported that almost 16,000 working women- 9,000 agricultural labourers, 3,000 industrial workers, and 3,800 civil servants, including 2,000 in health, 800 in education, and 1,000 in administration- had lost their jobs. The change in government also resulted in the drastic reduction or suspension of all Nicaraguan social programs, which brought back the burdens characteristic of pre-revolutionary Nicaragua. The women were forced to maintain and supplement community social services on their own without economic aid or technical and human resource.
One of the major contributions to Nicaraguan society during the Sandinista rule was the 1980 Literacy Campaign, which was the most prominent event with regards to the new education system. Illiteracy was significantly reduced from 50.3% to 12.9%, which resulted in a major impact on the youth and development of the country. One of the government's major concerns was the previous education system under the Somoza regime which did not see education as a major factor on the development of the country. As mentioned in the Historical Program of the FSLN of 1969, education was seen as a right and the pressure to stay committed to the promises made in the program was even stronger. 1980 was declared the "Year of Literacy" and the major goals of the campaign that started only 8 months after the FSLN took over. This included the eradication of illiteracy, the integration of different classes, races, gender and age, more political awareness and the strengthening of political and economic participation of the Nicaraguan people.
Immediately after the Sandinistas gained power they began implementing agrarian reforms. Initial measures involved appropriating all Somoza owned land (apx. 20% of the arable land in Nicaragua)and nationalizing banking institutions giving the government control of credit. During their ten year duration in power their policies and reforms shifted and can be categorized in six different stages: agrarian reform from 1979-1981; recognition of the peasants in 1981; agrarian reform 1981-1982; acceleration and deceleration 1982-1984; prioritization of peasant in 1985; and changes in expropriation from 1986-1989
Initially the Sandinistas plan involved restructuring the country side. Their policies were geared to achieving four main goals: to recover 1978 production; maintain national unity; avoid conflict with the United States; and begin "transition structure" for the introduction to socialist methods of production. To attain these goals, the government implemented policies to promote and revive the Nicaraguan agrarian export economy through the establishment of state farms. The government recognized this as the most efficient means of creating a transition to socialism while avoiding conflict with the United States. The government guaranteed agricultural export growers credit (at negative interest rates). They also guaranteed profitable export prices at the government's expense (should international market prices drop). Rural labourers received a 30% increase in minimum wages. Consumer prices were kept low via cheap food policies and access to subsidized goods from state farms. Employment increased and the work day was shortened. In addressing peasant interests the government took three measures. First, in the spring of 1980 the government expropriated farms seized by the ATC (Farm workers Association). Secondly, they extended low interest credit to small producers and co-operatives. Thirdly, land rents were reduced by 85%. The resulting inflation due to the increased availability of currency without the corresponding increase in product meant that many peasants were unable to repay their loans. The cheap food policies also hurt many peasant food producers. Peasant support of the Sandinistas declined as they began aligning themselves with the conservative UPANIC (Nicaraguan Union Of Agricultural Productivity).
In 1981 there was a shift in agrarian policy. In August of 1981 the government discarded its credit programs. A few months prior, in March, 1981 the "Law of Forced Rents" was instituted. It required that all idle land be rented at legally established low rent rates. This was a response to the increase in demand for land by providing greater access to good quality low rent land. The second measure was the creation of UNAG (National Union of Farmers and Ranchers). It was an arm of the Sandinista government where the peasant farmers could re-align themselves and voice their concerns.
At this point there were three streams of opinion regarding the agrarian reform. Some favoured collectivization via state farms, others favoured allowing peasant choice in the matter, and others rejected the gradualist actions of the agrarian reform. In 1981, the institution of the Agrarian Reform Law and the Law of Cooperatives were introduced in August. These would maintain state collectivization but would not isolate it as the only path to socialist agricultural development. At the same time a voluntary gradualist policy was initiated while prioritizing both the cooperatives and ownership. Distribution of state resources such as land and credit would favour productive cooperatives. Distribution to individuals favoured injured veterans and families with members that had been killed in the war or tortured by Somoza's security forces. Additionally the government retrenched its former policies. Greater focus was placed on successful cooperatives. Credit policies were more discriminative favouring the most successful cooperatives. In the fall of 1982 these measures were institutionalized with the Programa Nacionale de Desarollo Cooperativo (National Cooperative Development Program). This involved an increased replacement of credit with government established producer prices to increase staple food production. Consumer prices were pushed down by consumer subsidies and price controls.
From the fall of 1982-1984 the Nicaraguan agrarian policies were influenced by the increase in counterrevolutionary activity and many of the governments policies were geared at gaining peasant support. This period of acceleration and deceleration refers to the increased preference in giving land titles to individuals as opposed to cooperatives. From 1979-1982, 952.82 square kilometres in new land titles was redistributed to individuals whereas in 1984 it increased tenfold to 9802.26 km². This period is also characterized by an increase in farming subsidies, producer prices and expansion of technical and training programs.
In 1985 the Sandinistas priority shifted due to an impending economic crisis. This phase is called the prioritization of the peasants. Land was distributed to individuals at a rate of 300% more than the prior six year period. Share croppers and peasants were also given titles to their land. The policy regarding the formation of the cooperatives relaxed allowing for greater diversity. With regards to macroeconomic policies the government was again emphasizing production. They increased producer prices, cut food imports, decreased credit to small and medium producers, cut consumer subsidies and prioritized production inputs for government investment.
After 1986 the agrarian policy experienced changes in expropriation, beginning January 1986. The policy favoured limitations on expropriation and redistribution. They removed the bottom acreage limit for land expropriation; expropriated for public use or social interest; no longer compensated expropriation of idle land; allowed for the eligibility of landless peasants as recipients of redistributed land; and created a land bank established from all idle and abandoned lands.
In 1989 the agrarian reform was declared complete by Minister of agriculture,
Jaime Wheelock. At this time, state farms constituted 11.7% of arable land; large capitalist land ownership, 6.4%; medium-sized capitalist producers, 9.0%; cooperatives, 13.8%; and peasant production 48.7%.
Upon assuming office in 1981, U.S. President Ronald Reagan condemned the FSLN for joining with Cuba in supporting Marxist revolutionary movements in other
Latin American countries such as
El Salvador. His administration authorised the
CIA to begin financing, arming and training rebels, some of whom were the remnants of Somoza's National Guard, as anti-Sandinista guerrillas that were branded "counter-revolutionary" by leftists ( in Spanish). This was inevitably shortened to
Contras, a label the anti-Communist forces chose to embrace. Eden Pastora and many of the indigenous guerrilla forces, who were not associated with the "Somozistas," also resisted the Sandinistas.
The Contras operated out of camps in the neighbouring countries of
Honduras to the north and
Costa Rica (see Eden Pastora cited below) to the south. As was typical in guerrilla warfare, they were engaged in a campaign of economic sabotage in an attempt to combat the Sandinista government and disrupted shipping by planting underwater mines in Nicaragua's
Corinto harbour, an action condemned by the
World Court as illegal. The U.S. also sought to place economic pressure on the Sandinistas, and the Reagan administration imposed a full trade embargo.
The armed resistance to the Sandinistas in Costa Rica initially called itself the
Nicaraguan Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (ADREN) and was known as the 15th of September Legion. It later formed an alliance, called the
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), which comprised other groups including
MISURASATA and the
Nicaraguan Democratic Union. Together, the members of these groups were generally called Contras. The Sandinistas condemned them as terrorists, and human rights organizations expressed serious concerns over reports of Contra attacks on civilians. In 1982, under pressure from Congress, the
U.S. State Department declared Contra activities terrorism. The Congressional intelligence committee confirmed reports of Contra atrocities such as rape, torture, summary executions, and indiscriminate killings.
After the U.S. Congress prohibited federal funding of the Contras in
1983, the Reagan administration continued to back the Contras by covertly selling arms to
Iran and channelling the proceeds to the Contras (The
Iran-Contra Affair.) When this scheme was revealed, Reagan admitted that he knew about the Iranian "arms for hostages" dealings but professed ignorance about the proceeds funding the Contras; for this,
National Security Council aide
Lt. Col. Oliver North took much of the blame.
Senator
John Kerry's
1988 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations report on Contra-drug links concluded that "senior U.S. policy makers were not immune to the idea that drug money was a perfect solution to the Contras' funding problems."[
1] According to the
National Security Archive, Oliver North had been in contact with
Manuel Noriega, Panama's drug-lord.
The
Reagan administration's support for the Contras continued to stir controversy well into the 1990s. In
August 1996,
San Jose Mercury News reporter
Gary Webb published a series titled
Dark Alliance, linking the origins of
crack cocaine in California to the contras.
Freedom of Information Act inquiries by the National Security Archive and other investigators unearthed a number of documents showing that White House officials, including Oliver North, knew about and supported using money raised via
drug trafficking to fund the contras. Sen. John Kerry's report in 1988 led to the same conclusions, however, major media outlets and the Justice Department denied the allegations.
The Contra war unfolded differently in the northern and southern zones of Nicaragua. Contras based in Costa Rica operated in Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast, which is sparsely populated by indigenous groups including the
Miskito,
Sumo,
Rama,
Garifuno, and
Mestizo. Unlike Spanish-speaking western Nicaragua, the Atlantic Coast is predominantly English-speaking and was largely ignored by the Somoza regime. The
costeños did not participate in the uprising against Somoza and viewed Sandinismo with suspicion from the outset.
Sandinista troops allegedly committed their most controversial activities (as far as human rights are concerned) on the Atlantic Coast, including the forcible relocation of 8,500
Miskitos from their land and the destruction of up to 100 villages, activities which led to charges of
genocide at the time. They also killed and imprisoned many indigenous people suspected of Contra collaboration. On two separate occasions in 1981 and 1982, Sandinista troops allegedly committed massacres in which approximately (UNHCR Report) 34 Miskito Indians died.
Another tactic used by the Sandinistas was the indiscriminate shelling of towns recently captured by the Contras, an action which was viewed by many as "punishment." This Sandinista practice resulted in the Reagan Administration issuing orders to the Contra to stop further capture of cities and to concentrate on a "wasting" war while the U.S. was outspending the Soviet Union into bankruptcy, effectively curtailing the military support to the Sandinistas.
During the war
Amnesty International and other groups alleged that political prisoners in Sandinista prisons, such as in Las Tejas, were beaten, deprived of sleep and tortured with electric shocks. They were denied food and water and kept in dark cubicles that had a surface of less than one square metre, known as ("little ones.") These cubicles were too small to sit up in and had no sanitation and almost no ventilation.
In the mid-1980s, under pressure from human rights organizations and widespread international condemnation, the Sandinista government acknowledged violations in its dealings with the Atlantic Coast and successfully negotiated an end to the southern front of the Contra war. In fulfillment of the terms of that negotiation, the National Assembly unanimously passed an Autonomy Law in
1987 that made Nicaragua the first Latin American nation to officially recognise its multiethnic nature, guaranteeing the economic, cultural, linguistic and religious rights demanded by the indigenous groups of the Atlantic Coast.
The Roman Catholic Church's relationship with the Sandinistas was extremely complex. Initially, the Church was committed to supporting the Somoza regime. The Somoza dynasty was willing to secure the Church a prominent place in society as long as it did not attempt to subvert the authority of the regime. Under the constitution of 1950 the
Catholic Church was recognized as the official religion and church-run schools flourished. It was not until the late 1970s that the Church began to speak out against the corruption and human rights abuses that characterized the Somoza regime.
The Catholic hierarchy initially disapproved of the Sandinistas revolutionary struggle against the Somoza dynasty. In fact, the revolutionaries were perceived as proponents of "godless communism" that posed a threat to the traditionally privileged place that the Church occupied within Nicaraguan society. Nevertheless, the increasing corruption and repression characterizing the Somoza rule and the likelihood that the Sandinistas would emerge victorious ultimately influenced Archbishop
Miguel Obando y Bravo to declare formal support for the Sandinista's armed struggle. Throughout the revolutionary struggle, the Sandinistas enjoyed the grassroots support of clergy who were influenced by the reforming zeal of
Vatican II and dedicated to a "preferential option for the poor" (for comparison, see
liberation theology). Numerous Christian base communities (CEBs) were created in which lower level clergy and laity took part in consciousness raising initiatives to educate the peasants about the institutionalized violence they were suffering from. Some priests took a more active role in supporting the revolutionary struggle. For example,
Father Gaspar Garcia Laviana took up arms and became a member of FSLN.
Soon after the Sandinistas assumed power, the hierarchy began to oppose the Sandinistas government. The Archbishop was a vocal source of domestic opposition. The hierarchy was alleged to be motivated by fear of the emergence of the 'popular church' which challenged their centralized authority. The hierarchy also opposed social reforms implemented by the Sandinistas to aid the poor, allegedly because they saw it as a threat to their traditionally privileged position within society.
The Sandinistas' relationship with the
Roman Catholic Church deteriorated as the
Contra War dragged on. The hierarchy refused to speak out against the counterrevolutionary activities of the contras and failed to denounce American military aid. State media accused the Catholic Church of being reactionary and supporting the Contras. According to former President Ortega, "The conflict with the church was strong, and it costs us, but I don't think it was our fault… …There were so many people being wounded every day, so many people dying, and it was hard for us to understand the position of the church hierarchy in refusing to condemn the contras." The hierarchy-state tensions were brought to the forefront with
Pope John Paul II 1983 visit to Nicaragua. Hostility to the Catholic Church became so great that at one point, "…FSLN militants shouted down Pope John Paul II as he tried to say Mass."[
2] Therefore, while the activities of the 'popular church' contributed to the success of the Sandinista revolution, the hierarchy's opposition was a major factor in the downfall of the revolutionary government.
In 1987, due to a stalemate with the Contras, the Esquipulas II treaty was brokered by Costa Rican President
"scar Arias Sánchez, between the FSLN and the Contras. The treaty's provisions included a call for a cease-fire, freedom of expression, and national elections. After the
February 26,
1990 elections, the Sandinistas lost and peacefully passed power to the
National Opposition Union, an alliance of 14 opposition parties ranging from the conservative business organization COSEP to
Nicaraguan communists. UNO's candidate,
Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, replaced Daniel Ortega as president of Nicaragua.
Reasons for the Sandinista loss in 1990 are disputed. Defenders of the defeated government assert that Nicaraguans voted for the opposition due to the continuing U.S. economic embargo and potential Contra threat. Opponents claim that Contra warfare had largely died down, and that the Sandinistas had grown increasingly unpopular, particularly due to forced conscription and crackdowns on political freedoms. An important reason, regardless of perspective, was that after a decade of the U.S. backed war and embargo, Nicaragua's economy and infrastructure were badly damaged and the United States promised aid only if the Sandinistas lost. The U.S. also helped keep the rightist factions united so there would not be two strong rightist candidates.
At the personal level, most Nicaraguans voted against the Sandinistas to end a bloody war, food shortages, the governments mishandling of the economy, and because they were tired of the FSLN.
After their loss, most of the Sandinista leaders held most of the private property and businesses that had been confiscated and nationalized by the FSLN government. This process became known as the
piñata and was tolerated by the new Chamorro government. Ortega also claimed to "rule from below" through groups he controls such as labor unions and student groups. Prominent Sandinistas also created a number of nongovernmental organizations to promote their ideas and social goals, such as the
Augusto César Sandino Foundation (FACS).
Daniel Ortega remained the head of the FSLN, but his brother Humberto resigned from the party and remained at the head of the Sandinista Army, becoming a close confidante and supporter of Chamorro. The party also experienced a number of internal divisions, with prominent Sandinistas such as
Ernesto Cardenal and
Sergio Ramírez resigning to protest what they described as heavy-handed domination of the party by Daniel Ortega. Ramírez also founded a separate political party, the
Movement for the Renovation of Sandinismo (MRS); his faction came to be known as the , who favor a more
social democratic approach than the
orthodoxos, or hardliners. In the 1996 Nicaraguan election, Ortega and Ramírez both campaigned unsuccessfully as presidential candidates on behalf of their respective parties, with Ortega receiving 43% of the vote while
Arnoldo Alemán of the Constitutional Liberal Party received 51%.
Daniel Ortega was re-elected as leader of the Sandinistas in 1998. Municipal elections in November 2000 saw a strong Sandinista vote, especially in urban areas, and former Tourism Minister Herty Lewites was elected mayor of Managua. This significant result led to expectations of a close race in the presidential elections scheduled for November 2001. Daniel Ortega and
Enrique Bolaños of the Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC) ran neck and neck in the polls for much of the campaign, but in the end the PLC won a clear victory. At these
elections, 4 November 2001, the party won 42.1 % of the popular vote and 43 out of 90 seats. The same day,
José Daniel Ortega Saavedra was defeated by the
Enrique Bolaños Geyer of the
Constitutional Liberal Party, winning only 42.3 %.
Daniel Ortega was once again re-elected as leader of the Sandinistas in March 2002.
The flag of the FSLN consists of an upper half in
red, a lower half in
black, and the letters F S L N in
white. The black is probably representative of revolution (and possibly also
anarchism), and the red represents
Marxism,
Communism, and/or
Socialism. The letters are probably white for legibility's sake.
*
Bayardo Arce, hard-line National Directorate member in the 1980s
*
Patrick Arguello, a Sandinista involved with the
Dawson's Field hijackings*
Nora Astorga, Sandinista Delilah and UN ambassador
*
Monica Baltodano*
Tomás Borge, one of the FSLN's founders, leader of the explicitly Marxist Prolonged Popular War tendency in the 1970s, Minister of Interior in the 1980s
*
Omar Cabezas*
Ernesto Cardenal, poet and Catholic priest, Minister of Culture in the 1980s
*
Luis Carrion, National Directorate member in the 1980s
*
Miguel d'Escoto, a
Maryknoll Catholic priest, served as Nicaragua's foreign minister
*
Carlos Fonseca, one of the FSLN's principal founders and leading ideologist in the 1960s
*
Herty Lewites, former mayor of Managua, opponent of Daniel Ortega in 2005
*
Silvio Mayorga, FSLN co-founder and martyr
*
Vilma Núñez*
Daniel Ortega, post-revolution junta head, then President from 1985, lost presidential elections in 1990, 1996, and 2001, but continues to control the FSLN party
*
Humberto Ortega, leader of the FSLN Insurrectional Tendency (Tercerista) in the 1970s, chief strategist of the anti-Somoza urban insurrection, Minister of Defense in the 1980s during the Contra war
*
Edén Pastora, "," social democratic guerrilla leader who joined the Terceristas during the anti-Somoza insurrection, broke with FSLN to lead center-left ARDE contra group based in Costa Rica during the early 1980s
*
Germán Pomares, early Sandinista and martyr
*
Sergio Ramirez, novelist and civilian Sandinista, architect of alliance with moderates in 1970s, Vice President in 1980s, opponent of Daniel Ortega in 1990s
*
Henry Ruíz, "," FSLN rural guerrilla commander in the 1970s, member of the National Directorate in the 1980s
*
Arlen Siu, one of the first female martyrs of the revolution.
*
Dora María Téllez*
Oscar Turcios, FSLN martyr
*
Pablo Ubeda, early FSLN member and martyr
*
Jaime Wheelock, leader of the FSLN Proletarian Tendency, Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development
*
Iran-Contra Affair*
Nicaragua vs. United States*
Nicaraguan Sign Language, language that was born as a result of Sandinistas bringing deaf children together in schools for the deaf
*
Carlos Mejía Godoy*
List of Films and Books about Nicaragua*Andrew, Christopher; Mitrokhin, Vasili.
The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World. Basic Books (2005)
*Andrew, Christopher; Mitrokhin, Vasili.
The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB. Basic Books (2001)
*Arias, Pilar. . Mexico: Siglo XXI Editores, 1980.
*Belli, Humberto.
Breaking Faith: The Sandinista Revolution and Its Impact on Freedom and Christian Faith in Nicaragua. Crossway Books/The Puebla Institute, 1985.
*Christian, Shirley.
Nicaragua, Revolution In the Family. New York: Vintage Books, 1986.
*Cox, Jack.
Requiem in the Tropics: Inside Central America. UCA Books, 1987.
*Gilbert, Dennis.
Sandinistas: The Party And The Revolution. Blackwell Publishers, 1988.
*Hodges, Donald C.
Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986.
*
Kinzer, Stephen.
Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua, Putnam Pub Group, ISBN 0399135944, 1991.
*Kirkpatrick, Jean.
Dictatorships and Double Standards. Touchstone, 1982.
*Miranda, Roger, and William Ratliff.
The Civil War in Nicaragua: Inside the Sandinistas. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993.
*Moore, John Norton,
The Secret War in Central America: Sandinista Assault on World Order. university Publications of America, 1987.
*Nolan, David.
The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution. Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1984.
* Prevost, Gary. "Cuba and Nicaragua: A special Relationship?".
The Sandinista Legacy: The Construction of Democracy, Latin American Perspectives.17.3 (1990)
*Smith, Hazel.
Nicaragua: Self-determination and Survival. Pluto Press, 1991. ISBN 0745304753
*Zimmermann, Matilde.
Sandinista: Carlos Fonseca and the Nicaraguan Revolution. Duke University Press, 2001.
*
www.fsln-nicaragua.com — Official Sandinista web page
*
25th Anniversary Celebration of the Sandinista Revolution at
NicaNet*
Art, Truth & Politics —
Harold Pinter delivers
Nobel Prize in Literature lecture in which he explains the Sandinista conflict and condemns the U.S.
*
Sandinista Revolution
