Expert: Austin Cline - 7/12/2010

Question
QUESTION: Dear expert,



First, let's suppose the Universe has a Designer "living" outside time and space (so he is timeless, changeless), as Kalam argument suggests.

I saw you dealt with the issue about asking a cause for the Universe
(indeed, in the causality-concept that effect follow its cause IN TIME, thinking about a cause for our Universe is the same as believing a time before t0; so a time before time)

Craig suggests that it's sensible to think about a cause for our Universe: this very cause isn't defined in the causality-concept you used "cause=>delay=>effect";
but is defined in a "simultaenous causation" concept where
effect exists as long as its cause exists, without delay between them both.

In this concept, if one imagines a man sitting on a sofa for infinite past (or beginninglessly), then his sofa is hollow (due to its weight) for a infinite past (or beginninglessly) as well.

So in a atemporal dimension where the Designer is supposed to live where things are beginningless, timeless, changeless,
this simulateous causation is assumed to be possible by Craig.

So the Deisnger didn't bring the universe before it, but created it instantaneously.


If Craig's claims are correct, before identifying this Designer with the causeless God, isn't sensible to ask a cause (according to simultaneous causation) for this Designer too?

Guess what Craig responded!
He claims that a designer for the Designer would be too superfluous in virtue of Ockham's razor.
Why? "because in atemporality it's possible to both conceive of a Designer having a atemporal condition for its existence (a simultanenous cause) and having none. Since the second option is the simpler, it's more probable."

But is his claim for the parcimony of a causless Designer right?




         thank you

ANSWER: "let's suppose the Universe has a Designer "living" outside time and space (so he is timeless, changeless)"

The concept "outside" presupposes a context of space. Ergo, "outside space" is an incoherent statement and isn't something that can be reasonably assumed, even for the sake of argument. It's like assuming a square circle.

"Craig suggests that it's sensible to think about a cause for our Universe"

Our concept of "cause" depends upon a context of both space and time. Ergo, there can be no "cause" that is "outside space and time" so long as we use the usual definition or understanding of cause. At the very least, a new definition needs to be offered - but in that case, no analogies between "cause" as we normally understand it and this "cause-b" of the universe can be made.

"But is his claim for the parcimony of a causless Designer right?"

Of course not. He offers no reason to suppose that a "cause" of the universe is any more necessary than a "cause" of a Designer - which is telling, since he can't point to an objectively existing Designer and is thus able to define it any way he wants. This means he can conveniently find a definition which "just happens" to not need a cause or explanation. Yet, he doesn't offer one... which suggests that he's been unable to come up with one.

Furthermore, Craig is lying about Ockahm's razor. Things that are "simpler" are not "more probable." They are just the best bet to work with until facts force you to move beyond them.



---------- FOLLOW-UP ----------

QUESTION: Thank for your answer.

Since the concept of atemporality tells us nothing whether a cosmic Designer is caused or not, or whether atemporal complex thing requires (like God) a Designer or not;
well, an empirical test seems to be required in this case, doesn't it?


By the Way, if we assume a free agent in atemporalily who can have volitions, intent, mind, intelligence.

Don't these processes necessitate change (thus time)?

Craig replied:
"Now [J.R.] Lucas is clearly correct, I think, in maintaining that a succession of contents of consciousness in God’s mind would itself be sufficient to generate a temporal series (...). But what if God’s mental life in the absence of any created world is not discursive, but changeless? Why could the contents of God’s consciousness not be comprised of tenselessly true beliefs (...) and be such that He never acquires and never loses any of His beliefs? Would not such a changeless consciousness of truth be plausibly regarded as timeless?"

What do you think of this assertion?


         Sincerely

Answer
"well, an empirical test seems to be required in this case, doesn't it?"

It would be required in any case. Unless the "god" in question has some detectable impact on the universe, then it's indistinguishable from a non-existent god.

"Don't these processes necessitate change (thus time)?"

They would appear to - it seems to be incoherent to assert that a being can make choices and decisions without some sort of temporal context.

"What do you think of this assertion? "

Nonsense. For one thing, this deity at some point made the decision to create a universe - and that's a change from previous states. For another, what's a "tenselessly true belief"? If Craig is going to postulate it, he has an obligation to demonstrate what he means. Third, if we imagine that such a thing can be, we must also conclude that there are such things as true beliefs which require tense - and that this deity could not have believed them before the universe. Ergo, this deity didn't believe things that could be true.

Finally, since the universe does not exist in any context of "time" as we understand it, then to the extent that "timeless" means anything, the universe is indeed timeless. If that's the quality Craig seeks, he's already got it with the universe.