Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
The
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (or
SNCC, pronounced "snick") was one of the primary institutions of the
American Civil Rights Movement in the
1960s. It emerged in April of
1960 from student meetings led by
Ella Baker held at
Shaw University in
Raleigh, North Carolina. SNCC began with an $800 grant from the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Some of the original student members were
organizers of
sit-ins at
segregated lunch counters in the southern
United States. Its purpose then was to coordinate the use of
nonviolent direct action to attack segregation and other forms of racism. SNCC played a leading role in the
Freedom Rides, the
1963 March on Washington, Mississippi
Freedom Summer and the
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party over the next few years. In the later part of the 1960s, led by fiery leaders like
Stokely Carmichael, SNCC focused on
Black Power, and then fighting against the
Vietnam War. In 1969, SNCC officially changed its name to the
Student National Coordinating Committee to reflect the broadening of its strategies.
Freedom rides
The movement took on even greater risks the following year, after a mob of
Ku Klux Klan members and other whites attacked the bus passengers who were defying local segregation laws as part of the
Freedom Rides organized by the
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). Rather than allowing mob violence to stop them, SNCC volunteers, including
Robert Moses,
Diane Nash,
James Bevel,
Marion Barry and SNCC President
John Lewis, put themselves at great personal risk by traveling into the deep South, forcing the
Kennedy Administration to provide federal protection for them to avoid more mob violence. More than a thousand people eventually took part in these Freedom Rides in the year that followed.
March on Washington
SNCC played a signal role in the 1963
March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom. While many speakers applauded the Kennedy Administration for the (largely ineffective) efforts it had made toward obtaining new, more effective civil rights legislation protecting the right to vote and outlawing segregation,
John Lewis took the Administration to task for how little it had done to protect Southern blacks and civil rights workers under attack in the
Deep South. While he toned down his comments under pressure from others in the movement, his words still stung:
"We march today for jobs and freedom, but we have nothing to be proud of, for hundreds and thousands of our brothers are not here--for they have no money for their transportation, for they are receiving starvation wages…or no wages at all. In good conscience, we cannot support the administration's civil rights bill.
This bill will not protect young children and old women from police dogs and fire hoses when engaging in peaceful demonstrations. This bill will not protect the citizens of Danville, Virginia who must live in constant fear in a police state. This bill will not protect the hundreds of people who have been arrested on trumped-up charges like those in
Americus, Georgia, where four young men are in jail, facing a death penalty, for engaging in peaceful protest.
I want to know, which side is the federal government on? The revolution is a serious one. Mr. Kennedy is trying to take the revolution out of the streets and put it in the courts. Listen Mr. Kennedy, the black masses are on the march for jobs and for freedom, and we must say to the politicians that there won't be a 'cooling-off period.'"
Voting rights struggles
SNCC expanded its activities in the next few years to other forms of organizing. Later in
1963 SNCC conducted the Freedom Ballot, a mock election in which black Mississippians came out to show their willingness to vote. This is a right they had been denied, despite the provisions of the
Fifteenth Amendment, due to a combination of state laws, economic reprisals and violence by white authorities and private citizens.
SNCC followed up on the Freedom Ballot with the Mississippi Summer Project, also known as Freedom Summer, which focused on voter registration. SNCC organized black Mississippians to register to vote, almost always without success, as white authorities either rejected their applications on any pretexts available or, failing that, simply refused to accept their applications.
Mississippi Summer got national attention when three civil rights workers involved in the project,
James Chaney,
Andrew Goodman and
Michael Schwerner, disappeared after having been released from police custody. Their bodies were eventually found after a reluctant
J. Edgar Hoover directed the
FBI to find them; in the process it also found corpses of several other missing black Mississippians, whose disappearances had not attracted any public attention.
SNCC also established Freedom Schools to teach children to read and to educate them to stand up for their rights. As in the struggle to desegregate public accommodations led by
Martin Luther King, Jr. in
Birmingham, Alabama the year before, the bolder attitudes of children brought into the movement helped shake their parents out of the fear that had paralyzed many of them.
The goal of the Mississippi Summer Project was to organize the
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, an integrated party, to win seats at the
1964 Democratic National Convention for a slate of delegates elected by disenfranchised black Mississippians and white sympathizers. The MFDP was, however, tremendously inconvenient for the
Johnson Administration, which wanted to minimize the inroads that
Barry Goldwater's campaign was making into what had previously been the Democratic stronghold of the "Solid South" and the support that
George Wallace had received during the Democratic primaries in the North.
When the MFDP started to organize a fight over credentials, Johnson originally would not budge. When
Fannie Lou Hamer, the leader of the MFDP, was in the midst of testifying about the beatings the police had given to her and others for attempting to exercise their right to vote, Johnson preempted television coverage of the credentials fight by arranging for a hastily scheduled speech of his own. Even so, her testimony had created enough uproar that Johnson offered the MFDP a "compromise": they would receive two non-voting seats, while the all-white delegation sent by the official Democratic Party would take its seats.
Johnson used all of his resources, mobilizing
Walter Reuther, one of his key supporters within the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, and his Vice-Presidential nominee
Hubert Humphrey, to put pressure on King and other mainstream
civil rights leaders to bring the MFDP around, while directing Hoover to put the delegation under surveillance. The MFDP rejected both the compromise and the pressure on them to accept it and walked out.
That experience destroyed what little faith SNCC activists had in the good faith of the federal government, even though Johnson had obtained a broad Civil Rights Act barring discrimination in public accommodations, employment and private education in
1964 and would go on to obtain an equally broad Voting Rights Act in
1965. It also estranged them from many of the mainstream leaders of the civil rights movement.
Those differences carried over into the voting rights struggle that centered on
Selma, Alabama in
1965. SNCC had begun organizing citizens to register to vote in Selma, but was forced to cede a larger role to the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference later that year. SNCC disagreed with SCLC over tactical and strategic issues, including the decision not to attempt to cross the Edmund Pettus Bridge a second time after county sheriffs and state troopers attacked them on "Bloody Sunday" on
March 7,
1965. Although the civil rights movement finally crossed the bridge on the third attempt, with the aid of a federal court order barring authorities from interfering with the march, as part of a five day march to
Montgomery, Alabama that helped dramatize the need for a Voting Rights Act, SNCC activists became more and more disenchanted with their role as shock troops for the movement.
Change in strategy
Many within the organization had also grown skeptical about the tactics of nonviolence. After the
Watts riots in
Los Angeles in
1965, some SNCC members sought to break their ties with the mainstream civil rights movement and the liberal organizations that supported it, arguing instead that blacks needed to seize power rather than seek accommodations from the white power structure. The leader of this movement, Stokely Carmichael (later Kwame Toure), replaced
John Lewis as head of SNCC in May 1966.
Carmichael first argued that blacks should be free to use violence in self-defense, then later advocated revolutionary violence to overthrow oppression. Carmichael rejected the civil rights legislation that the movement had fought so hard to achieve as mere palliatives.
Carmichael raised the banner of Black Power in a speech in
Greenwood, Mississippi in June 1966. As the mainstream civil rights movement distanced itself from SNCC, SNCC expelled its white staff and volunteers and denounced the whites who had supported it in the past. By early 1967 SNCC was approaching bankruptcy and close to disappearing.
Carmichael left SNCC in June 1967 to join the
Black Panther Party.
H. Rap Brown, later known as Jamil Abdullah Al-Amin, replaced him as the head of SNCC.
Brown renamed the group the Student National Coordinating Committee and supported violence, which he described "as American as cherry pie." He resigned from SNCC in
1968, after being indicted for inciting to riot in
Cambridge, Maryland in
1967, to become Minister of Justice of the Black Panther Party.
SNCC was by that point no longer an effective organization. It finally disappeared in the early 1970s. SNCC is recognized today as one of the primary influences on the modern
youth activism movement.
*
SNCC 1960 - 1966: Six years of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. Retrieved
2 May 2005.
Archives*
Ellin (Joseph and Nancy) Freedom Summer Collection. Collection Number: M323. Dates: 1963 - 1988. Volume: 1.7 ft³ (48 L)
The University of Southern Mississippi Libraries Special Collections. Retrieved
2 May 2005.
Books* Carmichael, Stokely, et al.
Ready for Revolution : The Life and Struggles of Stokely Carmichael (Kwame Ture). Scribner (
15 February 2005) 848 pages. ISBN 0684850044.
* Carson, Claybourne.
In Struggle, SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960's. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1981. ISBN 0674447271.
* Greenberg, Cheryl Lynn, ed.
A Circle of Trust: Remembering SNCC. Rutgers University Press (
1 February 1998). 274 pages. ISBN 0813524776.
* Hogan, Wesley C.
How democracy travels: SNCC, Swarthmore students, and the growth of the student movement in the North, 1961-1964.
*
Lewis, John.
Walking With the Wind: A Memoir of the Movement. New York: Simon & Schuster. 1998.
* Sellers, Cleveland and Robert Terrell.
The River of No Return: The Autobiography of a Black Militant and the Life and Death of SNCC. University Press of Mississippi; Reprint edition (
1 November 1990). 289 pages. ISBN 087805474X.
*
Zinn, Howard.
SNCC: The New Abolitionists Boston: Beacon Press. 1964. ISBN 0896086798
Interviews*
Transcript: An Oral History with Terri Shaw. SNCC member and Freedom Summer participant.
The University of Southern Mississippi Libraries Special Collections. Retrieved
2 May 2005.
*
Interviews with civil rights workers from the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). Stanford University Project South oral history collection. Microfilming Corp. of America. 1975. ISBN 0884559904.
SNCC publications and documents*
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Founding Statement.
*
Memorandum: on the SNCC Mississippi Summer Project Transcript. Oxford, Ohio: General Materials (ca. June 1964). Retrieved
2 May 2005.