Q1. (a). "Ethics has no place in business." Discuss this statement.
Q1. (b) "An ethic of caring conflicts with morality because morality requiresimpartiality." Discuss this criticism of an ethic of caring.
Q2. (a) "From an ethical point of view, big business is always bad business." Discussthe pros and cons of this statement.
Q2. (b) "Equality, justices and a respect for rights are characteristics of the Americaneconomic System. Would you agree or disagree with this statement? Why?
Q3. (a) Do you agree with the claims that (i) future generations have no rights, and(ii) the future generations to which we have obligations actually include only thegeneration that will immediately succeed us? Explain your answer. If you do not agreewith these claims, state your own views and provide arguments to support them.
Q3. (b) Discuss the arguments for and against the 3 main theories of a producer'sduties to the customer. In your judgment, which theory is most adequate? Are thereany marketing areas where one theory is more appropriate than the others?
Q4. (a) In your judgment was the historical shift in emphasis fromintentional/isolated discrimination to non-intentional/ institutionalized discriminationgood or bad? Justify your statement.
Q4. (b) Kohlderg's views on moral development show that the more morally mature apersonal becomes, the more likely it is that the person will obey the moral morms of his or her socieity." Discuss.
Q5. (a) In view of contractual agreement that every employee makes to be loyal tothe Employer. Do you think that the Whistle blowing is ever morally justified? Explainyour answer.
Q5. (b) In your judgment, is it wrong, from an ethical point of view, for the autocompanies to submit plans for an automobile to China? Explain your answer.
Q6. (a) "Utilitarianism is the view that so long as an action provides with moremeasurable economic benefits than costs, the action is morally right." Identify all of the mistakes contained in this definition of utilitarianism.
Q6. (b) "Any pollution law is unjust because it necessarily violates people's right toliberty and right to property." Discuss.
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(a) “Ethics has no place in the business.” Discuss this statement
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONAL ETHICS
BUSINESS Organizational ethics is a tool that shapes an organization as a community. In every organization, there is something that works well, which can serve as a foundation for significant progress toward a desired future. Organizational ethics pays special attention to the best of an organization's past and present to ignite its collective imagination of what might be. It builds from what is working well now toward where the organization and its stakeholders truly desire to go. Organizational ethics sees an organization as a community to be valued and explored. It strives to quicken and intensify existing individual capabilities and organizational capacities, extend their number and scope, organize them so that their conflicts will be harmonized, and mobilize their energies of will and intellect to bring them to self-realization. Organizational integrity is the end sought. It is a dynamic state of being and process; it both shapes and improves. It is about moving the organization toward its guiding image of the future.
What, then, is ethics?
Ethics is two things.
First, ethics refers to well based standards of right and wrong that prescribe what humans ought to do, usually in terms of rights, obligations, benefits to society, fairness, or specific virtues. Ethics, for example, refers to those standards that impose the reasonable obligations to refrain from rape, stealing, murder, assault, slander, and fraud. Ethical standards also include those that enjoin virtues of honesty, compassion, and loyalty. And, ethical standards include standards relating to rights, such as the right to life, the right to freedom from injury, and the right to privacy. Such standards are adequate standards of ethics because they are supported by consistent and well founded reasons.
Secondly, ethics refers to the study and development of one's ethical standards. As mentioned above, feelings, laws, and social norms can deviate from what is ethical. So it is necessary to constantly examine one's standards to ensure that they are reasonable and well-founded. Ethics also means, then, the continuous effort of studying our own moral beliefs and our moral conduct, and striving to ensure that we, and the institutions we help to shape, live up to standards that are reasonable and solidly-based.
A Framework for Thinking Ethically in decision making
This information is designed as an introduction to thinking ethically. We all have an image of our better selves-of how we are when we act ethically or are "at our best." We probably also have an image of what an ethical community, an ethical business, an ethical government, or an ethical society should be. Ethics really has to do with all these levels-acting ethically as individuals, creating ethical organizations and governments, and making our society as a whole ethical in the way it treats everyone.
What is Ethics?
Simply stated, ethics refers to standards of behavior that tell us how human beings ought to act in the many situations in which they find themselves-as friends, parents, children, citizens, businesspeople, teachers, professionals, and so on.
It is helpful to identify what ethics is NOT:
1 Ethics is not the same as feelings. Feelings provide important information for our ethical choices. Some people have highly developed habits that make them feel bad when they do something wrong, but many people feel good even though they are doing something wrong. And often our feelings will tell us it is uncomfortable to do the right thing if it is hard.
2 Ethics is not religion. Many people are not religious, but ethics applies to everyone. Most religions do advocate high ethical standards but sometimes do not address all the types of problems we face.
3 Ethics is not following the law. A good system of law does incorporate many ethical standards, but law can deviate from what is ethical. Law can become ethically corrupt, as some totalitarian regimes have made it. Law can be a function of power alone and designed to serve the interests of narrow groups. Law may have a difficult time designing or enforcing standards in some important areas, and may be slow to address new problems.
4 Ethics is not following culturally accepted norms. Some cultures are quite ethical, but others become corrupt -or blind to certain ethical concerns (as the United States was to slavery before the Civil War). "When in Rome, do as the Romans do" is not a satisfactory ethical standard.
5 Ethics is not science. Social and natural science can provide important data to help us make better ethical choices. But science alone does not tell us what we ought to do. Science may provide an explanation for what humans are like. But ethics provides reasons for how humans ought to act. And just because something is scientifically or technologically possible, it may not be ethical to do it.
Why Identifying Ethical Standards is Hard
There are two fundamental problems in identifying the ethical standards we are to follow:
1. On what do we base our ethical standards?
2. How do those standards get applied to specific situations we face?
If our ethics are not based on feelings, religion, law, accepted social practice, or science, what are they based on? Many philosophers and ethicists have helped us answer this critical question. They have suggested at least five different sources of ethical standards we should use.
Five Sources of Ethical Standards
The Utilitarian Approach
Some ethicists emphasize that the ethical action is the one that provides the most good or does the least harm, or, to put it another way, produces the greatest balance of good over harm. The ethical corporate action, then, is the one that produces the greatest good and does the least harm for all who are affected-customers, employees, shareholders, the community, and the environment. Ethical warfare balances the good achieved in ending terrorism with the harm done to all parties through death, injuries, and destruction. The utilitarian approach deals with consequences; it tries both to increase the good done and to reduce the harm done.
The Rights Approach
Other philosophers and ethicists suggest that the ethical action is the one that best protects and respects the moral rights of those affected. This approach starts from the belief that humans have a dignity based on their human nature per se or on their ability to choose freely what they do with their lives. On the basis of such dignity, they have a right to be treated as ends and not merely as means to other ends. The list of moral rights -including the rights to make one's own choices about what kind of life to lead, to be told the truth, not to be injured, to a degree of privacy, and so on-is widely debated; some now argue that non-humans have rights, too. Also, it is often said that rights imply duties-in particular, the duty to respect others' rights.
The Fairness or Justice Approach
Aristotle and other Greek philosophers have contributed the idea that all equals should be treated equally. Today we use this idea to say that ethical actions treat all human beings equally-or if unequally, then fairly based on some standard that is defensible. We pay people more based on their harder work or the greater amount that they contribute to an organization, and say that is fair. But there is a debate over CEO salaries that are hundreds of times larger than the pay of others; many ask whether the huge disparity is based on a defensible standard or whether it is the result of an imbalance of power and hence is unfair.
The Common Good Approach
The Greek philosophers have also contributed the notion that life in community is a good in itself and our actions should contribute to that life. This approach suggests that the interlocking relationships of society are the basis of ethical reasoning and that respect and compassion for all others-especially the vulnerable-are requirements of such reasoning. This approach also calls attention to the common conditions that are important to the welfare of everyone. This may be a system of laws, effective police and fire departments, health care, a public educational system, or even public recreational areas.
The Virtue Approach
A very ancient approach to ethics is that ethical actions ought to be consistent with certain ideal virtues that provide for the full development of our humanity. These virtues are dispositions and habits that enable us to act according to the highest potential of our character and on behalf of values like truth and beauty. Honesty, courage, compassion, generosity, tolerance, love, fidelity, integrity, fairness, self-control, and prudence are all examples of virtues. Virtue ethics asks of any action, "What kind of person will I become if I do this?" or "Is this action consistent with my acting at my best?"
Putting the Approaches Together
Each of the approaches helps us determine what standards of behavior can be considered ethical. There are still problems to be solved, however.
The first problem is that we may not agree on the content of some of these specific approaches. We may not all agree to the same set of human and civil rights.
We may not agree on what constitutes the common good. We may not even agree on what is a good and what is a harm.
The second problem is that the different approaches may not all answer the question "What is ethical?" in the same way. Nonetheless, each approach gives us important information with which to determine what is ethical in a particular circumstance. And much more often than not, the different approaches do lead to similar answers.
Making good ethical decisions requires a trained sensitivity to ethical issues and a practiced method for exploring the ethical aspects of a decision and weighing the considerations that should impact our choice of a course of action. Having a method for ethical decision making is absolutely essential. When practiced regularly, the method becomes so familiar that we work through it automatically without consulting the specific steps.
The more novel and difficult the ethical choice we face, the more we need to rely on discussion and dialogue with others about the dilemma. Only by careful exploration of the problem, aided by the insights and different perspectives of others, can we make good ethical choices in such situations.
We have found the following framework for ethical decision making a useful method for exploring ethical dilemmas and identifying ethical courses of action.
A Framework for Ethical Decision Making
Recognize an Ethical Issue
1. Is there something wrong personally, interpersonally, or socially? Could the conflict, the situation, or the decision be damaging to people or to the community?
2. Does the issue go beyond legal or institutional
concerns? What does it do to people, who have dignity, rights, and hopes for a better life together?
Get the Facts
3. What are the relevant facts of the case? What facts are unknown?
4. What individuals and groups have an important stake in the outcome? Do some have a greater stake because they have a special need or because we have special obligations to them?
5. What are the options for acting? Have all the relevant persons and groups been consulted? If you showed your list of options to someone you respect, what would that person say?
Evaluate Alternative Actions From Various Ethical Perspectives
6. Which option will produce the most good and do the least harm?
Utilitarian Approach: The ethical action is the one that will produce the greatest balance of benefits over harms.
7. Even if not everyone gets all they want, will everyone's rights and dignity still be respected?
Rights Approach: The ethical action is the one that most dutifully respects the rights of all affected.
8. Which option is fair to all stakeholders?
Fairness or Justice Approach: The ethical action is the one that treats people equally, or if unequally, that treats people proportionately and fairly.
9. Which option would help all participate more fully in the life we share as a family, community, society?
Common Good Approach: The ethical action is the one that contributes most to the achievement of a quality common life together.
10. Would you want to become the sort of person who acts this way (e.g., a person of courage or compassion)?
Virtue Approach: The ethical action is the one that embodies the habits and values of humans at their best.
Make a Decision and Test It
11. Considering all these perspectives, which of the options is the right or best thing to do?
12. If you told someone you respect why you chose this option, what would that person say? If you had to explain your decision on television, would you be comfortable doing so?
Act, Then Reflect on the Decision Later
13. Implement your decision. How did it turn out for all concerned? If you had it to do over again, what would you do differently?
IN BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, THE PEOPLE TAKE AN ORDINARY/ REGULAR DECISION
AND PUT IT THROUGH THE ETHICS FILTER.
Until now we have been discussing a generic decision model similar to those taught in every business school and management training program. But our concern is not just decision making; it is ethical decision making.
The ethical component of the decision making process takes the form of a set of "filters". Their purpose is to separate the sought after elements from their containing environment.
At key steps in the process the decision maker can stop and run his/her considerations through these filters and thereby separate the ethical conations from the remainder of the decision. This ensures that the ethical issues imbedded in the decision can be given consideration.
In their academic form, the language for these filters is too complex and academic for most employees. In simplifying the process we risked losing some of the finer points but dramatically increased the utility of the ethics filters process.
To make it easy to understand and apply these ethics filters we have adapted to mnemonic word PLUS.
1 P = Policies
Is it consistent with my organization's policies, procedures and guidelines?
2 L= Legal
Is it acceptable under the applicable laws and regulations?
3 U = Universal
Does it conform to the universal principles/values my organization has adopted?
4 S= Self
5 Does it satisfy my personal definition of right, good and fair?
PLUS presumes effective communication with all employees so there is a common understanding of:
1 the organization's policies and procedures as they apply to the situation.
2 the applicable laws and regulations.
3 the agreed to set of "universal" values - in this case Empathy, Patience, Integrity, Courage (EPIC)
4 the individual's sense of right, fair and good springing from their personal values set.
PLUS also presumes a formal mechanism, provided by the organization, to allow employees access to a definitive interpretation of the policies, laws and universal values when their own knowledge of these PLUS factors is insufficient for them to make the decision with a high level of confidence.
The PLUS filters work as an integral part of steps 1, 3 and 6 of the decision making process. The decision maker applies the four PLUS filters to determine if the ethical component(s) of the decision are being surfaced/addressed/satisfied.
1 Step 1
2 Define the problem (PLUS surface the ethical issues)
3 Does the existing situation violate any of the PLUS considerations?
4 Step 2
5 Identify available alternative solutions to the problem
6 Step 3
7 Evaluate the identified alternatives (PLUS assess their ethical impact)
8 Will the alternative I am considering resolve the PLUS violations?
9 Will the alternative being considered create any new PLUS considerations?
10 Are the ethical trade-offs acceptable?
11 Step 4
12 Make the decision
13 Step 5
14 Implement the decision
15 Step 6
16 Evaluate the decision (PLUS surface any remaining/new ethical issues)
17 Does the resultant situation resolve the earlier PLUS considerations?
18 Are there any new PLUS considerations to be addressed?
The user should realize that the PLUS filters do not guarantee an ethical decision. They merely ensure that the ethical components of the situation will be surfaced so that they might be considered.
While PLUS suggests a process for assessing the ethical impact of a decision, ultimately whether or not the decision meets the ethical standards of the organization or the individual decision maker is a matter of personal responsibility. After all, ethics is about choices.
ETHICS IS PART / PARCEL OF BUSINESS.
(b) “An ethic of caring conflicts with morality because morality requires impartiality.” Discuss this criticism of an ethic of caring
I think you can be impartial because you care. Taking only one side, hence being partial, means you will only care for that side. However, being impartial will allow you to care for both sides. It is the characteristic of arbiters, mediators, negotiators, etc. By being impartial, one can work out common agreements while maintaining a good sense of respect. In this case, that would be caring.
Even in circumstances where your actions seem to favor one side, you are still remaining impartial and moral. For example, someone is about to commit a violent crime against another. In this case, the moral thing to do is to protect the victim. It does not mean you are taking the victim's side in this. The victim is not automatically given the right to be "right," in whatever conflict the two are having, simply for being the victim. Intervention is merely a means of balancing things out, and making sure the perpetrator does not achieve his/her end through unfair means.
Morality, as typically conceived, requires impartiality. The principle of impartiality (or the equal consideration of interests) specifies that we must treat all humans (creatures?) alike unless there is some general and morally relevant difference between them which justifies a difference in treatment. This principle is central to traditional ethical theory. It is "in some sense beyond dispute" . The principle of impartiality does permit treating different people differently, but any difference in treatment must be justified by general features of the circumstances, so that others in like circumstances should act similarly ; Specifically, impartiality forbids any deviation in one's moral duties because of one's "variable inclinations" or "generic differences between persons" . Put differently, "the class of persons alleged to be an exception to the rule cannot be a unit class" . Thus, a teacher should give equal grades to students who perform equally; unequal grades are justified only if there is some general and relevant reason which justifies that difference. For example, it is legitimate to give a better grade to a student who does superior work; it is illegitimate to give her a better grade because she is pretty, wears pink, or is named "Molly."
On the other hand, personal relationships[CARING] are partial to the core: the subject of attention is always "a unit class" -- "... its particular focus [is] the unique concatenation of wants, desires, identify, history, and so on, or a particular person" . That is why personal relationships (which have partiality at their core) clash with morality, typically conceived (which has impartiality at its core). How, if at all, can this conflict be resolved? Is there some way to show that the conflict is more apparent than real? If not, does morality supersede the demands of personal relationships? Or, do the demands of personal relationships supersede those of morality? If not, can we have an adequate morality sans the principle of impartiality? I shall briefly canvass each of these responses.
The conflict is only apparent
A common -- and once the standard -- move is to claim that morality and personal relationships do not really conflict. Those who embrace this view claim the partiality of personal relationships is explained and justified by impartial moral principles. Those who take this tack point out that the principle of equal consideration of interests is not a substantive moral principle: it does not specify exactly how anyone is to be treated. As a formal principle it requires only that we treat people the same unless there is some general and relevant reason which justifies a difference in treatment.
Those who embrace this view further claim that the general and relevant reason why I should treat Eva (my wife) better than I treat Phyllis (a stranger) is simply that she is my wife. That is, I should treat my wife -- whoever she turns out to be -- better than I treat strangers. Thus, were Phyllis my wife and Eva a stranger, then I should treat Phyllis better than I treat Eva. I should also treat my friends, children, and kin better than I treat strangers. Likewise you should treat your friends, children, and kin better than you treat strangers -- including strangers who happen to be my intimates. The moral rule which justifies partiality toward intimates is itself impartial; it does not make any reference to specific individuals. The rule impersonally allows (requires?) everyone to treat intimates better than they treat strangers. Consequently, the demands of morality and of personal relationships do not conflict, appearances to the contrary.
Is this a satisfactory resolution? "Being an intimate" is a general characteristic; it does not make reference to any specific individual. But not all general characteristics are morally relevant. After all, a racist's principles are general. She claims all white people should be treated better than all non-white people. "It would even apply to me," she might say, "if I were non-white. The fact that I happen to be white does not show the principle is unacceptable." The problem, of course, is that although skin color is undoubtedly a general characteristic, it is not morally relevant . Skin color is a biological characteristic unrelated to personal characteristics (e.g., character) which are morally relevant. It is difficult to even imagine a plausible reason one could give for thinking skin color is morally relevant.
On the other hand, it is easy to see why someone might think intimacy is morally relevant. "Being an intimate" appears to be not only a general characteristic, but also morally relevant. Intimate relationships generally promote honesty, caring, loyalty, self-knowledge, patience, empathy -- significant values by anyone's lights. Indeed, intimate relationships -- which are partial to the core -- may be uniquely able to promote these values. Hence, so the argument goes, partiality toward intimates is morally legitimate; after all, it is justified by impartial moral principles. The apparent conflict evaporates.
On this view, close personal relationships are akin to the relationships between professionals and their clients. My doctor should pay special attention to my medical needs and your doctor should pay special attention to yours. Partiality toward patients is the best way for each of us to receive the best medical care. If each doctor tried to care equally for the needs of all people, then likely none of us would receive adequate care. That is why we not only permit, but expect, physicians to be partial. Likewise, close personal relationships are the best way to promote important values. That is why we not only permit, but expect, intimates to be partial toward each another.
There is considerable insight in this maneuver; but it is inadequate as it stands. Many people would be uncomfortable thinking intimacy is, as this view implies, only derivatively valuable. Moreover, even if this maneuver could resolve the apparent tension between morality and self-interest, a parallel problem emerges when thinking about how we should treat specific intimates. The previous arguments explain that, since intimacy is a general and morally relevant characteristic, it is legitimate to treat intimates better than we treat strangers, . But, that explanation implies that we should treat all intimates the same unless there is some general and relevant reason that justifies our treating them differently. Yet, most of us assume it is legitimate to treat different friends (and different kin) differently. However, there is no feasible way to provide impartial (i.e., general and relevant) reasons which would justify these differences in treatment.
Morality trumps personal interests
Those who embrace the second option likewise think a) moral principles must be impartial, and that b) impartial moral principles can justify some partiality toward intimates. That is, they think we have special duties to family and friends; duties which justify our treating them preferentially. However, unlike proponents of the previous view, they think morality and personal relationships do sometimes conflict -- and that when they do, the demands of morality are more compelling. Since close relationships are derivatively justified, when the demands of personal relationships conflict with the impartial moral principles which justify them, then the demands of morality are always more weighty. "[Universal love is a higher ideal than family loyalty, and ... the obligation within families can be properly understood only as particular instances of obligations to all mankind" .
What this means in concrete terms is that we are not morally justified in treating intimates as preferentially as most of us are wont to do. Impartial moral principles likely justify parents' giving preferential care to their children, much like they justify people in institutional roles (policeofficers, judges, doctors, or lifeguards) treating people under their care preferentially. That is the best system for giving children maximal care and preparing them for life as adults. But, Rachels argues, we cannot justifiably give so much preferential care that we ignore the needs of other less well-off children.
Although doctors should give preferential care to their patients, they are not justified in ignoring a person bleeding by the side of the road. Likewise, we cannot heap trivial benefits on our children or friends, while completely ignoring the needs of strangers. Partial personal relationships of some stripe are extremely valuable -- and thus justified by impartial moral principles. However, close relationships which are morally justified cannot be fundamentally partial; their partiality is justified derivatively. Hence, the scope for legitimate impartiality is limited.
This view will likely strike most readers as wrong. In unqualified form I think it is wrong. Wrong, but not nonsense. It includes significant insights we should not ignore. Impartiality is vital to our understanding of morality,
"something deeply important, that we should be reluctant to give up. It is useful, for example, in explaining why egoism, racism, and sexism are morally odious, and if we abandon this conception we lose our most natural and persuasive means of combatting these doctrines."
Moreover, although it is appealing to be able to lavish attention on those for whom we care, such attention seems at least tacky and probably cosmically unfair given that other people, through no fault of their own, are so poorly off. These other people's lives could be improved if we would spread our attention beyond our close friends and family. For instance, it seems unfair that Sarah can legitimately buy her child an expensive toy or treat her husband to a exorbitant gourmet meal, while people living next door starve. Luck plays an inordinately large role in determining people's lot in life, and morality should attempt to diminish, if not eradicate, these undesirable effects of morally irrelevant luck. That, most assuredly, is a significant insight of the impartialist view.
However, we should not wholeheartedly embrace impartialism. In its unqualified form this view does not merely indicate that we cannot have the depth and range of personal relationships we might want, it arguable entails that we cannot have close personal relationships at all. Here's why. Personal relationships are partial to the core: they are always focused on one single person -- that is why we consider them so valuable. Rachels's view, however, rejects fundamentally partial relationships. His view suggests parents should care for children -- and that we should act kindly toward our friends and spouses -- not because we love them, but because morality demands it.
If that is a consequence of his view, then his view is untenable. It would undermine what is most precious about personal relationships, namely, that intimates care for one another and want to spend time with each other because of who they are, because of their specific personality traits. Knowing we are loved for who we are will, among other things, heighten our self-esteem. It will also increase the opportunities for personal and moral growth. If, however, others befriend us simply because morality requires it, then we lose these benefits of close personal relationships.
Perhaps, though, there is a way to salvage both an impartial morality and genuinely partial personal relationships. Doing so, though, requires showing how impartial moral principles might justify personal relationships, even though the motives for acting within the relationships would be fully partial. I think we can show this, and thereby preserve -- albeit in somewhat attenuated form -- the best of impartialism and personal relationships. But a full description and defense of that view must be delayed until I canvass the third option.
Non-moral values occasionally trump moral requirements
Several prominent philosophers, have argued not only that impartial moral theories are incompatible with the partiality of personal relationships, but also that non-moral concerns sometimes (frequently? always?) trump moral concerns.
Though the argument each offers for these views differs, each concludes there are two radically different perspectives from which a person can determine how she should behave. She could determine how any rational agent should act, or she should determine how she -- with her particular interests and relationships -- should act. These philosophers claim the second perspective is often the most compelling: that close relationships and personal projects often take precedence over the demands of an impartial morality.
Williams offers the following case to illustrate his point. Suppose two people are drowning and a rescuer can save only one of them. It so happens that one is the rescuer's wife. Should the rescuer be impartial between these potential victims and decide whom to save by some impartial means, for example, flipping a coin? No. He should straightforwardly save his wife. That choice, Williams claims, requires no further justification.
Williams point, I take it, is not that the impartialist in unable to provide the right prescription in this case (although in some cases Williams thinks the impartialist's prescriptions will be incorrect). Rather, he claims, the impartialist will give the wrong reasons even if she gives the right answers.
[The consideration that it was his wife is certainly, for instance, an explanation which should silence comment. But something more ambitious than this is usually intended [in someone's saying that he was justified in his action], essentially involving the idea that moral principle can legitimate his preference, yielding the conclusion that in situations of this kind it is at least all right (morally permissible) to save one's wife....But this construction provides the agent with one question too many: it might have been hoped by some (for instance, his wife) that his motivating thought, fully spelled out, would be the thought that it was his wife, not that it was his wife and that in situations of this kind it is permissible to save one's wife.
Williams claims that when close personal relationships are at stake, it is inappropriate to guide (or think we should guide) our actions by impartial moral standards. Our personal projects, including our commitments to friends and family, will occasionally trump moral standards. Without such relationships and projects, Williams asserts, "there will not be enough substance or conviction in a man's life to compel allegiance to life itself." Put differently, if life is to be meaningful, we cannot guide our lives by principles which subvert close relationships or personal projects. And that, he asserts, is exactly what impartial moral principles do.
Certainly Williams's view strikes a responsive chord in most of us: we sometimes think personal interests should take precedence over the needs of strangers. Yet, we can also see the intellectual and moral appeal of Rachels's view. Our personal interests and relationships should not always take precedence over the demands of morality -- e,g., should I could save my wife from drowning rather than diffusing a nuclear bomb which is about to devastate New York? (Even those who might think it obvious that I should save my wife, would presumably recognize this is a question with clear moral dimensions.) Hence, it would be ideal if we could find some way to show that a proper understanding of both morality and personal relationships are not necessarily at odds, but actually mutually supportive.
The interplay of morality and caring personal relationships
Ideal, but difficult. For as I mentioned earlier, they do appear to be at odds. Sometimes when moral concern for strangers conflicts with concern for those we love, we assume concern for our intimates should take precedence. Yet giving unbridled preference to our intimates appears to conflict with the principle of impartiality, and that principle lies at the heart of our ordinary moral understanding. Perhaps, though, these views are not as far apart as we first supposed. Rachels, for example, acknowledges the importance of personal relationships; indeed, he sees them as ineliminable elements of the moral scheme. However, he thinks concern for our intimates should not blind us to the legitimate needs of strangers. Specifically, he decries the callousness we sometimes show when we become preoccupied with our intimates or with our projects.
Williams, on the other hand, claims our interest in close relationships should take precedence over impartial moral demands. Yet in the case he offers to illustrate his misgivings with impartialism, he relies on some form of impartialism. Let me explain, Williams claims a man can save his wife rather than a stranger, even if impartialist principles suggest otherwise. Yet his commentary on the case indicates that he believes something stronger than this, namely, that it would be positively wrong for the man to save his stranger rather than his wife, regardless of his reasons. For instance, suppose my "personal project" were to be impartial. That implies that I should decide whom to save for impartial reasons, perhaps by flipping a coin. I suspect Williams would think it would be wrong for me to save the stranger instead of my wife, even if that were what my personal project required. Put more generally, I think he thinks that any person should save his spouse instead of a stranger. And this belief is presumably reflects some impartial principle. Of course, as Williams notes, it would be most infelicitous were the man to announce this principle (even to himself) while rescuing his wife. But that only shows that the principle does not -- and should not -- consciously motivate his actions. It is no way shows that impartialist principles do not justify the action. Indeed, as I suggested earlier, distinguishing between the motive and justification for an action may help us see that these seemingly opposed positions are, with appropriate modification, perhaps not really so far apart.
Why an accommodation is difficult
But an accommodation will not be easy. For there are elements of morality, as typically understood, which make it more likely to conflict with personal relationships. Specifically, widely held views of morality: a) construe moral rules legalistically, b) give limited scope to moral judgement, c) have a narrow understanding of moral motivation, and are, therefore, d) unconcerned with developing the appropriate moral motivation.
This apparently embraces a legalistic view of morality according to which moral rules uniquely determine what we ought to do -- at least they uniquely determine what Kant deems our "perfect duties" . Legalistic views naturally leave little room for moral judgement: moral agents need judge only how to apply the exceptionless moral rules. Moreover, those who embrace such views are relatively unconcerned about how to make people behave morally. This claims that an act is devoid of moral worth If we are motivated by self-interest or inclination . Put differently, an action has moral worth only if we are motivated exclusively by the desire to do our duty. He has no suggestions about how to inculcate the desire to do our duty. Indeed, he couldn't. It is not hard to see why: any suggestion would inevitably make reference to other motives (self-interest, inclination, love, etc.) and, on his view, it would be moral inappropriate to develop moral motives for non-moral reasons.
Hence no general rule will tell me what I should do. I must judge what I, with my particular temperament and abilities, can best do to respond to her sensitively, given her needs and the character of our relationship. If I have inculcated sensitivity and kindness, I may act appropriately. Yet there is no precise description of what "acting appropriately" would be.
Ethical rules are exceptionless, but agents must apply them to individual circumstances.
The key to understanding the interplay of morality and personal caring relationships is to understand that morality is, at its core, not a continuous series of choices, but a network of habits. By "habits" I do not mean some mere behavioral repetition, like biting one's nails..
Habits are "that kind of human activity which is influenced by prior activity, which contains within itself a certain order of systemization of minor elements of action; which is projective, dynamic in quality, ready for overt manifestation; and which is operative in some subdued subordinate form even when not obviously dominating activity" .
Most human activity is habitual. It couldn't be otherwise. We couldn't walk or write or drive or think if we had to consciously determine to take the next step, write the next word, apply the brakes, or add two numbers. Morality joins thinking, emotions, and work as habits. "Habit means special sensitiveness of accessibility to certain classes of stimuli, standing predilections and aversions, rather than bare recurrence of specific acts. It means will" Consider thinking which is generally understood as the paradigm of a conscious, self-directed activity.
However, I wish to emphasize again: habits are not mere repetitions of behavior. Habits -- at least those of interest here -- are very fine-grained: they prompt different responses to different situations. For instance, the habit of thinking does not require that we think about all problems in exactly the same way. The habit can be sufficiently complex and supple so that we make suitable adjustments in the way we think about a problem, depending on the nature of that problem.
Morality is also a complex habit -- not some mysterious and inexplicable practice of abstract rational contemplation. To treat morality as primarily the conscious adherence to a set of rules will inevitably lead to its failure. If, in each and every case, we had to rely on conscious decisions to be moral, we would be even less moral than we are. Moral education (whether by others or by ourselves) is successful if we become habitually sensitive to the needs and interests of others. That is, if we are moral, we do not have to decide to consider the interests of others, we just will consider their interests. And, since moral habits, like habits of thought, can be very complex, very fine-grained, they empower us to respond sensitively to others in a variety of circumstances.
A truly moral person is not forced to act morally; rather it is something she does by inclination -- it is part of her, that is, it is one of her habits, one of her deeper disposing traits.
Of course to acknowledge that morality is a habit does not mean we need never deliberate, nor does it imply that we need never act against our current habits (although the ability to abandon or modify a current habit is, itself, a different type of habit, a meta-habit if you will.) Morality sometimes demands that we act against our inclinations. Modifying our habits so that we are inclined to do what we ought is a crucial element of morality. Unfortunately, many of us do not have the strength -- or the sufficiently ingrained meta-habits -- to do that. My point here is simply that most behavior -- including moral behavior -- is habitual. Thus, if we do not have deeply ingrained and finely textured moral habits, then we will behave immorally.
Inculcating moral habits
Once we see that morality is a habit, we are better equipped to understand two ways in which morality and personal relationships are supportive: 1) close personal relationships give us the knowledge and the motivation to develop an impartial morality; and 2) intimacy flourishes in an environment which impartially recognizes the needs and interests of all. Understanding these connections will not dissolve the tensions between impartial moral demands and close personal relationships, but it will certainly make them more amenable to resolution.
For instance, close personal relationships can empower us to act morally, they are grist for the moral mill. Different ethical theorists disagree about the extent of the concern we must have for everyone, but all agree that morality requires that we consider (even promote) the interests of others. But how do we learn how to promote others' interests? How do we become motivated to promote those interests?
We cannot develop knowledge necessary to act morally unless we have been in intimate relationships. No one knows how to do mathematics or to play football without acquaintance with the discipline or the game. The same is generally true of any attempt to promote the interests of others. Someone reared by uncaring parents, who never established close personal ties with others, will simply not know how to look after or promote the interests of intimates or strangers. We cannot promote interests we cannot identify, and the way we learn to identify the interests of others is by interacting with them. For instance, most of us learned from our families how to recognize the needs of others. Our parents comforted us when we were hurt; they laughed with us when we were happy. Eventually, we learned to identify their interests and to be concerned about them.
Without that experience, we not only would not have the knowledge we need to promote other's interests, we wouldn't have the inclination either. Though I expect we may have some biologically inherited sympathetic tendencies, these will wither unless others cared for us and we for them. If we are not motivated to promote the needs of our families or friends, how can we be motivated to promote the needs of strangers?
On the other hand, if we develop empathy toward our friends, we will have some inclination to generalize it to others. In close relationships we become so vividly aware of our intimate's needs that we are willing to help them, even when it is difficult to do so. But empathy is typically non-specific. Therefore, by learning to respond to the interests of friends, we also learn to respond to the interests of acquaintances and even strangers.
My point is not simply that a person must have some exposure to loving personal relationships in order to know how to care or to be motivated to care. There is also a strong correlation between the extent of a person's involvement in close relationships and the extent of her ability and motivation to care for strangers. That is, if we have had several close relationships, we will learn how to best respond to different intimates' needs in a variety of circumstances. Our moral horizons will be opened up by such encounters. We must learn ways people suffer -- ways which had previously escaped our attention. We can learn how to ease their suffering. And we will learn the myriad ways to promote the interests of others.
That is not to say that those who develop close relationships always come to care for strangers. My point is simply that a person must have some exposure to personal relationships to acquire the knowledge and motivation to be moral. Put differently, a person cannot be just or moral in a vacuum; she can become just only within an environment which countenances personal relationships.
On the other hand, an environment which recognizes the needs of strangers (i.e., an impartialist's morality) will be one in which intimacy is more likely to flourish. A society concerned about the needs and interests of everyone, including strangers, is one in which empathy, caring, and honesty, etc., are prized. And a society which prizes these behaviors will be one which thereby equips its citizens for close personal relationships.
Q2 (a) “From an ethical point of view, big business is always bad business.” Discuss the pros and cons of this statement
THIS GENERALIZATION OF THE STATEMENT IS NOT RIGHT.
CONS OF THIS STATEMENT.
BIG BUSINESS BRINGS A LOT OF BENEFITS TO THE COMMUNITY.
-Maximize Sales and Profit:
*brings return on investment for the stakeholders.
*brings job opportunity for the community.
*brings better living for the job holders.
*brings more products for better lifestyle.
*career opportunties for many aspirants from the community.
-Collaboration and Productivity Enhancement:
*Big Business helps the employees work together and share lifestyle information.
-Easy to Use:
*Big Business helps the employees to learn/ develop themselves
with easy to use knowledge/skilla.
*Big Business helps to add value to your life by providing
resources support like superannuation.
*The latest technologies are integrated into Big Business to automate the entire business process and infrastructure and make you more productive. This enriches your life and your own knowledge.
CONS OF THIS STATEMENT
-sometimes big business focus too much on finance
and less on human resources.
-sometimes big business try to go for bigger profit
at the cost of the consumer--some kind of exploitation.
-sometimes pay very little attention to the local
-sometimes exploits the workers.
(b) “Equality, justices and a respect for rights are characteristics of the American Economic System.” Would you agree or disagree with this statement? Why?
The American economic system is a capitalist, free-market system, benefiting from the size and uniformity of the market, and resulting from its social and cultural systems. It is very competitive when scale matters, such as large industries, and often very creative in new industries. But with the relatively lowly educated American population, especially in matters of selling to other cultures, America will struggle to compete internationally.
The American economic system has many characteristics that are reasons for optimism. Here are three:
No matter what some critics assert about "an America that's changed forever" or "an America on the verge of Armageddon," the U.S. remains one of the freest, fairest nations in the world -- and this has led to wave after wave of innovation. Critics speak of an America in the current and future decades not being conducive to business start-ups and entrepreneurs. Tell that to the hundreds of thousands of foreign citizens/businessowners who would jump at the chance at U.S. citizenship. This country will continue to attract talented, industrious, enterprising people from abroad and others pursuing their dreams, and many of these individuals will contribute to the innovation that will revitalize the U.S. economy.
Another characteristic you can trace across centuries is the American economy's ability to adapt, reorganize and find new engines of growth. The early period of mechanization was supposed to lead to economic decline because all the local craftsmen who made things by hand were displaced. The rise of Japan's electronics industry in the 1960s and 1970s was supposed to do the same because the U.S. couldn't possibly survive without a domestic TV and radio manufacturing sector. Now it's the rise of China, India and other emerging nations that's supposed to lead to the great American decline. But investors will carefully note that during each period of structural change, the U.S economy adapted and retooled, workers retrained and new sectors were created where Americans performed value-added jobs.
Another overlooked advantaged -- perhaps because the current recession has reduced its prevalence -- concerns job mobility. Among industrialized economies, U.S. workers are highly mobile. Of course, that has a big downside: Unless workers have a contract, companies can eliminate jobs quickly. But the reverse is also true: Employees can secure employment in better/more suitable positions more quickly than they can in many European economies. True, job scarcity and the excruciatingly high U.S. unemployment rate have reduced this natural flow of talent to its highest and best use. But that flow will increase again once the economy starts adding jobs in a sustained way.
The new U.S. health care system could further unleash this talent pool. Many professionals, blue-collar employees and others stay in their current job, not because it's their preference but because they get employer-provided health care. However, because the new system gives everyone the opportunity to buy health insurance at an affordable price, regardless of preexisting conditions, workers will likely feel much freer to pursue the most suitable employment. That could unlock creativity, increase productivity and spark a new wave of business start-ups.
So when you hear the dueling diatribes on 24-hour cable news shows, it's worth remembering that more people still want to come to the U.S. than to leave it. And that most international investors still consider the country an excellent place to invest their money. The reason is the American economic system itself.
“Equality, justices and a respect for rights are provided by the economic system.
BUT OFTEN THEY ARE MIS-REPRESENTED AND MIS-USED BY PEOPLE FROM BOTH SIDES OF THE EQUATION.
Q3 (a) Do you agree with the claims that (i) future generations have no rights, and (ii) the future generations to which we have obligations actually include only the generation that will immediately succeed us? Explain your answer. If you do not agree with these claims, state your own views and provide arguments to support them
future persons not have rights claims
The Re-Population Paradox.(8)
The first objection must be treated briefly, though not because it can be easily and quickly disposed of.
-argues that any effective attempts to "improve" the living conditions of the remote future will so alter "genetic shuffle" of future meetings, matings, and births, that such policies will, in fact, "repopulate" that future with different individuals. Accordingly, since none of the individuals in "Future A" will exist in ("improved") "Future B," no individual will be benefited ("made better off") as a result of this policy. It follows that since any attempts to "improve the future" will, strictly speaking, "benefit" no one, there are no obligations to future generations.(9)
And if there are no duties to the future, it follows that future generations have no rights.
The Time-Span Argument against the rights-claims of posterity objects that duties and rights cannot meaningfully be said to hold over long periods of time and between persons with non-concurrent lives, who are thus denied reciprocal communication and interaction. But with this argument, time itself is the foremost reason for this moral disconnection.
Do long durations of time erode moral responsibilities? For the moment, consider, causal and epistemic connections through time, rather than moral connections. According to informed scientific opinion, some technological innovations and social policies enacted during the last few decades, and others now being contemplated, may result in both short-term advantages for some of our contemporaries, and devastating long-range effects for our successors. Such long-term effects, which are tied to their remote causes by quiet, continuing, and accumulating processes, are called, by ecologists, "time-lag effects." Consider some possible cases: First, the manufacture of thousands of nuclear weapons, and the decision to invest heavily in nuclear fission energy, has resulted in the production of highly toxic, long-lasting, radioactive by-products. Some of these substances (i.e., the actinides) must then be isolated from the biosphere for hundreds of thousands of years.(12)
If, in the intervening time, a geological event should cause the release of these materials into the biosphere, the results could be catastrophic. The "time-lag" between the disposal of these substances and their possible reappearance is unknown and unknowable.
The "No-Claims" Argument. Another common objection to the claim that future generations have rights, is that posterity, being "merely potential," is incapable of claiming these alleged rights. And without claims, it is argued, there can be no rights.
The Non-Actuality Argument. Among the most common objections against the rights of future generations is the contention that since posterity does not exist now, it makes no sense to speak of posterity having rights now.
The ascription of rights is properly to be made to actual persons -- not possible persons. Since future generations can only be viewed as consisting of possible persons, from any vantage point at which the description "future generations" is applicable, it would follow . . . that rights cannot properly be ascribed to future generations."(18)
The "non-actuality argument" might be subdivided into two interpretations: (a) the charge that posterity is "merely imaginary," and (b) the contention that posterity's rights apply only in posterity's own time. We will examine these points in order.
(a) There are no duties owed to imaginary persons.
(b) "Future generations . . . should correctly be said to have a right only to what is available when they come into existence, and hence when their possible future rights become actual and present."
The final objection to the notion of the rights of posterity might be called "the indeterminacy argument."
While it is appropriate to ascribe rights to a class of persons, in general, such ascription is inappropriate when the class in question has no identifiable members. Now the class describable as "future generations" does not have any identifiable members -- no existing person or persons on whose behalf the specific right can be claimed to exist.(22)
(b) Discuss the arguments for and against the 3 main theories of a producer’s duties to the customer. In your judgement, which theory is most adequate? Are there any marketing areas where one theory is more appropriate than the others?
Producers' Duties: Producers are obliged to place only safe products on the market. Within the limits of their respective activities, producers shall:
1.provide consumers with information to enable them to assess the risks inherent in a product throughout the normal or reasonably foreseeable period of its use, where such risks are not immediately obvious without adequate warnings, and to take precautions against those risks. Provision of such warnings does not, however, exempt any person from compliance with the other requirements in this Directive; and
2.adopt measures commensurate with the characteristics of the products that they supply, to enable consumers to be informed of risks that these products might present and to take appropriate action, including, if necessary, withdrawing the product in question from the market.
3.The measures include, for example, whenever appropriate:
*marking of the products or product batches in such a way that they can be identified;
*sample testing of marketed products; and
*investigating complaints made and keeping distributors informed of such monitoring.
-these producer's duties helps the consumer
1. the right to safety;
2. the right to be informed;
3. the right to choose; and
4. the right to be heard
-the implementation of the regulations is always questionable.
-the monitoring is always shaky.
In your judgment which theory is most adequate?
3.The measures include, for example, whenever appropriate:
*marking of the products or product batches in such a way that they can be identified;
*sample testing of marketed products; and
*investigating complaints made and keeping distributors informed of such monitoring.
The producers can be partner in protecting the consumer rightsby adopting the following responsibility :
- Quality of Material;
- Safety and precision of material;
- After sales service;
- Training if needed;
- Warranty and Gauranty to be properly implemented;
- Insurance against non working or accident;
- Businesses and Producers have responsibilities
“ RIGHT to expect laws and regulations to be essential and efficient
-RESPONSIBILITY to provide safe products and services, information choice and a fair hearing
-RESPONSIBILITY to practice and promote ethical marketplace behavior”
Are there any marketing areas where one theory is more appropriate than other?
3.The measures include, for example, whenever appropriate:
*marking of the products or product batches in such a way that they can be identified;
*sample testing of marketed products; and
*investigating complaints made and keeping distributors informed of such monitoring.
THIS THEORY CAN BE USED WITH THE MARKETING APPLICATIONS,
-new product development.